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“Let cowards flinch and traitors sneer. 






This thesis analyzes how the need for ontological security (OS), the ‘security of being’, 
impacts the foreign policy decision-making of states. Traditional security studies focus 
primarily on physical threats to the state. By contrast, an OS framework argues individuals 
feel secure when they are able to maintain communal narrative. This narrative in turn 
becomes the lens through which policymakers, and thus states, analyze events, while also 
becoming a potential source of conflict if challenged. Therefore, while physical security is 
still important, one is better positioned to account for perceptions of physical (and non 
physical) threats, and subsequent policies seemingly contradictory to traditional security 
studies, by employing an OS framework. While this will be explored within the context of the 
DPRK, the applicability of such a framework is far greater, holding key insights for 
International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).  
 
DPRK narrative formed out of the postcolonial nationalism of Japanese occupation, 
culminating into the hyper-nationalist ideology of Juche. North Korea’s seemingly 
‘abnormal’ behavior might in turn be indicative of its unique national narrative and history 
of colonization and humiliation, leading to a different set of behavioral expectations than 
states whose narratives do not encompass such stories or reference points. While not all 
states are expected to act in the same manner as North Korea, the framework would expect 
them to defend and promote their respective national narratives.  Moreover, while narratives 
can double as sources of legitimacy, as seen increasingly in the DPRK, this in no way 
detracts from, and merely compounds, the emphasis on narrative maintenance. Examining the 
historical record, it is argued the OS framework is consistently better at accounting for 
DPRK policies than traditional security studies. Therefore, more broadly in FPA, by taking 
seriously group narrative as a key component of OS, one can better account for perceptions 
















                                                
1 Kim Il Sung, “On Improving and Strengthening the Work of Commodity Circulation (Speech Delivered at a National 
Conference of Activists in Trade, February 14, 1957)” in Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. II (Foreign Languages Publishing 





The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) provides an exceptionally 
interesting case study for scholars and practitioners of International Relations (IR). In 
addition to its topical relevance, with Pyongyang continuing to grip headlines 
through its bellicose rhetoric and nuclear and ballistic missile tests, the country also 
poses a thought-provoking theoretical question of how best to account for state 
behavior. Scholars and policymakers working on North Korea are almost uniform in 
their assessment that the regime is not ‘crazy’ or ‘irrational’, as is often portrayed in 
the media. At the same time, they have struggled to craft a holistic account of DPRK 
behavior. This is largely a result of mischaracterizations of the regime and 
problematized approaches to understanding Pyongyang’s perceptions and interests, 
all of which, it is argued, require a closer examination of DPRK identity. While 
recent shifts in analysis have made great strides towards this end, important gaps 
remain; in particular why and how does identity influence foreign policy in the 
DPRK, or, for that matter, states in general? Part of the problem is that the larger 
frameworks of IR theory within which works on the DPRK operate, suffer from 
similar shortcomings. 
 
1. North Korea & International Security Theory: A Cursory Intro  
 
Analogous to the works on North Korea explored below, there has been a historical 
emphasis in IR on factors that, by themselves, leave significant gaps in our 
understanding of state behavior. While more recent works have sought to incorporate 
ideational factors into the analytical picture, much remains to be done in exposing 
how and why they are important. Indeed, since the acceleration of constructivism, and 
calls by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to further examine perception, identity has 
taken a more central role. Yet despite this newfound enthusiasm, criticisms abound, in 
part due to the under-conceptualized relationship between identity and interests, 
usually addressed through offhanded references to how identity constitutes interests.2 
Recent work on ontological security (OS) is therefore of great interest due to its 
reconceptualization of this relationship to one where states have an interest in 
maintaining identity.3  Building from these works, the thesis seeks to account for 
previously inexplicable state behavior by crafting an OS framework, strengthening 
our ability to conduct more robust analysis (Ch. 2 and 3).  
                                                
2 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Felix Berenskoetter, “Parameters of a National Biography” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2014); 
Felix Berenskoetter, “Identity in International Relations” in R. Denemark (ed.) The International Studies Encyclopedia (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010) 
3 See: McSweeney, Security; Jef Huysmans, “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier” European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1998); Eli Zaretsky, “Trauma and Dereification: September 11 and the 
Problem of Ontological Security” Constellations, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002); Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious 
Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security” Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004); Brent Steele, 
“Ontological Security and the Power of Self-identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War” Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2005); Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma” 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol.12, No. 3 (2006); Jennifer Mitzen, “Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: 
Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006); Alanna Krolikowski, 
“State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Sceptical View” 
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2 (2008); Ayse Zarakol, “Ontological (In)security and State Denial of Historical 
Crimes: Turkey and Japan” International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2010); Jelena Subotic and Ayse Zarakol, “Cultural intimacy 
in International Relations” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 4 (June, 2012); Brent Steele, Ontological 
Security in International Relations: Self Identity and the IR State (Routledge, 2014); Jelena Subotic, “Narrative, Ontological 
Security, and Foreign Policy Change” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2015); Bahar Rumellii (ed.) Conflict Resolution 
and Ontological Security (Routledge, 2016)  
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Outside of its topical relevance, selecting North Korea holds a number of important 
theoretical benefits. For one, the fact the DPRK is a relatively small state makes it a 
hard case study for an OS framework, since traditional security studies assert small 
states are even more at the whim of systemic forces than Great Powers (Ch. 4). 
Consequently, if OS is found to account for DPRK behavior, the framework will be 
even better placed to account for the actions of larger powers. Moreover, as a 
seemingly less ‘modern’ state than Western liberal democracies, studying North 
Korea also makes its possible to reformulate current approaches to OS and their 
emphasis on modernity, expanding the analytical focus to both pre and post modern 
states. It also allows for a broader challenge toward IR’s transatlantic focus in theory 
building. As former colonial states rise in prominence, it is vital that we have a 
framework that can adequately take into account their distinct national narratives and 
historical memories. As Johnston writes: 
 
A review of the East Asia–related literature on three important clusters of 
theorizing—structural theories of conflict, institutional design and efficacy, and 
historical memory—suggests that this neglect of the region (and other regions) may 
come at a cost to transatlantic IR, not only in terms of data problems but also in terms 
of omitted or downplayed explanatory variables and theoretical arguments.4 
 
This dissertation thus asks what is the relationship between the need for OS and 
foreign policy? More specifically, it asks how has the interest in maintaining national 
narrative influenced DPRK foreign policy decision-making?   
 
The remainder of this Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed 
synopsis of the current status of work on the DPRK, outlining five analytical 
components required by any framework seeking to account for DPRK behavior. 
Section 3 then provides a brief overview of the OS framework and how it addresses 
shortcomings in literature on both IR and the DPRK. The Chapter concludes by 
touching on the implications of this framework for epistemology and ontology, 
situating itself within the internal debates of constructivism and the consequences this 
has for the empirical analysis that is conducted.  
 
2. Evolutions & Gaps in Analysis on North Korea  
 
While literature on North Korea has grown exponentially in recent years, Charles 
Armstrong warns “little of this can be considered "scholarship," if by this term we 
mean intellectually rigorous, evidence-based work grounded in original research and 
produced by professional academics or independent scholars.”5 While this claim may 
be somewhat exaggerated given the presence of important works by Oberdorfert, 
Carlin, Halberstam, and Suh6 on the North’s history, Portal, Harris and Cummings, 
Crane and Bonner, Springer, and Suk-Youg Kim’s7 exploration of art and culture, 
                                                
4 Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About International Relations Theory?” The Annual Review 
of Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2012), pg. 53 
5 Charles Armstrong, “Trends in the Study of North Korea” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 70, No. (May, 2011), pg. 357  
6 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: Revised and Updated - a Contemporary History (Basic Books, 2001); Don Oberdorfer and 
Robert Carlin, The Two Korea’s: A Contemporary History (Basic Books, 2013); David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: 
America and the Korean War (Hachette Books, reprint, 2008); Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, North Korean Leader, (Columbia 
University Press, 1995) 
7 Jane Portal, Art Under Control in North Korea (Reaktion Books, 2005); Chris Springer, Pyongyang: The Hidden History of the 
North Korean Capital (Entente Bt., 2003); Chris Springer, Encounters in Early North Korea: The Travel Diary of Ambassador 
Edwin Pauley (Sandra Books, 2009); Chris Springer, North Korea Caught in Time: Images of War and Reconstruction (Garnet, 
 6 
Myer’s evaluation of literature8, and the economic analysis of Woo-Cummings and 
Smith9, there is little in the way of political science.  
 
A majority of works, for example by Demick, Lankov, Hunter, Ryang, Martin, and 
Gause, aim to shed light on North Korea - the daily life of its citizens, its structure 
(Armstrong), regime (Hassig and Oh), caste system (Collins), and human rights and 
the work of NGO’s (Flake and Snyder).10 Others, such as Haggard and Noland, have 
sought to extrapolate empirical insights from refugees - one of the few instances 
where social science methodology is employed.11 Related works include accounts by 
refugees, such as Kang Chol-hwan, Kim Young, and Kang Hyok,12 as well as 
Demick’s accumulation of interviews with refugees. Still, one of the only true 
anthropological studies is that of Lee,13 with Ryang also providing and excellent 
ethnological study.14  
 
While helping to paint a picture of an elusive regime, these works do little in the way 
of providing elaborated insight into the processes behind DPRK foreign policy. 
Meanwhile those works that do elaborate on DPRK foreign policy have, as Jae-Jung 
Suh notes in his overview of the evolution of analytical approaches on the DPRK, 
been problematized by the growing realization it is necessary to focus on social and 
cultural factors. Suh in turn provides a strong indictment of the “consensual 
understanding of the North [which] is framed by perpetual Orientalistic failures to 
recognize the other’s agency or cultural parity, much less to understand the others 
history and contemporary mindset.”15 To this end, the authors in his work argue 
emphasis should be placed on the DPRK ideology of Juche. As North Korea’s 
‘Eternal President’ Kim Il-sung wrote, Juche means:  
 
being the master of revolution and reconstruction in one’s own country. This means 
holding fast to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using one’s 
own brains, believing in one’s own strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit of 
self-reliance, and thus solving one’s own problems for oneself on one’s own 
responsibility under all circumstances.16 
                                                                                                                                      
2010); Mark Harris and Bruce Cummings, Inside North Korea (Chronicle Books, 2007); Charlie Crane and Nicholas Bonner, 
Charlie Crane: Welcome to Pyongyang (Chris Boot, 2009); Suk-Young Kim, Illusive Utopia, Theater, Film and Everyday 
Performance in North Korea (University of Michigan Press, 2010)  
8 Brian Myers, Han Sorya and North Korean Literature: The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK, (Cornell University East 
Asia Program, 1994); for a critique see Alzo David-West, “Marxism, Stalinism, and the Juche speech of 1955: on the theoretical 
de-Stalinization of North Korea” The Review of Korean Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2007) 
9 Hazel Smith, Hungary for Peace, (US Institute for Peace, 2005); Meredith Woo-Cummings, “The Political Ecology of Famine: 
The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lessons” ADB Institute Research Paper Series, No. 31, (Jan. 2002)   
10 See for example Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Real Lives in North Korea (Granta, 2010); Andrei Lankov, North of the 
DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea (McFarland & Co Inc, 2007); Helen-Louise Hunter, Kim Il-Songs North Korea, 
(Praeger, 1999); Sonia Ryang (ed.), North Korea: Toward A Better Understanding (Lexington Books, 2009); Ken Gause, North 
Korea under Kim Chong-il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change (Praeger Security International, 2011); Bradley Martin, 
Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (Saint Martin Griffin, 2006); Charles 
Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Cornell University Press, 2004); Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, The 
Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom (Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2009); Robert Collins, 
Marked For Life: Songbun North Korea’s Social Classification System (The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 
2012); Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (Praeger, 2003) 
11 Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee insights into North Korea (Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2011) 
12 Kang Chol-hwan, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag (Atlantic Books, New ed. 2006); Hyok 
Kang, The is Paradise!: My North Korean Childhood (Abacus, New ed. 2007); Yong Kim, Long Road Home: Testimony of a 
North Korean Camp Survivor (Columbia University Press, 2009) 
13 Mun Woong Lee, Rural North Korea Under Communism (Texas A&M University Press, 1974)  
14 Sonia Ryang, Reading North Korea: An Ethnological Inquiry (Harvard University Asia Center, 2012)  
15 Jae-Jung Suh, “Making Sense of North Korea” in Jae-Jung Suh (ed.) Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War and 
Development (Lexington Books, 2014), pg. 3 




The authors thus advance a historical intuitionalists account of Juche, which is viewed 
as a “a product of North Koreans experiences with colonialism, the Korean War, and 
economic development and that…[it] structures the way in which North Koreans 
behave and frames the way in which they see their world.”17 Before examining this 
approach further, its helps to outline the trajectory of DPRK analysis to date, as this 
underscores the necessity of examining ideational factors while also highlighting 
those facets of the DPRK that any framework must be able to account for.  
 
2.1 Approaches to Explaining the DPRK:  
 
Analysis on the DPRK was originally dominated by the ‘puppet-theory’, viewing 
North Korea within the prism of the Cold War and as subservient to Soviet whims.18 
However, these approaches overlooked Pyongyang’s agency in advocating for the 
Korean War and USSR-DPRK friction throughout the 1950s over ideological and 
economic positions. It was not until the capture of the USS Pueblo, when it became 
apparent the North was acting independently, and the inability of the Soviets to assert 
any influence in the incident’s wake, that a new prism was called for.19 Any analysis 
must thus be able to account for this early agency and friction with patron powers.  
 
Following the capture of the Pueblo, a new approach, exemplified by the works of 
Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee and Dae-Sook Suh, sought to account for DPRK 
behavior as interlinked with its domestic landscape and power struggles.20 This new 
literature laid the groundwork for what would become the totalitarian thesis, seen for 
example in the works of Hunter and demonstrated to be prevalent in U.S. strategic 
thinking by Robert Wampler, 21 which focused on the control mechanism and 
idolization of Kim. Yet while these works could “explain the cohesiveness and 
independence of the North Korean state and society that the previous studies could 
not”22 they still placed North Korea almost exclusively within the context of the Cold 
War; the USSR was understood in the same manner.23  
 
A central weakness to these approaches highlighted by Suh, and exemplified by the 
work of Eberstadt,24 is that their emphasis on leadership led to the conclusion that the 
state would collapse following the death of Kim. Not only did this not come to 
fruition, the North has weathered the collapse of its economy, famine, and the fall of 
the USSR around the same time as the succession of power to Kim Jong-il. While 
some, such as Sue and Lee and Becker, sought to place new emphasis on the 
totalitarian characteristics of Jong-il, Suh notes how others began to emphasize 
“social and cultural attributes to explain what seemed the North Korean peoples 
                                                
17 Suh, “Making Sense” pg. 2 
18 U.S.  Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study of a Soviet Satellite, Report of the Department of State Research 
Mission to Korea, Office of intelligence Research Report No. 5600 (May 20, 1951)  (US Government Printing Office, 1961) 
19 “Kim Il Sungs behaviour was so contradictory to the cold war puppet thesis that American officials-such as Walt Rostow and 
Dean Rusk…“regarded the North Koreans as nuts.”” Suh, “Making Sense”, pg. 5 
20 Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea: The Society (University of California Press, 1973); Dae-Sook 
Suh, The Karen Communist Movement 1918-1948 (Princeton University Press, 1967); Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North 
Korean Leader (Columbia University Press, 1988)   
21 Robert Wampler (ed.), North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record (National Security Archives 
Electronic Briefing Book 87, April, 25, 2003) 
22 Suh, “Making Sense”, pg. 5-6; See Hunter, Kim Il-songs 
23 Young Chul Chung, “The Suryong System as the Center of Juche Intuition” in Jae-Jung Suh (ed.) Origins of North Korea’s 
Juche, pg. 91; Chung also places works by Hassig and Oh, who emphasize elements of Confucianism in DPRK power structures, 
within this totalitarian approach.  
24 See Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (AEI Press, 1999)  
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voluntarily participation in the social order”.25 Consequently, any framework must 
also account for the importance of these wider social and cultural attributes. 
 
None of this is to overlook the importance of the DPRK’s domestic power structure. 
A prominent factor in North Korea is Suryong (supreme leader). As Chung writes, the 
Kim dynasty “render[s] the world comprehensible to the members of society and 
makes their social reality seem superior to that of others…[they] bestow benevolence 
on the people and to whom they return his favor with their loyalty.” Divisions remain, 
however, over how and why this system formed. Contrary to the Cold War context of 
early works, Cummings was one of the first to shift analysis, emphasizing history and 
arguing DPRK structure is based off of a patriarchal family.26 Suh also cites the work 
of Park as a strong example of this new historical/cultural approach, while others such 
as Mansourov, Carlin and Wit, and McEachern have focused on pluralism in the 
DPRK.27 Chung, however, critiques these works for their continued emphasis on the 
power structures themselves with little regard for the factors that shaped them. 
Instead, he argues the system formed as a consequence of struggles that emerged over 
ideological disputes regarding economic development policies. 28  Contemporary 
structures are thus the result of Kim’s faction combatting rival views to Juche, with 
each successive victory further institutionalizing and safeguarding its nationalist 
manifesto and leading progressively towards a centrally regulated government. 
Building from this analysis, any framework must thus be able to account for the 
formation of power structures in the DPRK.  
 
More recent works on domestic power structures have also helped to showcase the 
centrality of Juche throughout the DPRK’s policy-making apparatus.  Particularly 
important is McEachern’s work critiquing those who equate DPRK behavior to Kim’s 
personal rule, as this would suggest policies free from ideology or constraint. 
Contrary to personalist states, which focus purely on extracting personal wealth, the 
North has enormous social control, invests heavily in ideology, and has produced 
long-term, albeit flawed, development and national security goals. More apt then, 
according to McEachern, are works by scholars like Cummings (or defector Hwang 
Jang-yop), who claim “Kim is the head of an organic polity, where the body (Society 
and political institutions) send signals to the head, but where the head goes, the body 
follows.” 29 At the same time, while adequately describing the structure under Il-sung, 
McEachern suggests some revisions are needed to account for the bureaucratic 
competition that arose under Jong-il. 
 
Following the 1998 constitution, Kim Jong Il forged three separate autonomous and 
equal bureaucratic institutions; the National Defense Commission (NDC), Cabinet 
(formerly the Administrative Council) and the Party. McEachern argues this led to 
bureaucratic infighting and contradictory behavior. A few problems arise with this 
                                                
25 Suh, “Making Sense”, pg. 6; See Jasper Becker, Rogue Regieme: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, North Korea After Kim Il Sung (Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998)  
26 Chung, “The Suryong System”, pg. 89, 91; See Bruce Cummings, “Corporatism in North Korea” Journal of Korean Studies, 
Vol. 4 No. 1 (1982/1983); Bruce Cummings, North Korea: Another Country (The New Press, 2004) 
27 Han S. Park, North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy (Prentice Hall College, 1995); Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics 
of Unconventional Wisdom (Lynne Reiner Publications, 2002); Alexandre Mansourov, Disaster Management and Institutional 
Change in the DPRK (KEI, 2007); Robert Carlin and Joel Wit, North Korean Reform: Politics, Economics and 
Security  (Rutledge, 2010); Patrick McEachern, “Interest Groups in North Korean Politics” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 8, 
No. 2 (May-Aug 2008), pg. 235-258 
28 Chung, “The Suryong System”, pg. 93 
29 Patrick McEachern, “North Korea’s Internal Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy” in Jae-Jung Suh (ed.) Origins of North Korea’s 
Juche, pg. 147 
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analysis however. For one, it is inconsistent with recent works by high-level defectors 
Jang Jin-sung and Hwang Jang-yop, as well as analysis by Michael Madden, 
indicating the centrality of the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), which 
was elevated by Jong-il in the 1980s to help solidify his succession, attaining a status 
where “not even the military…can hold power away from the OGD.”30 Contrary to 
McEachern then, even seemingly contradictory foreign policy positions would seem 
to have required OGD clearance. Secondly, while the three institutions may have 
slightly varied preferences, Juche appears to underscore each.  
 
For example McEachern argues that while the NDC and Party generally promote 
similar lines, for example advocating against U.S. inspections of the Kumchang-ri 
nuclear facility in 1998, the Party did so on ideological principals of sovereignty, the 
NDC due to ‘pragmatic’ concerns over allowing access to military sites while also 
asserting its right to nuclear weapons. Yet Party concerns over sovereignty and 
military claims regarding their right to nuclear weapons are positions both seemingly 
indebted to Juche. Even the less ‘hardline’ cabinet seems to maintain comparable 
ideological positions, for example justifying the North’s 1998 missile launch as the 
“recognized rights of a sovereign state for independence”.31 While the cabinet may be 
more favorable towards engagement as a means of attaining aid, it would thus be 
hesitant of deals undermining the Juche discourse. And indeed McEachern does 
acknowledge this to some extent, writing “policy decisions are still framed within and 
justified by ideological terms”32 and that “[t]he range of policy alternatives is more 
restrained and predictable than previous analyses have allowed…a close reader of the 
North Korean press can delineate the type and scope of North Korea’s policy 
responses to external events.”33  Thus not only are all these institutions centrally 
directed, they are also embedded within similar ideological foundations.  
 
There is also reason to question McEachern’s assertion that DPRK behavior after 
nuclear inspections in May 1999 was contradictory, especially since Michishita 
demonstrates how it followed a pattern of brinkmanship seen throughout the 1990s.34 
To this end, Jang outlines how subsequent military clashes after 1999, rather than the 
result of a rogue bureaucratic institution, were actually a premeditated strategy 
developed within the OGD and United Front Department. Michishita also shows how 
this stance was a continuation of aggressiveness that has historically characterized 
DPRK behavior, suggesting the provocation–dialogue dichotomy surrounding nuclear 
talks throughout the 1990s was part of a larger ploy to attain policy objectives that 
had been in place for some time.35 All of this helps to reinforce Chung’s position that 
emphasis should be placed on the society within which DPRK structures operate. Any 
DPRK framework must therefore be able to account for the apparent continued 
emphasis the régime as a whole places on Juche. 
 
Historians working on the DPRK have made great headway in addressing some of the 
analytical needs noted thus far. However they too have been undermined by their 
struggle to unravel mechanisms of process.  
                                                
30 Jang Jin-sung, Dear Leader: Poet, Spy, Escapee—A Look Inside North Korea (Atria, 2014), pg. 316  
31 Patrick McEachern, Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-Totalitarian Politics (Columbia University Press, 2011), pg. 105  
32 McEachern, “Internal Politics”, pg. 158 
33 McEachern, Inside, pg. 139 
34 Narushige Michishita, North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008 (Routledge, 2011), pg. 14 
35 See for example Sue Mi Terry, “North Korea’s Strategic Goals and Policy towards the United States and South Korea” 
International Journal of Korean Studies, Vo. XVII, No. 2 (Fall, 2013) 
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2.2 Historians & Historical Intuitionalists:   
 
Historians were some of the first to begin emphasizing the importance of Juche and 
ideational factors in North Korea. Of particular importance is the work of Lerner, who 
was one of the first scholars to utilize declassified Soviet documents to garner a more 
nuanced understanding of the DPRK.36 Similar to the puppet theory, Lerner argues 
recent analysis has failed to try and unearth the motivation behind DPRK behavior, 
and argues more emphasize should be placed on Juche as well as on domestic 
economic and political considerations on foreign policy.  
 
His conclusions come in contrast to Andrei Lankov, who has also explored archival 
records to examine the North’s formative years.37 Unfortunately Lankov’s analysis 
has failed to take into account more recent records, leading him to still portray Kim as 
a “little Stalin” even though new documents “highlights another, perhaps greater 
motivation…postcolonial revolutionary nationalism.”38 In turn Jin Woong Kang,39 
much like Lerner, writes, “while the regime's anti-American mobilization has come 
from above, people's politics of hatred, patriotism, and emotion have been reproduced 
from below,” reinforcing the notion above that Juche must be taken seriously.  
 
Additional overviews of Juche include works by Oh and Hassig, David-West, and 
Hale,40 while historical overviews include works by Cummings and Koo and Nahm 
on the national context of the Korean War, and Balazs Szalontai who utilized 
Hungarian archives to demonstrate Kim’s nationalism from 1953-1964.41 Kathryn 
Weathersby has also investigated Kim’s views on nationalism and the use of force 
following the Korean War,42 while Kwon and Chung have explored the use of 
“charismatic politics”.43 In an interrelated account Bleiker44 posits that competing 
forms of Korean identity is one of the fundamental issues driving tension between 
North and South Korea. A counterpoint to these works is Myers45 who has focused on 
race in the DPRK and its replication of Imperial Japan. However his work has faced 
great criticism, particularly by David-West who, for example, demonstrated that Kim 
                                                
36 Especially: Mitchell B. Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (University of 
Kanas Press, May, 2002); Lerner, “ A Failure of Perception: Lyndon Johnson, North Korean Ideology, and the Pueblo Incident” 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001); Lerner, “A Dangerous Miscalculation: New Evidence from Communist-Bloc 
Archives about North Korea and the Crisis of 1968” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 2004); Lerner, “Biting 
the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 18 
(2007) 
37 Andrei Lankov, “Kim Takes Control: The “Great Purge” in North Korea, 1956-1960” Korean Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2002); 
Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960 (Rutgers University Press, 2002); Lankov, 
Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (University of Hawaii Press, 2004) 
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39 Jin Woong Kang, “North Korea’s Militant Nationalism and People’s Everyday Lives: Past and Present” Journal of Historical 
Sociology, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March, 2012) 
40 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassing, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Brookings Institution Press, 3rd Printing, 2000); 
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35, (2011); Christopher Hale, “Multifunctional Juche: A Study of the Changing Dynamic between Juche and the State 
Constitution in North Korea” Korean Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002)  
41 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: a Modern History (W.W. Norton, 2005); John H. Koo and Andrew C. Nahm, 
Introduction to Korean Culture (Hollym International Corporation, 2008); Bruce Cummings, Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: 
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A History (Modern Library, (Reprint) 2011); Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and 
the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 (Stanford University Press, 2006) 
42 Kathryn Weathersby, “The Enigma of the North Korean Regime: Back to the Future?” in James M. Lister (ed.), Challenges 
Posed by the DPRK for the Alliance and the Region (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2005) 
43 Heonik Kown and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012)  
44 Roland Bleiker, Divided Korea, Toward a Culture of Reconciliation (University of Minnesota Press, 2008)  
45 Brian Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters (Melville House, 2011)  
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Il Sung’s Juche speech of 1955 was “not only nationalist, but also grounded in the 
Stalinist political tradition inaugurated in the Soviet Union in 1924.”46 Unfortunately, 
despite this growing consensus regarding the importance of nationalism and Juche, 
these primarily historical accounts overlook mechanisms of process. One is thus left 
asking why and how ideology and nationalism inform DPRK policy and if this process 
is representative of a broader thought process.  
 
The same situation arises with those works addressing the importance of history in 
North Korea. In the 1970’s Yong-Ho Ch’oc explored North Korean attempts to 
rewrite Korean historiography, which prior to 1945 had been dominated by 
(somewhat anti-Korean) Japanese scholars. 47  In contrast to their Southern 
counterparts, who merely sought to rectify Japanese historical transgressions, Ch’oc 
demonstrates how the North attempted to rewrite history and stresses the importance 
history has played within nationalism and the regime, a sentiment reinforced through 
the work of Petrov.48 Again, while alluding to the relationship between history and 
policy, little is done to clarify what this relationship entails, focusing instead on 
analyzing the context of the history itself. Thus while many scholars, such as Cha 
note “[i]n order to understand North Korea, one must begin with a look at the way 
they view their own history”,49 they often never elaborate on why. Consequently, 
there is a need to further demonstrate the role of perception in the DPRK, 
investigating the history it propagates of itself and the mechanisms through which 
identity influences foreign policy.  
 
To this end, one of the main contributions of Suh and his colleagues are how they 
begin to translate much of this fantastic historical work into the realm of political 
science. They argue that in order to explain the commonality shared amongst North 
Koreans and their difference vis-à-vis others, “requires more explicit attention to the 
“institutional landscape” in which political actors seek influence.” To this end, critical 
moments have feedback loops that impact current perceptions; because the USSR 
occupied the North, socialist and nationalist institutions were promoted, making room 
for Kim, while in the South nationalist and socialist forces were opposed by the U.S. 
Military Government.50 
 
While an excellent addition to the literature, there are problems with this approach. 
For one, the authors never truly apply this to specific case studies, focusing more on 
the formation of the Juche institution. While an important feat in its own right, like 
with much of the more general literature on institutions one is left wondering why 
there is such a connection between individuals and the group, and how it comes to 
actually impact decision-making and perceptions. There is a missing step between the 
seemingly emotional connection individuals have with these institutions and group 
behavior, which in turn could go a long way in explaining the relationship between 
                                                
46 David-West, “Juche speech of 1955”  
47 Yong-Ho Ch’oc, “History in North Korea: Its Role and Characteristics” Journal of East and West Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 
(1976); “Reinterpreting Traditional History in North Korea”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (May, 1981) 
48 Leonid A. Petrov, “Restoring the Glorious Past: North Korean Juche Historiography and Goguryeo”, The Review of Korean 
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Juche and DPRK foreign policy. Accordingly, there is a need to further establish the 
relationship between Juche/national identity and foreign policy decision-making.   
 
Given the preceding analysis, a new analytical framework is required to help account 
for various gaps in current DPRK literature. While some of these have been addressed 
in the literature piecemeal, there has yet to be a more holistic framework. In particular 
there are five general areas of concern: 
 
1. Account for early DPRK agency and its friction with patron powers as seen, 
for example, during the Korean War, post-war reconstruction, and during the 
run up to and course of the Second Korean War;  
2. Account for the DPRK’s wider social and cultural attributes and the seeming 
resonance between the narrative propagated by the regime with the DPRK 
populace;   
3. Account for the formation of domestic power structures;  
4. Account for the continued emphasis on Juche; 
5. Explain How and Why Juche influences foreign policy decision-making. 
 
It is argued OS helps to address these various concerns vis-à-vis North Korea. More 
generally, it also re-conceptualizes how we account for the relationship between 
national identity, perceptions and foreign policy, and helps to forge a new framework 
that can be applied to a wide range of case studies. The OS framework would in turn 
expect state (DPRK) foreign policy to be aimed at maintaining and asserting national 
identity (Juche), even if this means jeopardizing more traditional security goals.  
 
3. Overview of An Ontological Security Framework  
 
The dissertation argues OS advances IR and FPA in two central ways; it addresses 
shortcomings in the theorized relationship between identity and interests and it helps 
to account for actor perceptions. Only once these two components can be accounted 
for can one even begin to talk about physical state security (Ch. 2). Following in line 
with recent shifts toward the individual level of security51 and the works of R.D. 
Laing and Anthony Giddens,52 it is argued individuals are motivated by their need for 
OS to maintain a perceived consistent self-narrative, which is linked to one’s 
community. In brief, Giddens writes “to be ontologically secure is to possess, on the 
level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, “answers” to fundamental 
existential questions which all human life in some way addresses.” The most 
important is that of self-identity, meaning we must be able to provide a coherent and 
sustained narrative of the Self. 53  Perceived discontinuity leads to ontological 
insecurity, what Laing terms an ‘inner deadness’. The dissertation argues that given 
the interconnectivity between self-identity and community, threats to the foundation 
of one’s community (e.g. nation) constitute an ideational threat to the self. Foreign 
policy is thus best understood within an OS framework, with policymakers, and thus 
states,54 responding to situations in different ways depending on if an ontological 
                                                
51 McSweeney, Security; Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm shift or Hot Air?” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 
(Fall 2001) 
52 R.D. Laing, The Divided Self (Penguin Publishing, 1966); Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in 
the Late Modern Age (Polity Press, 1991) 
53 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 47 
54 Steele, Ontological Security pg. 18; Peter Hays Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ 
Inevitable?” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2005), pg. 238 
 13 
threat is perceived. This in turn generates distinct expectations from traditional 
security studies; rather than starting with states as the subject of security, it focuses on 
how individuals have an interest in maintaining national narrative.  
 
Much of Giddens work on OS is entwined with modernity. This is because, according 
to Giddens, the Self is no longer an inherited static entity, but a biographical narrative 
interlinked with one’s chosen ‘lifestyles’ that provide daily rituals and “material form 
to a particular narrative of self-identity.”55 This corresponds to Goffman’s Umwelt56, 
“a core of (accomplished) normalcy with which individuals and groups surround 
themselves.” By safeguarding the Umwelt individuals can ensure the continuation of 
stability and trust necessitated for OS. Here the dissertation raises two arguments. 
First, that society has always constituted the means by which the Self is created 
meaning OS threats need not be limited to modernity, but to threats toward this more 
timeless relationship. The second is that even in modernity society has a structuring 
influence, indicating the continuation of this fundamental relationship.  
 
Building from the work of Pagel, it is argued that communal narrative was part of 
mankind’s mechanisms for establishing the parameters of altruistic groups or “mutual 
aid societies”.57 In order to determine altruistic compatriots, Pagel asserts groups 
formed social cues that can be equated to Giddens lifestyles. One’s community thus 
structures and constitutes available lifestyles, meaning the Umwelt and OS has always 
been partially dependent on maintaining community – a relationship that continues 
today with the nation and nation state. Policymakers’ needs for OS thus leads to 
behavior aimed at safeguarding these rituals by maintaining the nation, a socially 
constructed entity that emerges out of discourse and shared myths.58 This means 
policymakers (and thus states), motivated by OS, have an interest in asserting and 
maintaining national narrative. Using this discursive approach we can see the DPRK 
as emerging out of Japanese colonization (a process undertaken in Ch. 4).  
 
Viewing national narrative as a social representation59 helps to show how it might 
influence foreign policy (Ch. 3). Representations are the “collective elaboration of a 
social object by a community for the purpose of behaving and communicating, 
thereby turning into reality.” Society then is a sort of ‘consensual universe’ comprised 
of mutually shared representations where “everyone feels at home.”60 By taking this 
sense of home to be equivalent to the Umwelt, we begin to form a picture of how 
groups approach social interactions. Once forged, communal narratives, like all other 
representations, become the existing world into which new information enters and is 
then re-presented into something that becomes either socially acceptable or 
unacceptable. The later can lead to a ‘personal crisis’; “unexpected events that intrude 
into the Umwelt…punctu[ing] the protective mantle of ontological security and 
caus[ing] alarm”.61 It is here a state would attempt to counter the OS threat.  
                                                
55 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 81 
56 See Erving Goffman’s Relations in Public 
57 Mark Pagel, Wired for Culture: The Natural History of Human Cooperation (Penguin, 2013)  
58 Duncan Bell, “Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54, No. 1 (March 
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The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Dec. 1998) 
59 Serge Moscovici, “The Phenomenon of Social Representations” in Robert M. Farr and Serge Moscovici (eds.) Social 
Representations (Cambridge University Press, 1984); Wolfgang Wagner et al., “Theory and Method of Social Representation” 
Asian Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1999)  
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It is not the existence of difference, or an Other, therefore that generates conflict as 
Summer, Mercer, Rousseau, Huntington or Neumann contend. Nor is conflict 
associated with the negative othering of Kant, Hegel and Foucault (applied in IR by 
Campbell, Klein, Connolly, Neumann) required in forming the Self. Instead as 
Gordon Allport found, in-group attachment is “psychologically primary” and while 
out-group hostility can aid in in-group cohesion, it is not required (see also Brewer, 
Lebow, Gries).62 Rather it is the contents of a group’s reflexive narrative that 
determines when and if conflict might arise depending on if OS is threatened and how 
that threat is responded to. This could in turn help account for DPRK behavior that 
contradicts previous theories. Finally, while work on OS has tended to focus on 
instances where identity is challenged, where it is reactive, for example Belgians 
decision to enter WWI,63 there is a need to also address its proactive elements; the 
role it plays in forming future action or what Giddens terms ‘life-planning’. 
Narratives let us know where we want to go, what Hopf views as the discursive 
practices of identity (see also Ringmar, Moscovici, Liu and Hilton).64 Narrative can 
thus be challenged, forcing one to react, bur can also be proactive.  
 
Having laid out the basic tenants of the OS argument – which will be examined in 
further detail over Chapters 2 and 3 – it now becomes important to elaborate on where 
the framework falls within the constructivist approach to IR, which in turn has 
epistemological and ontological implications that deserve clarification. This also 
helps to situate and inform the empirical portion of the dissertation. 
 
4. Specifying Constructivism: Ontology & Epistemology  
 
The foundation of constructivism is the belief that it is intersubjective rules that are of 
importance rather than some set of intrinsic laws. Importantly, as Guzzini notes, 
constructivism is not a form of “pure voluntarism…rules and norms guide the 
behavior of actors, and they are intersubjective, not individual.” 65 A second element is 
the call to take seriously the  “interpretivist and the sociological turn in the social 
sciences” which in turn has implications for the theoretical level of observation 
(ontology and epistemology), level of action (individual or intersubjective) and the 
relationship between the two. While constructivists tend to agree on the level of 
action, the extent to which they view social entities within their ontology and their 
epistemological claims, differ. From this, one can roughly divide constructivism into 
conventional, interpretive, and radical schools of thought.66 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue, “constructivism’s distinctiveness lies in its theoretical 
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arguments, not in its empirical research strategies.”67 Therefore, while the dissertation 
does not argue one school is universally superior to others, the presence of debate 
makes it important to situate one’s work. The following therefore seeks to merely 
articulate the methodological implications of the above OS framework. It is argued 
this framework can, contrary to conventional constructivism, only discern 
constitutive, not causal, relationships (McSweeney, Hansen), moving more towards 
interpretive constructivism. Still, so long as one adheres to scientific rigor they can 
produce useful generalizations to help calculate the probability of an event within the 
confines of its time/space dependency. This follows the turn towards pragmatism, 
fusing constructivist ontology with the epistemological implications of the pragmatist 
philosophy of science, meaning researchers can make mid-level generalizations 
without succumbing to many of the epistemological debates that have plagued IR.  
 
4.1 Level of Analysis & Observation:  
 
To begin with the point of most consensus, constructivists focus on the intersubjective 
level of action, as drawn from constructivist social theory. In short, “there are no 
natural laws of society”, instead the social world “is an intersubjective domain: it is 
meaningful to people who made it and live in it.” 68  Building from Weber, 
constructivists argue that in order to understand human action one must thus first 
understand the social setting they operate within and what knowledge they have.69 
According to Tannenwald this means we should look at “ideologies or shared belief 
systems, normative beliefs, cause-effect beliefs, and policy prescriptions.’”70  
 
It helps here to turn to the work of Adler, who makes note of the scientific difference 
between being, a static concept, and becoming, a concept of everything as in flux.71 
Realism and neorealism largely adhere to a picture of being; “[i]t looks for the 
recurrent, for stability, and tries to predict the future from past events”, treating the 
international system as independent from the units that constitute it. Yet this is a 
problematic view as, “the actors in politics have memories, they learn from 
experience. They have goals, aspirations, and calculative strategies. Memory, 
learning, goal seeking and problem solving intervene between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’.”72 
There are no universal social laws, only intersubjective ones, and this must be the 
focus of the social sciences. To this end, the dissertation focuses on intersubjective 
national narratives and the relationship these have with OS and decision-making.    
 
Moving from the level of action, one must address the level of observation. This 
pertains to constructivism’s challenge of positivism (the meta-theoretical position that 
social science can generate causal statements) and empiricism (we have direct access 
to empirical data). Starting with empiricism, there are two points that need to be 
highlighted for they in turn have implications for one’s position on positivism. The 
first is a universally shared tenant of constructivism, that there is a difference between 
the natural and social world. Unlike a brute fact, money (a social or ‘institutional’ 
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fact) can only exist in the presence of intersubjective beliefs and practices that 
constitute it; “[h]uman relations, including international relations, consist of thoughts 
and ideas and not essentially of material conditions or forces.”73  
 
It is with the second point on empiricism that agreement in constructivism ends, and 
the fissure between ‘conventional’ and ‘interpretivist’ constructivists arises. 74 
Interpretivists, such as Guzzini, argue that while constructivism does not eliminate the 
presence of the natural world, we can only access this world through discursive 
practices, meaning there are no “language-independent observations.” Hansen stresses 
that discursive approaches do not discount material facts; they merely set out to 
“study how these are produced and prioritized”, 75  while Jackson emphasizes that 
what is important are the “the ideas and understandings according to which those 
[physical] assets are conceived, organized and used.”76  
 
Conventional constructivists such as Wendt contend, however, that some social facts 
are objective, allowing for causal explanations and positivism. Positivism builds from 
a reflective ontology and epistemology wherein reality is separate from cognation and 
social construction, and as such can be accurately described and observed,77 resulting 
in universal truth statements. Conventional constructivists thus tend to bracket the 
actual construction of norms and identity, focusing instead on their causal 
implications. As Checkel quips, they merely want to ‘get on with research’ rather than 
remain hung up on epistemological debates.78 Given that part of the dissertation’s 
framework focuses on opening up the “state I”, epistemologically it follows the 
dissertation must shift away from conventional constructivism’s use of positivism.79  
 
Kratowhil and Ruggie’s work on institutions further bolsters this shift on 
epistemological grounds. Given the social creation of institutions they argue we lack 
an “external Archimedian point” from which to examine and assess them as they 
‘really are’, meaning “the concept of regimes, like the concept of "power," or "state," 
or "revolution," will remain a "contestable concept”. An institution’s ontology resides 
on the intersubjective beliefs and norms that constitute it, making it impossible to 
conduct positivist research where there is a separation between subject and object, 
where “objective” forces have causal relationships, and where intersubjective 
meaning is deduced from behavior. This leads to a situation where “epistemology 
fundamentally contradicts ontology!”80 Similarly Haas and Haas argue positivism is 
undermined by the fact that in social science “entities studied ‘talk back’ to the 
scholar”.81 This means a correspondence theory of truth, where the reality studied is 
real and independent from the observer, cannot be adapted to social entities subject to 
change. Similarly, while norms may “guide…inspire…rationalize or justify” 
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behavior, it is difficult to conceive of norms as “causing” a phenomenon “in the sense 
that a bullet through the heart causes death.”82 
 
In their attempt to help forge a theoretical consensus, Haas and Haas thus suggest that 
positivism is no longer appropriate, with Ruggie and Kratochwil advocating for an 
interpretivist epistemology.83 Interpretivist constructivists thus argue for a social 
epistemology and a focus on ‘understanding’, following the linguistic turn based off 
the works of Heidegger and Wittgenstein.84 By asking “how possible” questions, 
scholars such as Kratochwil, Onuf, Liften, Crawford, and Weldes seek to “explore the 
role of language in mediating and constructing social reality.”85 Rather than looking 
for causal explanations, such as how a norm effects state interests, they examine the 
linguistic constructs and discourses that allowed for such an impact to begin with.86  
 
4.2 ‘Understanding’ in IR:  
 
Interpretivism and understanding in IR has been underscored by Max Weber’s 
Verstehen, the notion that accounts of social reality are interpretations with meanings 
of their own, separate from the actions they wish to describe.  Debates have raged 
between rationalists, who in their attempt to study meaning view interpretation as an 
epistemological problem overcome through “empathetic understanding and pattern 
recognition”, and relativists (primarily postmodernists) who argue interpretation is 
insurmountable and will remain just that, the investigator’s interpretations, which are 
themselves grounded in language and not objective reality.87  
 
There are largely three approaches to interpretation that follow an objective logic, 
where the interpreter ‘stands over’ their subject so as to “understand the subjective 
meaning of action (grasping the actor’s beliefs, desires and so on) yet do so in an 
objective manner”. 88  This includes empathic identification (built from Dilthey), 
phenomenological sociology (built from Cicourel and Garfinkel and influenced by 
Schutz) and language games (built form Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations). 
These approaches, however, have faced severe criticism, particularly from Gadamer 
and Taylor, who (building from Heidegger) refute the argument of hermeneutics as a 
“methodological foundation for the human sciences.” Instead they assert, 
“understanding is not, in the first instance, a procedure – or rule governed 
undertaking; rather, it is a very condition of being human. Understanding is 
interpretation…we are always taking something as something.” 89  Adler argues 
constructivists can overcome this by focusing on the ontological implications of 
Verstehen; the subject of social science research has already been interpreted within 
the social world. “Verstehen, in fact, is social reality.”90  
 
Vincent Pouliot has recently expanded on this while seeking to account for Maja 
Zehfuss’ critique of various strands of constructivism found under Wendt, Kratochwil 
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and Onuf, noting how, respectively, “methodological shortcuts that lead the analyst to 
reify identities, norms or materiality run counter to constructivism’s core assumption 
that reality is socially constructed.” At the same time, while hailing the work of 
Francois Debrix – who sought to underline the linguistic overlap of constructivism 
and poststructuralism – he goes on to argue that emphasis should not be placed on 
language alone as this is but “one of several ‘stations’ on the bridge between the 
various mechanisms of the social construction of reality.”91 Championing the work of 
Taylor and Searle, Pouliot instead argues that social facts should be seen as the 
“essence of constructivism”, moving towards a “nonfoundationalist” approach.92 
 
He argues there is a difference between “the act of essentialization [and] the 
observation of essentialization.”93 As analysts we must avoid undertaking acts of 
essentialization. However, it is possible to make observations regarding the 
essentializations or reifications 94  that actors make daily. Continued reification 
eventually results in a social fact – individuals will treat it as if it were objective or 
‘real’. Thus social facts are “ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective; 
their existence depends on collective meanings, though not necessarily on the 
individual agent’s particular beliefs.” 95 It is here, Pouliot argues, constructivism can 
find common ground. Scholars should thus make observations in regards to reality as 
perceived by the agents at hand, not as it really is. While these observations are 
interpretations, for we cannot study intersubjective meanings objectively, Pouliot, 
employing Taylor, stresses:  
  
some interpretations make more sense than others, and constructivists should strive to 
observe/interpret agents’ acts of essentialization as empathetically as possible. The 
impossibility of objective observation is no reason for not trying to pragmatically 
interpret social reality with as much detachment as possible.96 
 
To this end Haas and Haas write, “while post-structuralists focus on the influence of 
political practice on social science…we tend to reject the notion that this influence is 
a general causal phenomenon.”97 Consequently, one need not journey all the way into 
the poststructuralist (radical constructivist) camp,98 while Pouliot’s de facto turn 
towards pragmatism (explored below) is of great use in buttressing against relativism.  
 
Following this overview, one can formulate what essentially becomes a two-stage 
approach to research. For example, Pouliot notes how scholars working on security 
communities do not accept their existence a priori, instead they are determined to 
exist (or not) as a product of research. Only once a security community has been 
observed (phase 1), “can one study the social and political implications of such a 
social fact” (phase 2). Hopf provides a potentially fruitful example for such a two-
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phase undertaking. 99  Employing linguistic techniques, he begins his work by 
recreating Russian identity through contextual and intertextual analysis. He then 
continued from this initial phase to explore the relationship this identity had with 
Russian foreign policy. In essence there is, to some extent, a fusion between the 
interpretivist focus on identity formation with a more conventional ethos of 
demonstrating the relationship between identity and behavior.  
 
In a similar vein, the dissertation will first reconstruct DPRK national identity through 
discourse analysis and then apply this identity within the OS framework, generating 
behavioral expectations that are then placed against DPRK foreign policy (Ch.4). This 
allows one to circumvent problems of tautology, which Kowert notes has plagued 
works on identity – with scholars often inferring an identity type from sustained 
behavior and then using that identity to account for the behavior.100 All of this in turn 
allows for a “theoretically vibrant and rigorous research agenda that speaks to 
pertinent political issues”.101 But if not causal statements, what are we left with?  
 
While some have sought to expand the use of the word “causal” to align more with its 
general usage, i.e. as having some sort of impact, this is of little help in scientific 
studies. To make the word too elastic is to lose its potency. Instead the dissertation 
seeks to adhere to calls for the adoption of a pragmatist philosophy of science, a 
sentiment best articulated by Hass and Haas, who write “[it is] capable of generating 
useful mid level truths without falling prey to the unresolvable philosophical, 
ontological and epistemological debates posed in unnecessarily dichotomous terms 
that currently bedevil the study of international relations.” 102  Pragmatic 
constructivism builds from Pierce, Dewy, and James’ pragmatist philosophy of 
science, moving away from objectivism or relativism and towards a focus on rational 
persuasion.  
 
4.3 Pragmatism & Midlevel Truth Claims:  
 
Pragmatism can be viewed as emerging in light of centuries of work, from Vico and 
Kant to Wittgenstein, repeatedly demonstrating the shortcomings of ontological 
realism and a correspondence theory of truth.103 Pragmatism calls for a focus on 
practical problems rather than trying to forge an unattainable catchall epistemology, 
allowing one to move away from positivism while still applying “rigor and 
relevance.”104  
 
As James wrote, “‘no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but…any one of them 
may from some point of view be useful’.” In place of forging universal truth 
statements, the success of a theory is instead dependent on its ability to address the 
practical problem at hand. “‘Theories thus become instruments, not answers to 
enigmas, in which we can rest’…Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them 
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up and sets each one at work.”105 This concept led Franke and Weber to note an 
important rift between those who view pragmatism as a theory and those who view it 
as a philosophy, where all theories are viewed as potentially useful tools.106 Here, 
they turn to James who wrote pragmatism, “lies in the midst of our theories, like a 
corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it…But they all are on the 
corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or 
out of their respective rooms.”107 One realm of pragmatists scholarship is thus located 
within one of the rooms, avidly seeking to forge a superior pragmatist theory,108 while 
the second realm is the philosophical hallway itself, utilizing the various rooms 
(theories) as useful tools.109 These theoretical approaches must eventually enter the 
hallway, as too must the OS framework. 
 
In order to successfully pass through this corridor of social practice a theory must be 
determined to be useful, thereby achieving the status of truth. While James views 
truth as verified through experience, a sentiment reminiscent of positivism, he goes on 
to note that direct and indirect verification is possible, stating the formers reliance on 
a correspondence theory of truth is too narrow. This is largely due to the fact that the 
background against which we test theories evolves and thus might come to contradict 
previous theories; “experience ‘has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our 
present formulas.’”110 We can, however, still develop useful generalizations and “mid 
level truth claims” useful for navigating life. As Kratowchil writes, “[l]ogical 
empiricists have a derogatory name for such changing truths: relativism, but such 
truths are real, while the absolute fully axiomized truth is imaginary.’”111  
 
James used specific criteria, including “usefulness for prediction, conservation of past 
doctrine [and] simplicity”, as attached to statements, to determine their expediency.112 
Similarly, Dewey holds that truth verification resides on the ability of the hypothetical 
concept to generate dependent results, a notion built upon the sentiment, similar to 
Wittgenstein, that all science shares at least a fundamental activity that allows for a 
common ground. Objectivity is then to be found in experience; by placing doubt out 
of the purview of our mind, thereby eliminating the practical problem, it becomes 
objective so long as that doubt is kept at bay.  In this sense “verification rests 
on…whether it yields dependable results to the practical problem concerned”.113  
 
Subsequently, there is a reliance on persuasion, where good reasons can help expedite 
persuasiveness, especially when debating with fellow practitioners. This approach has 
been dubbed a consensus theory of knowledge. Here truth “is a matter for deliberation 
within a community of inquirers…putting forth reasons and arguments which are 
evaluated on the basis of their fit with the evidence, the objective conditions of the 
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situation, and their ability to improve upon it in accordance with the purposes of the 
affected community”. Regarding the social sciences, this could include “policy 
relevance, simplicity (if that e.g. means an easy application of the theory), complexity 
(if that e.g. means comprehensiveness), context-sensitivity, context-independence, 
high degree of corroboration through past and present cases, potential to inspire 
further theories or new vocabularies and so on.”114   
 
Cheryl Misak surmises it is a “‘deflated’ theory of truth, which can only put forward 
the best notion of truth available given where inquiry has come to rest in light of the 
evidence and argument that is present at the time; it is a notion of truth that is 
objective in so far as it is independent of the impulses of individuals and is instead 
what a group of inquirers have collectively arrived at.”115 As Haas writes in his 
intimately related work on evolutionary epistemology, while we cannot ‘know’ reality 
for this is constantly changing, meaning we are "condemned to settle for successive 
approximations to reality”, understanding, while temporally bound, can still be 
consensual.116 Progress is thus possible on a modest scale either through theory 
development or by making complex problems more understandable.117  
 
The dissertation thus seeks to generate midlevel truth claims addressing shortcomings 
in current approaches to North Korea and IR, thereby entering the corridor of social 
practice. The framework will be seen as true if it helps to address these shortcomings 
by generating more accurate predictions and better accounts of the foreign policy of 




The preceding has established important gaps in literature on North Korea, in 
particular highlighting five issue areas that any framework on the DPRK must be able 
to account for. It also suggested that many of these gaps relate to larger theoretical 
shortcomings in IR and FPA. Chapter 2 thus seeks to examine in greater detail gaps in 
security studies and the need for an OS framework. This framework is then further 
refined in Chapter 3 within the context of FPA. 
 
In line with this theoretical framework, Chapter 4 outlines the dissertation’s 
methodology and framework for examining North Korea. It then goes on to conduct 
the first portion of empirical research, employing discourse analysis118 on North 
Korean texts so as to reveal DPRK national identity. To this end, it examines the 
annual DPRK New Years Address (a ‘State of the Union’) housed by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the four DPRK constitutions and ‘Ten 
Principles For Establishing the Monolithic Ideological System’, as well as the official 
biographies on, and selected works and speeches of, Kim Il Sung, all published by the 
Pyongyang Foreign Broadcasting House. These were all selected given their 
representation of general discourse in the DPRK. Conducting discourse analysis 
allows one to justify temporally bracketing narrative for the periods under review, as 
well as pinpointing potential internal conflicts that might arise due to domestic OS 
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concerns. Secondly, it allows one to develop behavioral expectations specific to North 
Korea, locating key components of narrative that, if challenged, will generate a 
response, and that will also help to guide proactive policies.  
 
Having established DPRK narrative, the empirical analysis then goes on in Chapter 5 
and 6 to verify if the behavioral expectations derived from the OS framework 
correspond with the DPK’s historical record better than alternative expectations 
routed in traditional security studies. All of this will then be cross-referenced against 
archival records of previously classified Soviet and DPRK documents. It then 
becomes possible to see if vocalized policy lines and narrative translate into ‘behind 
door’ stances and tangible policies, in a similar methodological approach as Hopf. 
Finally, Chapter 7 surmises the empirical findings and extrapolates the importance of 


































Chapter 2  
The Need for An Ontological Security Framework 
 
 
I concentrate attention at the international level because the effects of structure are 
usually overlooked or misunderstood and because I am writing a theory of 
international politics, not of foreign policy. – Kenneth Waltz119  
 
Prior to Waltz, and the introduction of neorealism, work on international security was 
intimately tied with foreign policy and with the agency of individuals.120 The thesis 
argues the field should re-emphasize the importance of foreign policy, incorporating 
unit level factors to provide a more holistic account of state behavior. Specifically, it 
argues for the need to interject an OS framework, wherein actors have an interest in 
maintaining a perceived consistent self-identity. This argument progresses over two 
chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the need to interject OS into IR. Chapter 3 then outlines 
the mechanisms through which such a framework operates within the context of FPA, 
while also expanding upon the content and stability of narratives.  
 
Chapter 2 progresses over three sections, demonstrating how the individual need for 
OS impacts inter-state relations. Section one examines how traditional security 
studies, by failing to focus on individual needs that lend meaning to the term security 
have led to inadequate analysis. Seeking to refocus the analytical lens, section two 
introduces work on OS, examining how one’s community has historically acted as the 
anchor for a stable sense of self-identity. Given this relationship, section three 
explores how communities are forged out of narrative, meaning individuals have an 
interest in maintaining communal narrative. The chapter concludes by placing this 
framework against similar ideational accounts of IR. Despite the newfound 
enthusiasm identity has enjoyed, criticisms abound, in part due to the under 
conceptualized relationship between identity and interests – usually addressed through 
offhanded references to how identity constitutes interests.121 OS re-conceptualizes this 
relationship into one where there is an interest in maintaining identity, meaning it is 
the perception of an OS threat, and not the existence of difference, that provides the 
space necessary for conflict to break out. 
 
1. What is Security? 
 
Within the modern conception of the term, the noun ‘security’ portrays a material 
image – e.g. as a gun. Security is a commodity we obtain and as such is a negative 
freedom, the freedom from some material threat. By contrast McSweeney suggests we 
must also address the positive form of freedom, ‘secure’, related more to “enabling, 
making something possible”. Such an approach focuses on the individual human 
sense of being secure, “embodied in the primal relationship.”122 The two forms are 
intertwined since the “subject who wants to be secure also needs to be defended.” 
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Reviewing security we find that “etymologically…the freedom of security is related 
to the possession of knowledge, confidence in the predictability of things, in knowing 
the objective order.”123 The individual human is thus ‘secure’ when they have 
knowledge and confidence, allowing them to have a freedom from concern, a 
carelessness. As shown below, this reading is inline with that of the ontologically 
secure individual. Current security studies tend to overlook this reading however, 
focusing instead on the physical survival of the state. 
 
Leaving aside the fact that, as Mitzen argues, the concept of state physical security is 
more convoluted than is often acknowledged,124 the real issue is how the positive 
freedom of security was eliminated from analysis in favor of focusing on freedom 
from material threat towards the state. Yet individuals must remain the subjects of 
security. “It is not just a question of the object which needs to be secured…but of 
where we must sit the ultimate ground and rationale for securing anything (the 
subject)”, leading McSweeney to advocate a shift towards human security. People are 
the main subject of security, with the human need to protect values lending meaning 
to the term ‘security’, yet little is done to conceive of this relationship at the state 
level. We cannot determine what security is, therefore, without looking at what makes 
the individual secure. 125 “In effect the means have become the end; the object has 
become the subject of security when the state is made the ultimate referent.”126 
 
Contra traditional security studies, an OS framework therefore adds a focus on 
ideational threats to the individual’s sense of being secure. This follows the broader 
argument put forward by some constructivist; that conceptions of security vary with 
identity (Katzensein, Hopf, Ringmar, Krause and Williams, McSweeney, Farrell, 
Weldes et al., and Kowert), which in turn helps to formulate what is interpreted as a 
security threat.127  An OS framework therefore expects quite different policies than 
those employing a traditional security framework, whose sidelining of individual 
security, it is argued, leads to limitations in analysis.  
 
1.1 Individuals in Security Studies:  
 
Overall McSweeney notes four main periods of security work. The first period, or 
‘political theory era’, came about during the formation of IR within academia in 1919 
and largely revolved around concepts of common security. Scholars such as Wright, 
Herz, Brodie and Wolfers maintained an interdisciplinary approach to security, 
incorporating international law, organizations, and political theory to explore the 
“political, psychological and economic aspects of war and peace.”128 These works 
were still largely in the realm of foreign policy. For example Herz stressed the 
benefits of pursuing  “a conscious balance-of-power policy” as opposed to more 
emotional, nationalist driven, policies,129 while Wolfers, emphasized how “any major 
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psychological and cultural, or major social and political, or legal, or technological 
change in the world” must be balanced less war break out.130  
 
Following the mid 1950s, security studies became a more privatized subsection of IR, 
leading to Walt’s “Golden age”131 and the adoption of a scientific approach and 
quantitative analysis. It was also during this period, and the advent of what Richard 
Ashley termed neorealism,132 that security became envisioned as the property of the 
state. The Golden Age thus overlooks analysis on what constitutes a threat to 
individuals – what makes them feel ‘non-secure’ – leading to a static view of 
interests.   
 
Unlike the classical realism of Morgenthau or Carr,133 which called for a more 
contingent understanding of the state and international security premised around 
foreign policy, neorealism instead focuses primarily on structure,134 leading Kowert to 
surmise “they say nothing about who the actors are or how their interests were 
constituted.” 135  Neorealists largely function in the same vein as neoclassical 
economics, where preferences are exogenously given to revolve around (the highly 
contested notion of) power. 136  For example Waltz assumes that the processes 
determining the fundamental identity of states are “exogenous to the states' 
environments, global or domestic.”137 Yet as Ringmar notes, “It is only as some-one 
that we can want some-thing, and it is only once we know who we are that we can 
know what we want.”138 While Waltz does not necessarily discount unit level factors, 
by focusing solely on the systemic level he underestimates their level of importance. 
This all relates to Frederick Frey’s article outlining the need to specify who the actors 
are within a system. 139  Yet both neorealism and neoliberalism embed in their 
theories a-priori assumptions regarding a state’s identification with other groups;140 
“[t]hey do not recognize that rationality, goals, and what actors consider appropriate 
means of achieving them are culturally embedded and socially constructed.”141 
 
Neorealism has subsequently faced both theoretical and empirical challenges. For 
example, given Crawford’s142 observation of the assumption of fear and hate and 
Lowenheim and Heimanns143 demonstration of emotion in rational choice, it would 
seem impossible for neorealism to discount non-systemic factors.144 Empirically, 
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neorealism’s shortcomings are optimized in its difficulty in accounting for the ending 
of the Cold War, leading to a plethora of works addressing its failure145 to account for 
domestic initiatives in the USSR.146 Moreover, such criticisms can be levied across 
time, with Lebow commenting how it “cannot explain why the same material 
structures lead to different outcomes”, for example in 18th century Europe.147 Indeed 
by largely overlooking ideational motivations, it becomes difficult for them to classify 
rising powers (a central component of structural theories),148 let alone account for 
variations in, and thus the motivations behind, arms buildup.149 This structural 
dominance has subsequently forged a misrepresentation of classical realism, with 
Williams noting that given Morgenthau’s view of power150 his work is more aligned 
with that of Foucault and Bourdieu than the materialistic approaches of neorealism.151 
Unfortunately, classical realism also does little to further conceptualize ideational 
factors, instead imposing law like statements about human nature152 that do little to 
account for variation. Thus, while allowing for some agency, classic realists’ 
incorporation of unit level factors need further refinement and nuance.   
 
All of this led Wendt to argue neorealism’s self-help system is not predetermined; it 
could easily be a collective security system, indicating the role of perceptions, not 
structure.153 While some neorealist have attempted to integrate ideational factors154 
and perception, they fail to undertake the appropriate ontological shift,155 a critique 
often leveled against Walt’s theory on balance-of-threat.156 Relying on a reified vision 
of the state similarly hampers Morgenthau’s classical realism, which also moves 
dangerously close to relying on cultural variables, such as national character.157 
Similarly, while some scholars such as Deutsch, Boulding, Holsti, and Jervis, began 
to touch on elements of identity, they never made “much use of the concept” itself.158  
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In order to account for interest, which Keohane claims is essential to IR,159 we must 
turn towards the individual level, moving away from those conceptions where 
security can only be attained materially vis-à-vis other states; where the object of 
security (the state) has become the subject (rather than the individual). Instead we 
must seek to examine what makes individuals secure, which sheds light on interests.  
 
McSweeney notes how this renewed focus on the individual can partially be found in 
the third period, which emphasized complex interdependence160 by building from 
earlier forays into economic interdependence and Deutsch’s conception of security 
communities.161 Here, democratic peace theory and Krasner’s international regimes 
began to allow for the influence of domestic factors. While contingent upon the 
presence of a common enemy, these works did succeed in shifting from the ‘golden 
age’ by “locat[ting] security and insecurity firmly in the relationship between states, 
not in the independent capacities of each.”162 However it was largely the work on 
North-South relations (seen in the Brandt and Palm Report) that began emphasizing 
the daily concerns of individuals. Yet theorization on this was left wanting. 
 
Buzan’s work perhaps went the farthest in examining the relationship between foreign 
and domestic security.163 However as McSweeney argues, while acknowledging 
security is intertwined with human collectives, Buzan takes the state as the referent of 
security (so as to avoid the realm of psychology and sociology),164 and refuses to 
provide a definition for individual security on the basis it is a contested concept, 
meaning this can only be overcome at the state level by treating security as 
materialistic non-contested objects. Later attempts by Waever et al165 to address these 
shortcomings by incorporating society as a referent of security are similarly troubled 
in that they take society as an independent object (outside the agency of man), again 
overlooking individual security.166 Similar critiques are also drawn from the work of 
Ferguson and Mansbach, as well as Mohammed Ayoob, Amitav Acharya, Ken Booth 
and Peter Vale’s chapters in Krause and Williams’ Critical Security Studies.167  
 
From these criticisms, McSweeney argues a wider conception of security must have 
three central components. First individuals must remain the primary referent. In 
addition there must be an incorporation of the positive, relationship-based sources of 
human security in addition to the negative, objective materialistic security concerns. 
This requires we make judgments as to what constitutes a human concern, rather than 
assume they are predetermined within the context of the state. For MscSweeney, 
focus should be on that which “presents itself, problematically in some measure, in 
every instance of interaction which goes to make up the social world.”168 
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It is here we are ushered into the world of OS; the security of the self and the need for 
trust in others, that spans the entirety of one’s lifecycle. This relates specifically to the 
etymology of security seen above, wherein knowledge and predictability allow for a 
certain carelessness. Starting to incorporate the non-material needs of individuals 
gains further credence in light of the work by Hylland et al, which shows how often 
times they take precedence.169 
 
1.2 Levels of Analysis: 
 
It is important to stipulate how the individual need for OS impacts group/state 
behavior. Many constructivist scholars continue to struggle with how to account for 
the “state as actor” approach.170 To address this conundrum the thesis adopts the same 
approach as McSweeney, Steele, Lang and various English School scholars; states are 
not people BUT should be considered AS IF they were.171 Of course states do not have 
brains “and, thus, the capacity to reflect on their spatio-temporal situatedness and 
direction of movement.”172 However, people effectively run states, they decide on 
policies and dictate the state’s behavior through these choices. In this sense “agentic 
action is implemented by leaders” who, regardless of their own sense of integrity, 
become the embodiment of the state in what Lang labels a moment of agency.173 
“States are not gigantic calculating machines; they are hierarchically organized 
groups of emotional people.”174 Thus as Gries notes, “for most social psychologists 
today, groups do not act; individuals act.”175  
 
Since individuals run states they endow it with human characteristics, meaning states 
act as if they have OS concerns, and (as will be argued) an interest in maintaining 
their community (i.e. the nation state) by maintaining communal narrative, meaning 
they are subject to both military and non-military (e.g. ideational) threats. 
 
In addition to the state-as-actor debate, it also becomes important to address the 
levels-of-analysis.176 One of the main criticisms labeled against constructivism, the 
latest evolution in security studies, has been its continued focus on the international 
level of analysis, particularly by ‘conventional’ constructivists. According to Farrell, 
constructivism largely interprets states as undertaking “appropriate” action inline with 
international norms and structures derived from the identity of leading international 
actors. 177 This has led to accusations of an overly systemic approach at the expense of 
the domestic level. 178 As Hopf notes,this “systemic variant cannot, and does not, 
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claim to explain the identity relations [and thus subjective threat perceptions] between 
any two states.”179 By contrast, an OS approach focuses on domestic sources behind 
state behavior. Relevant then is what has been deemed the constructivist-culturalist 
debate.   
 
Both are concerned with the impact of norms or “inter-subjective beliefs” that provide 
meaning to both an actor and to action. Significantly, however, culturalists’ levy 
domestic systems as the source of social structures. Berger thus cites a disciplinary 
difference with constructivism while Duffield views the latter as a meta theoretical 
framework in contrast to culturalisms’ focus on the “nature, causes and consequences 
of culture”, leading Farrell to conclude that while “culturalists may draw on 
constructivism, [they] are also interested in “non-normative aspects of culture” and 
“non-ideational sources of social structure.” 180 Like culturalists, OS expects to find 
variety among states,181 as action required for maintaining OS will fluctuate inline 
with various national identities. While the domestic is in no way isolated from the 
international, it still acts as the lens through which international interaction is 
interpreted, establishing the need for a domestic-level analysis.  
 
This corresponds to the larger division between FPA and IR noted above. When 
Wendt writes, “[l]ike Waltz I am interested in international politics, not foreign 
policy”182, he is representative of those constructivists who bracket out such analysis. 
Yet as the overview of security literature has shown, this bracketing has resulted in 
serious gaps between theoretical expectations and actual state behavior. As Lebow 
writes, “[a] theory of IR embedded in a theory of society is also a theory of foreign 
policy.”183 To this end Hymans’ provides a useful summation: 
 
international politics is politics, politics is only possible in the context of society, and 
in society the micro and macro levels are inevitably mutually constituting. Of course, 
traditional constructivists also subscribe to this as a general principle; but they have 
typically failed to respect it in their actual theoretical models…By bringing 
psychology back in, we can start to fulfill constructivism’s original promise.184 
 
Literature on OS may provide one route for overcoming these current shortcomings 
and forging a more robust approach to our understanding of international security in 
general and North Korean behavior in particular.  
 
2. Ontological Security  
 
Much of the IR literature on OS (explored in Ch. 3) is built from Giddens and Laing. 
While the thesis agrees with much of Giddens’ work, it shifts away from the extent to 
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which he focuses on modernity. Instead the thesis argues the anchor of OS has always 
been partially constituted by one’s community, meaning individuals have historically 
been motivated by OS to maintain the community. While developing states and 
totalitarian regimes (like North Korea) might not be as ‘modern’ (in Giddens’ sense) 
as Western liberal states, they are still motivated by OS to maintain the community.  
 
2.1 Defining Ontological Security:  
 
Laing deliberately uses a varied version of ‘ontology’ from that conceived by 
Heidegger, Satre and Tillich noting, “I have used the term in its present empirical 
sense because it appears to be the best adverbial or adjectival derivative of being.”185 
As Steele notes, OS then has to do with the “security of being.” According to Laing 
who first coined the term:  
 
A man may have a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a 
temporal sense, a continuous person. As such, he can live out into the world and meet 
others…Such a basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of 
life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm sense of his own and 
other people's reality and identity.186  
 
Starting at childbirth the baby becomes “existentially born as real and alive.” From 
this phase onward the individual will have a sense of Self as being “real, alive and 
whole” with an identity that is separate from, and continuous in, the world. By 
contrast, the ontologically insecure feel ‘unreal’, with an identity and autonomy from 
the world that is consistently in question, a temporal consistency that appears in doubt, 
and a self that is “partially divorced from the body.” 187 There is a low threshold for 
security; daily life can prove to be overwhelming, and a perceived threat. Ontological 
insecurity forms during infancy due to the caretaker’s failure to respond to the child’s 
needs, forcing the child to create a separate identity for external consumption. Here an 
adequate independent Self is never forged, meaning identity is fundamentally 
detached from any sense of ‘real self’.188 
 
In contrast to the psychological accounts of Laing, Giddens sought to integrate his 
findings into a sociological approach, whereby the social world can lead to 
ontological insecurity. Giddens says to be human is to have answers to both what, and 
why, one is doing, supplied through the discursive interpretations associated with 
human monitoring of activity. Related to this is “practical consciousness”, the taken 
for granted ‘non-conscious’ bracketing of the infinite possibilities associated with 
social activity that allow us to focus on the present and undertake such monitoring. 
This practical consciousness is reproduced through everyday routines, becoming the 
“anchor” of OS and allowing us to function as social agents.189 Giddens concludes, 
“to be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical 
consciousness, “answers” to fundamental existential questions which all humans life 
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in some way addresses.”190 By not having to fixate on these questions, we are able to 
maintain practical consciousness, and OS. 
 
The question of most relevance is that of self-identity,191 the stability of which 
requires the acceptance of reality. For Giddens, self-identity is “the self as reflexively 
understood by the person in terms of her or his own biography”,192 or as Lynch and 
Laing demonstrate, the tales we tell of ourselves.193 In order to ‘be’ then, requires the 
ability to provide a coherent and sustained narrative of Self;194 “It is through narrative 
that we make sense of the world and create our own identities (Somers 1994:606).”195 
As Kratochwil writes, “In order to be able to act, agents have to first recover their 
history”196 through narrative. This focus on narrative has been seen in numerous 
works, including Taylor, MacIntyre, Sarbin, and White.197 For example, pulling from 
Taylor, Whitebrook writes “to have an identity, ‘we have to have a notion of how we 
have become, and of where we are going’; we grasp a sense of our lives in 
narrartive”.198 Referencing Ricoeur, Ezzy similarly writes, identity “is a narrative 
construction that is the product of this reflective process…Narrative identity 
constructs a sense of self-sameness, continuity and character in the plot of the story a 
person tells about him or herself. The story becomes that person's actual history 
(Ricoeur 1988, p. 247).” To this end, “A person…is defined as a self-narrating 
organism" (Maines 1993, p.23).”199  
 
Kinnvall surmises, “[f]or Giddens then, like [Erik] Erikson, self-identity consists of 
the development of a consistent feeling of biographical continuity where the 
individual is able to sustain a narrative about the self and answer questions about 
doing, acting, and being.”200 Such perceived consistency is vital, for as Gergen and 
Gergen note, our view of self is “fundamentally nonsensical unless it can be linked in 
some fashion with one’s own past.” 201 Practical consciousness and routines thus 
bracket the anxiety202 we all have over “self, others and the object world, all of which 
need to be taken for granted in order to keep on with everyday activity.”203 When 
practical consciousness and routines are undermined, so to is our ability to maintain a 
consistent narrative. Giddens suggests this can not only lead to overwhelming anxiety, 
but to a breakdown in trust in the world and in those around us, making it difficult to 
act as we become fixated on existential questions. Reviewing situations where 
routines are threatened, it becomes possible to set the stage for how OS may come to 
impact perceptions, an important component of decision-making.   
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2.2 Fateful Moment & Personal Crisis:  
 
The routines and rituals of everyday life and the basic trust they generate is viewed by 
Giddens as corresponding to Goffman’s Umwelt, “a core of (accomplished) normalcy 
with which individuals and groups surround themselves.”204  This ‘protective cocoon’ 
provides the stability and trust that allows one to view the majority of the goings-on 
around them, and future anticipations, as non-consequential, allowing for normalcy 
and the sustainment of the Umwelt.  
 
While normally risk can be kept at bay, some situations, deemed ‘fateful moments,’ 
are both highly consequential and problematic for an individual. Here one is at the 
“cross-roads of existence” or is confronted with new information with ‘fateful 
consequences’. It was at these moments that individuals in pre-modern societies were 
able to rely on fate to provide answers. Instead they are now faced with immense risk 
from an unknown situation where their actions will have significant consequences 
and, once made, will be difficult to return from. This can also occur at the group level, 
“where a given state of affairs is suddenly altered by a few key events.”205  
 
Fateful moments can stem from choices we face (such as the decision to marry), or 
from unsought events - the most difficult being those that coincide with fateful events, 
which in turn impede on self-identity. For the discussion at hand this could include 
the Japanese colonization of Korea. While Giddens suggests the individual can 
continue as if the new situation does not impede on already established routines, this 
is often not possible given the very nature of fateful moments.206 Instead, one is 
forced to undertake ‘homesteading’, a strategy whereby the threatened individual 
seeks out similar comforts within alternative forms,207 a process reminiscent to Berger 
and Luckmann’s ‘alternation’ or re-socialization. To be successful an alternative 
plausibility structure must be presented and re-socialization must take place within the 
context and setting of that world’s community. This could include religious 
conversion or political indoctrination. Biographical continuation is addressed by 
reinterpreting the past to allow for a perpetuation of the ‘story’, i.e. the past is 
reinterpreted as simply leading up to the point of re-socialization.208 
 
Of course not all unsought after events reach the level of a fateful moment. They 
could instead be “unexpected events that intrude into the Umwelt” whereby they 
“puncture the protective mantle of ontological security and cause alarm.” Here 
routines are not necessarily overwhelmed, as say during colonization, but there is an 
ideational challenge, a “personal crisis,” that threatens self-identity and OS. 209  This 
far surpasses the momentary crises we face daily, but quickly adjust to given trust. 
Here, we are faced with a fundamental challenge that we instinctively reject; identity 
maintenance becomes an end in its own right. A community might then react to an 
event in a certain way depending on if it punctures the Umwelt. The argument is not 
that concerns over OS are always at the forefront of our minds, but that some 
situations threaten the norm and force us to become motivated by OS needs. To this 
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end, gaps in the literature on North Korea could potentially be explained as periods 
when the North was driven by OS concerns due to a perceived personal crisis.  
 
In order to expand on this, it is important to first elaborate on where routines/rituals 
are derived. For Giddens, this involves an examination of the impacts of modernity, 
which eroded traditional buttresses against OS threats leaving us more insecure. By 
contrast, the thesis argues OS threats are not necessarily unique to modernity, but 
pertain more to the fundamental relationship between individuals and communities, 
meaning analysis should focus on threats to this more timeless relationship.    
 
2.3 Modernity & Self Identity:  
 
Modernity, which emerged with European post-feudal institutions, is made distinct by 
its “dynamism”, marked by fast paced and widespread social changes that have forced 
the Self to become re-conceptualized. This includes globalization and technological 
advances that allow previously distant events to have a substantial impact on 
“proximate events, and on intimacies of the self”.210 This was accompanied by the 
growth of “abstract systems”, a combination of symbolic tokens - medias of exchange 
applicable across numerous contexts (e.g. money) – and expert systems – knowledge 
that is validated independently of its practitioners, meaning there are no certain truths. 
This allowed for the awareness of risk to “seep into the actions of almost everyone” 
leading to increased reflexivity, the “susceptibility of most aspects of social 
activity…to chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge.”211  
 
Bauman thus argues we now live in liquid, rather than heavy, modernity. Heavy 
modernity was characterized by a centrally organized and rigid community typified 
by the Ford plant; while oppressive in nature it provided predictability and rootedness. 
Then we knew the ends, if not the means, but in liquid modernity it is the reverse, we 
know the means but not the ends. 212 There is always something more to move 
towards. While in heavy modernity there were leaders, individuals who espoused the 
‘we’, now there are only counselors – the ‘we’ is replaced by a conglomeration of 
individuals.213  
 
For Giddens modernity leads to possible radical doubt, stripping away previous 
sources of predictability and OS. Following such advances the biographical Self 
becomes a “reflexively organized endeavor”, taking place within a world where 
“tradition loses its hold” and daily life is “reconstituted in terms of the dialectical 
interplay of the local and the global.” Unlike traditional societies, the modern Self is 
thus faced with a plethora of ‘lifestyles’ that can be adopted; the “integrated set of 
practices which an individual embraces…[giving] material form to a particular 
narrative of self-identity.”214 As Bauman notes, identity is no longer given (I am born 
a bourgeois) but has become a task (I must live as a bourgeois). 
 
Identity here still presumes continuity, but “continuity as interpreted reflexively by 
the agent.”215 Perceived discontinuity leads to ontological insecurity, what Laing 
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terms an “inner deadness”, and which he suggests can leave us paralyzed; we 
“become strangers in a world where we thought we were at home” and experience 
anxiety in becoming aware that we cannot trust our answers to the questions, “Who 
am I?” 216 It is here we find overlap with the etymology of security, wherein 
individuals feel secure when they have knowledge and predictability as provided by 
lifestyles. These consist of the reflexive mundane rituals of everyday life formed 
through the choices we make; “my decision on what to wear or eat is as much about 
my choice on how to act as it as on ‘who to be.’”  
 
In association with these lifestyles we find ‘life-planning’ and together these form the 
“settings which help to shape their [agents] actions.”217 Unlike in the pre-modern era, 
the future is no longer left to fate. Instead we now have an appreciation that risk exists, 
generating a need to filter out new, more large-scale, risks (such as nuclear war).  
While we can make estimates as to the result of high-consequence risks (those outside 
of our direct ability to influence), we can never be certain. However the individual 
often meets these risks passively. Giddens argues this is due to the fact that life-
planning takes into account “packages of risks” and thus some risks are seen as 
acceptable. Life-planning also involves attempts to colonize (plan for) the future, 
though “the degree to which the future round can be successfully invaded is partial, 
and subject to the various vagaries of risk assessment.”218 Only the ontologically 
secure can thus undertake risk-assessment and plan for the future, as this requires both 
trust in the Self and the world, and the ability to bracket out overwhelming risk.  
 
To surmise, according to Giddens, in modern society it is one’s lifestyles that form 
the core of self-identity, thereby helping to shelter one from existential questions, 
generate trust and bracket risk. The thesis now raises two arguments. One, that society 
has always constituted the means by which the Self is created and thus OS threats 
need not be limited to modernity per se, but to threats toward this relationship. And 
two, that even in modernity, society has a structuring influence, indicating the 
continuation of this fundamental relationship.  
 
2.4 Individuals and Communities: Expanding the Relationship: 
 
Bauman, by de-emphasizing the motivational role of norms, argues societies are now 
more attune to a cloak that can be easily removed. Citing Alain Touraine he concludes 
we have come to “the end of definition of the human being as a social being, defined 
by his or her place in society which determines his or her behavior or action'.”219 At 
the same time, he also cites the work of Elias and the reciprocal relationship between 
individuals and society, with “society shaping the individuality of its members, and 
individuals forming society out of their life actions.”220 Similarly Giddens rejects 
methodological individualism, arguing the Self can “only become coherent through 
the reflexive use of the broader social environment.” To explore this further it helps to 
elaborate on self-narrative.  
 
Tompkins’ ‘script theory’ and McAdam’s ‘life-story model of identity’ were some of 
the first forays into narrative approaches of Self, “imagin[ing] human beings as 
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storytellers and human lives as stories told,” all of which gives some semblance of 
meaning and purpose.221  Their work provided an important retort to the ‘situationist 
critique’, the argument that “behavior is mainly a function of situational variation and 
environmental contingencies” by showing that “behavior and experience are guided 
as least as much by internal factors as they are by the vagaries of the situations.” By 
the 2000s, advances in the field by social constructionists came to show how these 
narratives had a situational component, demonstrating the “role of historical and 
cultural contexts in the expression and development of personality.”222  
 
McAdam cites 3 levels of the individual. At Level 1 are dispositional traits  (the “Big 
Five” personality traits) while at Level 2 are “characteristic adaptations… 
contextualized in time, place, or social role…[and] speak to what people want or do 
not want and how they go about [this].” It is only at Level 3 that we encounter how 
people make sense of their lives through ‘integrative life stories’, “those internalized 
and evolving self-narratives that people construct to make sense of their lives in time”. 
Importantly, these narratives are “co-authored by persons and the social words 
wherein their lives make sense.”223 As Andrews, Kinvall and Monroe write, “thinking 
[is] an inherently dialogical process, in which consciousness works upon internal 
arguments and discourses that are derived from public/social debate”,224 a sentiment 
Ezzy similarly finds in the works of Goffman and Ricoeur.225 Thus while Bauman 
acknowledges the ability to shop for identity depends on one’s locale in society, he 
seems to downplay the more general structuring impact of society as a whole;226 as 
Gergen and Gergen write “[o]ne is not free simply to have any form of history he or 
she wishes. Cultures invite certain identities and discourages others.”227  
 
None of this is to deny that individuals have seemingly numerous and possibly 
contradictory subnarratives; “in fact there would appear to be no one story to tell.” 
However, given our tendency to “relate events within different temporal perspectives” 
we begin to nest these narratives. This is important because “to the extent that 
consistency among narratives is sought, macronarratives acquire preeminent 
importance. Such narratives seem to lay the foundations within which other narratives 
are constructed.”228 This tendency to nest narratives reinforces the importance of 
maintaining the macronarrative (such as national narratives) for OS. This is 
substantiated by the work of Donald Campbell and Hamilton et al. on entitavity,229 the 
perceived “groupness of groups”, with variations in cohesion associated to group 
type.230 Research indicates that decreasing levels of entitativity were statistically 
found to be relevant in distinguishing between intimacy groups (e.g. family), task-
oriented groups (e.g. coworkers), social categories (e.g. American) and loose 
associations (e.g. students at a university).231 While human need for belonging is 
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satisfied at the intimacy group and need for achievement at the task group, “humans 
also have an important need to establish a stable and secure sense of self and social 
identity”, which is achieved at the level of social categories – i.e. the nation. As Ezzy 
surmises “[r]egular interaction with a network of others, the routines of everyday life, 
and the presence of physical props are also central to a person’s ability to maintain a 
consistent and satisfying narrative.”232 While the individual Self may be in flux, it is 
therefore comforted by the perceived continuity of the community it is embedded 
within; a community that structures lifestyles – and thus the formation of Self – while 
also providing a stable macronarrative, all of which becomes the foundation of OS. 
 
The role of one’s community as a provider of OS could help explain why there 
continues to be such enforced differentiation between various communities. For 
example, evolutionary biologist Mark Pagel notes the remarkable amount of genetic 
variations that have emerged among mankind in a relatively short period of time and 
in our species unique use of language (in that as a species we often cannot understand 
one another), suggesting humans have a predisposition for separation derived from 
our “our most basic instincts to promote copies of our genes.” 233 This enforced 
differentiation has led to a hindered adaption of outside cultures, which are “regarded 
with suspicion or even indignation”, allowing far more variance between neighbors in 
a cultural context then many might expect and further suggesting individuals are still 
structured by their communities. 234  
 
Pagel’s work also reinforces the notion that this relationship has exisisted throughout 
the ages. Here Pagel questions why culture arose at a time man was still preoccupied 
with attaining basic necessitates. He suggests this had to do with our distinct ability to 
undertake social learning; humans not only replicate and transfer behavior, but “know 
what they are copying and why”. Consequently, our ability to overcome our DNA-
predisposition to cheat non-relatives and visually steal from them (i.e. learn from 
others without reciprocating knowledge) resided on our ability to distinguish altruistic 
compatriots through scale-free cultural mechanisms. In short, we developed cues 
through which to demarcate fellow members of socially constructed communities. 
Harrari argues that further compounding our need to cooperate was the fact that as 
Homo Sapiens evolved, they invested into brain power (not physical muscle that 
would allowed for more independence), while the ability to stand resulted in 
contracted birth canals and more premature babies, thereby generating a new social 
problem since lone mothers could not forage enough food.235 
 
Objects such as art, music and religion can thus be viewed as functioning as “cultural 
enhancers”, acting in much the same way genetic enhancers of DNA function within 
our bodies to make genes work more effectively.236 Biologically these enhancers do 
nothing to directly build security or reproduction, but are utilized to determine how 
much something is expressed. Early groups might then have developed their own 
distinct music or art to develop greater cohesion, reinforcing a community’s shared 
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233 Indeed the statistician Robert Sokal has found that even within the perceived to be highly integrated region of Europe, 
genetics can place an individual within 100 miles of their birthplace. Pagel, Wired, pg. 54, 56 
234 Pagel, Wired, pg. 57 
235 Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens, A Brief History of Humankind (Vintage Books, 2011), pg. 9, 11 
236 Much like DNA and RNA, once two replicators join together and find that their returns are greater due to a shared vehicle, 
their fates become intertwined, eliminating competition. The same holds true for individuals in society. Once their fates become 
intertwined, individuals sought to further improve their cooperation, and like DNA began to specialize and develop more 
complex organizations. Pagel, Wired, pg. 75  
 37 
history and interests so as to better discern altruistic compatriots, thereby offsetting 
fears over visual theft.237 Following the cognitive revolution 70,000 years ago, our 
ability to imagine things collectively and develop common myths therefore allowed 
for cooperation amongst larger groups of individuals.238 From this overview, we can 
see communal identity forming around the abstract non-altruistic Other. This abstract 
Other, while not necessarily something negative, generated a need to define a 
community and create mechanism through which to demark fellow compatriots.   
 
This is reminiscent to biological studies on the ‘social amoebae’, organisms that have 
fostered social cooperation to the point of self-sacrifice (much like humans) by 
forging mechanisms through which to discern altruistic members.239 Communities 
have similarly sought to emphasize their distinctness; for example in New Guinea 
“communities have purposely fostered linguistic diversity because they have seen 
language as a highly salient marker of group identity.” 240 Emotions often associated 
with nationalism, patriotism, xenophobia and bigotry, are in turn not necessarily 
social features of man; they are “visceral in nature” and while helping to promote our 
cultural survival vehicles, they have also helped to maintain mankind in much the 
same way they have helped the social amoebae.241 However the mere presence of 
indicators does not always suffice and “this might be why as a species we are so 
sensitive to cues of a shared cultural history”. Pagel writes: 
 
All of those shared beliefs, customs, religious systems, languages, accents, rituals, 
songs, styles of dress, and mannerisms are the cues we instinctively and 
subconsciously use to assess our cultural relatedness to others. Our societies’ 
tendency throughout history to restrict the movement of people and ideas, and to 
develop strong identities around their languages and cultures, make these cues more 
reliable. 242 
 
We can instantly see how this relates to the lifestyles outlined by Giddens, from 
which we obtain the routines of daily life and forge self-identity. While personal 
identity in traditional societies would have been more socially determined (i.e. 
peasant or lord) it would still have been partially constructed by the lifestyles found in 
one’s community. As McAdams writes, “[c]ulture provides people with a menu of 
narrative forms and contents from which the person selectively draws in an effort to 
line up lived experiences with the kinds of stories available to organize and express 
it.”243 Disruptions to these indicators could in turn generate a threat. For example: 
 
Wise has shown how the breaching of previously taken-for-granted behavioural 
standards in two local settings, a beach (2009) and a shopping precinct (2010) in 
Sydney, was used to label particular groups as un-Australian. Similarly, Blokland’s 
study of a housing estate in Rotterdam, the Netherlands (2003) examined the ways in 
which white residents discussed the ordinary activities of minority neighbours, 
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cooking ‘strange’ foods, playing loud ‘foreign’ music, wearing Islamic dress, as a 
challenge to Dutch culture and values (2003: 11–12).244 
  
Following this overview, it is argued that OS is intimately linked to the timeless 
relationship between individuals and communities. It is not just for modern man that 
“maintaining community becomes an end in itself” as Bauman would have; this has 
been the case since the first communities were formed. Only through the ability to 
distinguish altruistic compatriots was man able to overcome our DNA predisposition 
not to form into communities and help non-related others. As explored in section 3, 
this was achieved by developing a myth of communal solidarity, in which were 
embedded a range of daily routines and rituals, removing the perception of difference. 
There are no a priori groups, only shared myths that in turn generate a sense of shared 
identity. To this end, OS concerns have been prevalent throughout history.  
 
Indeed Bauman notes how questions of living in times of uncertainty (a focal point 
for postmodernists) dominated philosophy during the onset of Roman decline, and 
immediately before modernity. Dennis Smith thus seeks to build upon this pattern, 
arguing that rather than a unique and contemporary dilemma, we are in actuality 
experiencing a new Middle Ages. Here he references Zakharov’s commentary on 
post-Soviet life in Russia where “many had turned to Orthodox religion but, alas, not 
so much to spiritual, inner religion as the external ritual of the church…[and] all 
manner of magicians, astrologers and mystics. That is what it is like – a new Middle 
Ages.” Smith parallels the description of post-Soviet life to Blochs’ account of tenth-
century Europe as marked by a life of perpetual insecurity, which was “one of the 
principle reasons for the emotional instability so characteristic of the feudal era.” 
Similarly, the introduction of medieval feudal warlords resembles local Russian 
power structures following the rejection of the ‘communist metanarrative’ as 
characterized in the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, wherein Russians broke into 
various groups depending on what “makes sense or masters reality in their own 
particular neck of the woods.”245 Smith further argues this all correlates with the 
“millenarian fears of the 1990s”246 and concludes while the comparison should not be 
pushed too far, “if present-day Russia can be thought of as ‘premodern’ in some 
respects then feudal Europe had its ‘postmodern’ aspect.”247  
 
Again this underscores how OS threats are intimately tied with disruptions to the 
fundamentally timeless relationship between individuals and communities. As 
established communities were eroded (fateful moments) there were periods of 
ontological insecurity until new communities could be formed, re-socializing 
individuals and replacing old foundations of the Umwelt. Consequently, not only are 
OS threats not unprecedented, they relate to communities that might not appear to be 
as ‘modern’ as the ideal democratic Western prototype that dominate post-modern 
accounts. Applying OS to a state such as the DPRK, which to many would appear as 
the antithesis of Giddens or Bauman’s modernity, helps further bolster this argument.  
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3. Communal Narrative & Nations 
 
Having established the interconnectivity of individual OS and community, it becomes 
important to clarify what exactly a community is. To this end, examining debates over 
the characteristics and formation of nations helps to elucidate how communities have 
historically proved to be a source of OS, a relationship that is argued to continue 
under national communities today. 248  In order to know how to maintain the nation we 
must first determine what constitutes it. Not only does OS help to further strengthen 
literature on the nation as an entity forged out of narrative, it helps to further clarify 
the relationship between individuals and the nation and why the latter is such a potent 
force in interstate relations. This in turn provides an ideational approach to IR that can 
account for conflict without referring to it in essentialized terms.  
 
3.1 Imagined Communities and Nations:  
 
Numerous works conducted by modernists (Gellner) and ethno-symbologists (Smith) 
have come to undermine the perenniliast view that nations have existed continuously 
throughout history (Walek-Czernecki, Levi) and the primordialist view of nations as 
organic entities formed along the natural divisions of humanity (Van den Berghe, 
Shils, Geertz);249 nations are indeed “imagined communities.”250 However this must 
be qualified, for as even Hobsbawm concedes, “the nation…is the most important of 
the lasting 'invented traditions”, leading Smith to conclude “'invention' must be 
understood in its other sense of a novel recombination of existing elements”251 and 
not as “‘imaginary’…and traditions as purely ‘invented.”252 While sympathetic to 
Smith’s critique of modernists (see also Hastings253), who view the nation as 
originating only in the modern epoch - be it due to industrialization (Hobsbawm, 
Gellner), an invention of America (Anderson) or the Enlightenment (Kedourie), the 
thesis is less concerned with when nations formed and more in what constitutes the 
nation and earlier communities of man. 
 
Smith disentangles nations and national identity from the modern political ideology of 
nationalism. 254 From here he argues that prior to the formation of any ‘ideal’ nation, 




Ethnie Ideal Nation 
A named community  A named community (self-identification as distinct 
group)   
Shared origin myths, memories (ethnic 
origin and descent; “largest presumed kin-
Shared origin myths, memories (usually of more 
immediate memories and traditions e.g. ethnic 
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based group”)   election; liberation and migration; heroic myths of 
golden age or heroic sacrifices)   
One or more element(s) of common 
culture (e.g. language or religion, but “no 
conscious reference to or virtue of them”) 
A common public culture (language or religion must 
be part of an acknowledged distinctive culture that 
links various generations. In pre-modern times this 
was probably limited to elites, but in medieval 
Western Europe there were attempts to “broaden the 
culture and education base and give it a more public 
character as an expression of growing elite or 
middle-class national sentiments and goals”) 
Association with a specific territory A historic territory 
  Common laws and customs (laws and rituals as 
opposed to ethnic customs and traditions, “though 
the line between them cannot be drawn in a hard and 
fast manner”) 
 
He surmises, “nations and ethnies are types of cultural community; but the type of the 
ethnie is broader, looser and closer to felt kinship ties, while the national type also 
incorporates territorial, legal and public elements lacking in ethnies.”256 Expanding on 
the work of Smith, Eriksen has come to provide a slightly revised interpretation. He 
argues that while Smith’s criteria of what constitutes an ethnie are mostly correct, 
they need not result in only ethnies. Instead they can form a range of imagined 
communities that can become the foundation for nations (or other communities).  For 
example, a shared past could pertain to a more spiritual myth, as in France, recent 
events, as shown by the centrality of the 1960s ethnic riots in Mauritius, or by 
nonbiological myths of origin, as in the case of postcolonial nations. Regarding 
culture he writes how “shared implicit conventions and notions, or taken-for-granteds, 
create a sense of community which is linked with space rather than time; sharing the 
same space rather than entertaining notions of shared origins.”257 Territory meanwhile 
can become a difficult subject, as often times cultural and territorial boundaries fail to 
align. At the same time, they are often metaphorically forged.  
 
Consequently, what is actually central for the foundation of imagined communities is 
a sense of shared narrative and territorial belonging, neither of which presuppose the 
formation of an ethnie. Instead, building from the “more universal dimensions of 
human existence”, Eriksen notes, “[v]irtually all political identities known to political 
anthropology are based, in different ways and to varying degrees…on place and 
kinship.” He concludes the nation is a “metaphoric kin group” and a “metaphoric 
place” in that as physical entities nations “cannot be observed directly; the citizens 
have to infer their existence from abstractions such as maps.”258 Emphasis is thus 
placed on fictive kinship – determined by the relevant kin group’s “rules of inclusion 
and its founding myth”, not necessarily by a common myth of descent259 - and on 
“creating a fatherland through geographical abstraction.”260 
 
As shown above, pre-national communities (including the earliest groups of man) 
forged ‘cultural cues’ or ‘lifestyles’ through which to demark altruistic compatriots. 
In doing so they constructed a social world within which individuals came to 
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construct the Self, meaning OS is thus entwined with the preservation of one’s 
community by maintaining its fictive kinship and fictive place. For example, Gellner 
notes that, as a “nationalist humanity… cultures, even a shared number of symbols 
and communication, were important even in the pre-industrial age.” 261  Thus Smith 
writes, the desire to “'know whence we came' is not confined to particular 
civilizations or epochs” with examples seen in ancient Greece, the biblical genealogy 
of Abraham, ancestral myths in early Africa and Asia, and Roman and Frankish 
claims of decent from the Trojans. He goes on to elaborate, “behind the ever-changing 
needs and purposes of individuals, a more obstinate question obtrudes…[that] of 
individual identity, which is always a matter of social and spiritual location. For in 
that location lies a sense of security, so indispensable to the much-desired 
individuality and uniqueness of persons and families alike.”262 To this end there is a 
clear link between community and OS prevalent in the modern and pre-modern era, 
resulting in the corresponding interest to maintain communal fictive kinship and 
fictive place. This sentiment is reinforced by Ringamr’s work on the correspondence 
between how society is represented and its conception of the individual: 
 
An Athenian was only fully a human being when participating in the political 
community where he was regarded as an equal; medieval man was a member of a 
body, or a family, outside of which he could not be imagined; the ruling elite of the 
Absolutist era were actors who acted with each other on the stage of the court.263  
 
In each instance one finds an intimate relationship between Self and community. In 
Athens, if the public realm were threatened, so to would the individual’s potential to 
‘be’. In the Middle Ages if the ‘head’ of the community was threatened then so was 
the ‘body’ and the Self. In the prince’s court, if foreign rules suddenly took hold, man 
would not know how to create the Self. This all reinforces the notion of a historical 
relationship between community and self-identity.  
 
This is not to say that there were no discrepancies between educated elites and the 
masses. For example Smith notes an ethnie’s formation only required solidarity 
amongst the elites, and that in early ages, membership of a nation may have only 
included “upper and middle class adult males.” However, “these members may 
possess intense national awareness”264 and were “repeatedly forced to take the 
cultures and interests of wider strata into account” leading to cultures that were 
“popular and ethnic in character; they assumed ties of affinity based on presumed 
common origins and shared customs, linked to regna or kingdoms, as Susan Reynolds 
has argued for early medieval Europe.”265 OS, at least for elites, therefore became 
dependent on the maintenance of the ethnie and/or nation. For peasants their 
immediate local community would have initially played this role, but as they came to 
be integrated into/recognize the larger community as envisioned by elites (or due to 
“vernacular mobilization” by “indigenous intelligentsia”)266 the ethnie/nation would 
have increasingly taken on this function.  
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Following the advent of nationalism, nations increasingly took center stage as the 
main community for individuals. In the West, states now had to espouse a nation of 
likeminded citizens. Consequently, attachment to homeland and culture “became 
ideologised and politicized…through the theory of national self determination and the 
ideals of authenticity and autonomy.”267 This “formal political philosophy…[was] 
then next to canonised by President Woodrow Wilson and the Versailles peace 
settlement of 1920.”268 In other parts of the world that were less developed, and often 
had nationalism impressed on them by Western conquers, it was premised less on “the 
ideals of mass citizenship [civic nationalism], and more on the selection of the 
contents of the myths, memories and traditions of earlier ethnies, and on communal 
attachments to the homeland and rituals of membership [ethnic nationalism].”269 Still, 
Eriksen notes, “[n]o functioning civic nationalism can be entirely divorced from 
cultural sharing…[or] a notion of relatedness, whether biological or not, in its 
collective imagery and ideology.”270 Thus even the modern western nation forged of 
equal individuals requires a sense of fictive kinship. 
 
What we find then is that the historical relationship between individuals and their 
community has continued under nations and, following the advent of nationalism, the 
modern nation-state, be they civic or ethnic (discussions on the coherence of, and 
contestation within, national narratives is addressed in Ch. 3). Following the logic 
above, this means individuals will have an interest in maintaining their respective 
nation. Because communities are imagined, being comprised of a metaphorical 
foundation of fictive kinship and geographical abstraction, the communal self (much 
like the individual self), emerges out of, and is found in, narrative.  
 
Ringmar writes the ability of man to make sense of things rests on the metaphorical 
(not literal) use of language, the shared “experiences and memories with which words 
are associated.”271 We then link these metaphors together to construct a narrative with 
a plot that gives direction and coherence to the story until the relevant problem is 
resolved  (see also Gergen and Gergen; Ezzy).272 In this sense, storytelling is “a 
prerequisite of action.”273 Since actors exist only in narrative, Ringmar posits this 
need not be limited to individuals but can apply to nations, a view later adopted in the 
works of Bially Mattern, Brand, Hansen, Steele, Waever, and Weldes et al.274 Pulling 
from Hegel, Ringmar thus notes “[w]e start by telling stories about ourselves, which 
we go on to test on people around us… Stories are told about states in much the same 
fashion” indicating, “identity-creation is a profoundly theoretical process”, a 
sentiment he derives from  Goffman, Butler, and Alexander.275 
 
While a discursive entity, national identity still rests on the ability to differentiate 
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between “us” and “them”. The narrative approach therefore still accounts for the 
spatial and temporal components of the Other 276  necessitated by the Self, 277  a 
sentiment reinforced by Prozorov in his rebuke278 of those focusing on temporal 
othering.279  It also compensates for shortcomings in conceptions of identity in IR to 
date. In particular, ‘systemic constructivists’280 focus on Meads “Me” thereby pushing 
national identity and the “I” out of the purview of discussion.281 Yet Zehfuss (see also 
Cederman)282 demonstrates how by bracketing the “I”, and taking states as given, one 
fails to address to account for domestic debates over identity, or, taking from Ringmar, 
the construction of accounts “which describe ourselves to ourselves” and are then 
tested with Others.283 Meanwhile Bially-Mattern, Steele, Zarakol, and Subotic and 
Zarakol have all questioned the impact international norms might have on the identity 
and action of states who had little say in their development.284  
 
This is why Inayatullah and Blaney reprove Wendt’s conception of  “alter” and “ego” 
as “blank slates” prior to contact; “Wendt employs first contact, but perhaps without 
considering its significance or deeper heritage. What brings alter and ego to contact? 
Why do aliens bother to come to earth...Haven’t actors already constructed some 
sense of self and some understanding of others prior to contact?”285 Similarly, 
Kratochwil notes how during first encounters “if a common reference world is 
missing, the only strategy available is falling back on one’s own conventions and 
trying out their capacity to ‘translate’. But that means that we never start out with an 
empty ‘inter’”.286 For example, Lebow notes that in Homer’s Iliad, while the Greeks 
were the Trojan’s Other (and vice versa), each held a preconceived notion of Self 
prior to interaction.287 Of course, as noted above, other story telling entities – whom 
we tell stories about the Self to – play a role in narrative construction; “What we are 
as subjects…is thus neither more nor less than the total collection of stories that we 
tell and that are told about us.”288 At the same time, the intersubjective nature of 
narrative identity can also be understood as internal soliloquies with “phantom 
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imagined others who inhabit our thoughts”,289 meaning through internal dialogue we 
can also form the Self.   
 
Channeling Laing, Steele thus concludes, “the identities of states emerge from their 
own project of the self” and while “[w]e do need the other to know we are, it is 
true…the “self does not experience the experience of others directly. The facts about 
other available to self are actions of others experienced by self” (Laing 1969:5)”290 all 
of which occurs through narrative.291 Zarakol similarly notes that while narratives 
might be impacted by past historical interactions and events, they still function as the 
prism through which nations view interaction. 292  Relatedly, as states take on 
significantly new attributes (e.g. economic growth), or have new experiences, they 
will discuss what this means for Self-narrative.293 This is all part of the consistent 
unfolding of Self, “whereby the Self comes to know itself by continuously disclosing 
the world and itself within it”.294  
 
To this end, Ernest Renan argued the nation is the intersubjective beliefs, “a soul” that 
unite a group of individuals in the past and into a projected future. It requires the 
“possession in common of a rich legacy of memories…[and] present consent, the 
desire to live together.”295 There is thus no ‘nation’ without actors viewing themselves 
through the discursive framework of that national identity.296 No nation then is 
predetermined or secure, but rely upon the continuation of narrative and recognition 
of that narrative. In this sense OS is in many ways dependent upon maintaining 
communal identity, both before, and in, modernity. This is why even early 
interactions between hunter-gathers held the potential to breed ontological insecurity 
and conflict.297 However potential does not equate to cause, difference merely creates 
the space for conflict to arise as result of non/misrecognition. To this end it helps to 
place OS within the wider spectrum of works on identity in IR theory.   
 
3.2 Identity, Difference & Conflict:  
 
The philosophical debate on the Self and Other of groups has led to two main camps. 
In one are the works of Kant and Hegel who argue in order to form the state there 
must be a negative Other around which a collective Self forms. Opposed to this are 
the works of Nietzsche and Habermas who “hope to transcend this dangerous binary 
through dialogue.”298 
 
Carl Schmitt299 takes one of the more extreme formulations of Self-Other, suggesting 
war is the best means through which to forge group identity, a dichotomy first forged 
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by Kant wherein “the price of order at home is conflict among societies.”300 Similarly 
Hegel301 argued the state was not a conglomeration of some primordial group, but 
consisted of individuals brought together for common defense against the Other. 
These concepts were soon expanded to inter-societal relations, when John Stuart Mill 
vehemently argued a common set of customs and law could never be forged between 
‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ nations, which in part explains his defense of 
imperialism,302 while “Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations makes the same kind of 
invidious distinctions.”303 
 
The necessity of a negative Other in order to form a Self, often as derived from the 
work of Foucault, has more recently been codified in many poststructuralist accounts. 
As Connolly penned, “the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves 
the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous 
surrogates.  Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into 
otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.”304  Weldes similarly writes 
“insecurity, rather than being external to the object to which it presents a threat, is 
both implicated in and an effect of the very process of establishing and reestablishing 
the object’s identity.”305 Thus Neumann argues it was the Ottoman Turk “as Europe's 
"primarily military-political other” that allowed for a sense of European shared 
identify to emerge.306 However this relationship is always in flux. As Campbell writes, 
“identity…is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. 
Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed 
by nature”.307 Because the Other is in no way a stable objective object, groups must 
constantly seek out new enemies to define the Self around.308 
 
Opposed to Kant and Hegel, Lebow cites the works of Herder, Nietzsche, Habermas 
and Rawls. These scholars argue difference relates to the lack of metaphysical truths, 
fostering an appreciation for the uniqueness of individuals and cultures. The Other is 
something that can be overcome through dialogue and understanding, allowing for 
plurality, rather than something that must be repressed. While Lebow remarks these 
works are not necessarily representative of reality, we can draw philosophical support 
elsewhere. Indeed Kant and Hegel do recognize the Self-Other dichotomy relates to a 
common humanity of man, which in turn provides the potential for eventual 
unification through a process of mutual recognition. This potential for positive 
identification is found in the work of Taylor who argued identity is partially shaped 
by recognition, or lack there of, 309 while Berenskoetter has shown how a ‘friend’ can 
become one’s significant Other.310 Meanwhile Honnerth argues non or misrecognition 
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is the foundation of social conflict,311 a sentiment also found in Ringmar’s work and 
one with important implications regarding the relationship between OS and foreign 
policy (Ch.3).  
 
Much like philosophy, psychology has historically focused on group cohesion being 
equated to out-group hostility, a concept that draws back to William Graham 
Summer’s work on ethnocentrism; “[t]he relationship of comradeship and peace in the 
we-group and that of hostility and war towards other-groups are correlative of each 
other.”312 Later Henri Tajfel and advocates of Social Identity Theory (SIT)313 noted 
the positive self-identification individuals hold with groups they are members of, 
leading not only to a sense of self-esteem but also a positive bias towards ones own 
group and a correlating prejudice toward others. SIT theory has been adopted in IR to 
provide an ideational cause of conflict, for example with Mercer utilizing it to support 
neorealism.314 However Creppell and Gries315 have been quick to highlight that, much 
as Tajfel argued, SIT cannot be seen as an explanation for social or political 
conflict.316 The human inclination towards group membership and the group need for 
positive identification does not in and of itself mean there will be conflict.  
 
The preeminent work supporting this claim is by Gordon Allport, who found “in-
groups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and, sometimes, for 
them. Hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is 
not required” The “familiar is preferred. What is alien is regarded as somehow 
inferior, less “good,” but there is not necessarily hostility against it” 317 Elaborating on 
Allport’s claims, Brewer notes that “[i]ndeed, results from both laboratory 
experiments and field studies indicate that variations in ingroup positivity and social 
identification do not systemically correlate with degrees of bias or negativity toward 
outgroups.” 318  Seymour Feshbach meanwhile found that “individual aggression 
proved to be weakly correlated to the index of attitudes toward war” and was of little 
use in differentiating between a ‘hawk’ or ‘dove’ amongst decision-makers.319   
 
Brewer’s work similarly substantiates the claim made earlier that, employing the 
work of Pagel, communities could be seen as forming around the need to delineate 
altruistic compatriots. For one, she notes how “cross-cultural evidence documents the 
universality of social differentiation into ingroups and outgroups at some level beyond 
the family or social village,” all of which are not engaged in intense (or even mild) 
conflict with an Other.320 Instead, she remarks on how as a species we have come to 
rely on cooperation and social learning, rather than strength, for survival, which raised 
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the problem of trust for “altruism must be contingent on the probability that others 
will cooperate as well.” This could be overcome by constructing clear group 
boundaries, with ingroups defined as “bounded communities of mutual trust and 
obligation that delimit mutual interdependence and cooperation,” leading one to feel 
positive about fellow, altruistic, members while also adhering to “ingroup norms of 
appearance and behavior that assure that one will be recognized as a good or 
legitimate ingroup member.”321    
 
What we find then, is that the existence of nationalism or difference in and of itself 
tells us little about the likelihood for conflict; on both a philosophical and 
psychological level, we cannot a-priori expect difference or nepotism to generate 
conflict. Difference is merely conducive to conflict, providing space for potential 
challenges or non/misrecognition of narrative to arise.  
 
4. An Ontological Security Argument  
 
Traditional approaches to security studies have been faulted due to their truncated 
approach, beginning with the state rather than the individual as the subject of security. 
Meanwhile efforts to introduce the concept of identity into security studies, while a 
step in the right direction, have struggled to fully address questions of how and why it 
is important. Similarly, works on North Korea employing more traditional approaches 
are unable to account for behavior often at odds with theoretical expectations, while 
ideational explanations often overlook mechanisms of process. An OS framework 
helps to address these various shortcomings.  
 
By refocusing security studies to start with the individual, we find one of the most 
basic principles behind feeling secure is the maintenance of OS; the security of the 
self that spans the entirety of one’s lifecycle. Rather than a theory of security that 
limits analysis solely to the physical realm, there is a need both theoretically, and 
within the context of North Korea, to incorporate the concept of OS. States will 
behave as if they have OS needs since policymakers, who effectively run states, are 
motivated by this basic need. Therefore, analysts employing OS must examine 
domestic, rather than international, institutions in order to form predictions on state 
behavior. In other words, there is a shift towards the culturist focus on domestic 
ideational factors driving state behavior as opposed to the oft-criticized systemic 
constructivist approach. This is not to say the international system has no bearing on 
foreign policy, but that states will react differently to the international system in 
accordance with their own diverse social institutions.   
 
OS deals with the security of being, meaning man must have answers to what and 
why he is doing, a reflexive process that requires bracketing the infinite possibilities 
associated with social activity. This is accomplished when one can maintain a 
perceived consistent self-identity, the stability of which is intertwined with the 
Umwelt, a protective cocoon of seeming normality maintained through daily routines 
and rituals. In most instances therefore, OS is an inconsequential factor because it is 
tied to normalcy, we are not forced to think of it in the mundane moments of life. 
However some situations, termed personal crises, pose a threat to the Unmelt and to 
our sense of being, and we in turn become driven by OS needs. These moments of 
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personal crisis act as a trigger and force us to react in order to reassert normalcy. 
Contrary to Giddens, such OS threats need not necessarily be tied to modernity (or the 
‘modern’ Western Liberal state) but pertain more to the fundamental relationship 
between individuals and communities.  
 
Going back to the earliest communities of man, it was necessary for a society of 
individuals to form rituals and routines that would allow them to discern altruistic 
others, thereby overcoming our genetic predisposition not to work together. This 
relationship continues today, with one’s community still structuring acceptable 
lifestyles while also providing the metanarrative individuals seek to nest themselves 
within. Consequently, OS threats should be interpreted as threats to the foundation of 
community in pre and post modernity. This process can help explain current gaps in 
our understanding of North Korea specifically and security theory more broadly, with 
states acting in certain ways due to a perceived personal crisis. 
 
The largest community of man today is, for the most part, the nation, a discursive 
entity emerging out of narrative. A ‘personal crisis’ will thereby emerge when there is 
a challenge to this narrative. It is not the presence of difference therefore, or the 
notion that we need an enemy in order to form a Self, that drives conflict. Instead 
when faced with a personal crisis states will react to try and counter the stimuli and 
preserve OS, undertaking policies that might in turn lead to conflict. This process is 
further refined in Chapter 3 by drawing on social representation theory and 


























Ontological Security in Foreign Policy Decision-Making:  
Forging a Framework 
 
Chapter 2 established the need to examine OS and the interplay between national 
narrative and the individual Umwelt. Chapter 3 seeks to now specify the process 
through which OS impacts decision-making, and in doing so attempts to overcome 
gaps in FPA and current literature on OS.  The chapter begins with a brief synopsis of 
the field to date. It then goes on to explore social representation theory (SRT), which 
is argued to be vital in further explaining how and why national narratives structure 
policymakers’ interpretations and images of others, as well as further elaborating on 
the emotional connection between individuals and their community. Following this 
brief overview, and the justification for temporally bracketing national narratives, it 
becomes possible to further address gaps in FPA, developing the specific mechanisms 
through which OS impacts decision-making.  
 
Works on OS that have been applied to the state level make a similar claim as the 
dissertation – that states are motivated by OS to maintain national narrative. However, 
the dissertation shifts away from these works on four points. 1, rather than treating 
states as the subject of OS, which they maintain through routinized relations with 
other states (Mitzen, Rumeleli), focus is shifted to the fundamental relationship 
between individuals and communities and how narratives underscoring the latter can 
become threatened, generating an OS threat.  2, this argument was created by 
critically analyzing Giddens’ focus on modernity, something most OS works have not 
done (with Zarakol’s recent work proving the exception). Thus while some have 
drawn on nationalism (Subotic, Kinnvall, Skey), they have not examined the 
historical relationship between communities and individuals noted by nationalist 
scholars, a sentiment Chapter 2 further explored in the context of evolutionary 
biology. In doing so, the dissertation was able to further elaborate on the relationship 
between OS and one’s community, arguing that individuals in both pre-modern and 
post-modern communities have an interest in maintaining communal narrative (not 
necessarily relationships with other states). 3, while Steele also focuses on how 
constructed national narratives can become threatened, he focuses on instances of 
‘critical situations’ rather than what Chapter 2 termed a ‘personal crisis’; the former, 
it is argued, results in the re-articulation of narrative, the latter in the reassertion of 
narrative. 4, by integrating literature from FPA and SRT, it becomes possible to 
further theorize how perceived OS threats impact the images states form and the 
implications this has for foreign policy (Boulding, Holsti, Hurwitz, Hurwitz and 
Peffley), something current OS literature has failed to elaborate on322 (though Subotic 
and Zarakol touch on perceptions briefly). 
 
1. Communal Narrative, Ontological Security, and FPA 
 
Following WWII, FPA - especially in the U.S. - was influenced by two central tracks 
of thought.  One was a call to improve the institutions designated to conduct foreign 
policy, and an interrelated “plea for the democratization of foreign policy.” Contrary 
                                                




to these heavily ideological approaches was Morgenthau’s realism, which sought to 
focus on how states seek to maximize power. Following this divide, the 1950’s and 
1960’s saw the interjection of the behaviorist turn in social science, leading FPA to 
try and forge a “unified theory and a methodology based on aggregate analysis”, an 
initiative that ultimately failed and “had to be rejected as empirically impracticable 
and analytically unfruitful.” 323  Despite this behaviorist intrusion, other works 
continued to focus on the processes behind foreign policy decision-making.  
 
Here, the focus was on foreign policy as “best understood as the product of a 
country’s internal dynamics.”324 As argued in Chapter 2, there is a need for renewed 
focus on “Innenpolitik” (domestic factors) in foreign policy. In so doing, the thesis 
moves away from those focusing on organizational process, such as groupthink 
(Herrmann, Janis, Tetlock), bureaucratic politics (Graham Allison) and Steinbruner’s 
cybernetic processes,325 to focus instead on broader state interests and perceptions. An 
OS framework thus finds itself at the intersection of agency-based, social-
institutional, and interpretive actor-based approaches to FPA, and could help 
strengthen sub approaches in these fields by fusing them into a more holistic 
approach. Unfortunately, current approaches to FPA remain underutilized within OS 
works despite the potential to provide further insight into how we might conceptualize 
the process through which OS influences foreign policy; while Subotic and Subotic 
and Zarakol do make some preliminary connections, they are never elaborated on.326 
To this end, and in line with the theoretical arguments of Chapter 2, the OS 
framework presented here is distinguishable from, and reformulates, previous OS 
works on a number of points.  
 
To begin, it challenges Steele’s assertion that work on OS should focus on instances 
of ‘critical situations’. This insistence, it is argued, problematizes his larger 
theoretical framework. Giddens writes, “[b]y ‘critical situations’ I mean 
circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affects substantial 
numbers of individuals, situations that threaten to destroy the certitude of 
institutionalized routines.”327 As an example, he presents the experience of Jews in 
concentration camps, or “being under fire on the battlefield for prolonged periods of 
time, [or] forced interrogation and torture.” Steele goes on to link critical situations to 
those instances when “agents, including states, are challenged by certain situations in 
their environment because those situations threatened their self-identities.”328  
 
Steele references, for example, England’s decision to abstain from entering the 
American Civil War after the Emancipation Proclamation and U.S. intervention in 
Kosovo after failing to do so in Rwanda. Yet these examples seem at odds with those 
provided by Giddens; it is hard to conceptualize the impact of the Emancipation 
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Proclamation on England as related, to say, prolonged torture. Critical situations are 
those that overwhelm the Unmelt, forcing one to rearticulate narrative. 329 At the state 
level this could include, for example, colonization. It would therefore appear as 
though theoretically, Steele is actually focused on a personal crisis, when the Umwelt 
is punctured, forcing one to reassert narrative (Ch. 2: 2.2). 330  While both are of 
interest to OS, when attempting to account for state behavior the latter would appear 
the more fruitful focal point, encompassing problems faced by states on a more 
frequent basis. This has further implications for OS literature.  
 
For one, it has some bearing on Subotic’s conceptualization of OS and policy change. 
Subotic’s work seems to come in response to Innes and Steele’s claim that some 
‘critical situations’ can force and actor to rewrite their collective narrative; for 
example the 9/11 attacks “brought with it movement away from the multicultural US 
identity, and enforced policies that were illiberal and which held a particular 
perception of American identity.”331 In line with the above reading, however, this 
would again appear to be more a personal crisis rather than a ‘critical situation.’ 
Additionally, the extent to which these shifts represented a ‘re-articulation’ of 
narrative is questionable. Instead, it would seem – as Subotic argues – that policy 
changes can be made through the de/activation of derivative narratives while the 
metanarrative as a whole remains in tact. Importantly, however, this can only be seen 
as possible during a personal crisis, when there is, in Subotic’s words a “rupture” that 
needs to be addressed, and not when the Umwelt is overwhelmed (as occurs during a 
critical situation).332 States can thus adjust behavior in response to a personal crisis, 
with changes often justified by de/activating derivative narratives. This flows into the 
second point, that policymakers must reflexively determine what a situation means to 
national narrative and what behavior will offset possible negative implications. 
 
This, in turn, challenges the theoretical foundation of Mitzen, who applies the work of 
Mercer and SIT to argue states obtain OS through routinized inter-state relations (a 
position similarly taken by Rumeleli). 333  As Krolikowski demonstrates, this 
framework is dependent upon trust type.334 Giddens does not suggest that we blindly 
follow routines; to do so is suggestive of a neurotic compulsion derived from a failure 
to develop basic trust. Normally, we “act or think innovatively in relation to pre-
established modes of activity”. 335  Krolikowski concludes Mitzen must then 
presuppose that states have low trust. Given this reading, a number of problems arise.  
 
To begin, the ontologically insecure, those who succumb to what Laing terms an inner 
deadness and compulsively focus on danger, are “people… [who] may seek to ‘blend 
with the environment’ so as to escape being the target of the dangers which haunt 
them.”336 This hardly sounds like the belligerent state engaged in constant conflict. 
Secondly, as argued earlier, communities are not founded upon relations with an 
Other, as Mitzen contends,337 but on reflexively forged narratives, which in turn 
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provide OS for individuals. While this narrative is often the result of previous 
interactions (Zarakol), building from past chosen traumas and glories (Kinnvall),338 it 
still becomes the lens through which policymakers, and thus states, reflexively 
interpret their environment. In terms of behavioral expectations then, states can learn 
from interaction and adjust – e.g. a friend can become an enemy. At the same time, as 
an institution tasked with mediating individuals’ relationship with death, Huysmans 
notes the state is required to guarantee “an acceptable degree of certainty.” 339 Thus 
when faced with a personal crisis - when national narrative is challenged - individuals 
(and policymakers) will seek to reassert the narrative. 340  This holds even for 
ontologically secure individuals since national narrative is more than a ritual, it is the 
foundation upon which rituals and lifestyles reside; it is the foundation of reality.341  
 
This helps to offset arguments that OS and the Self has become conflated with 
identity.342 The individual Self, it was noted, is far from a coherent entity. Importantly, 
however, it was argued that individuals nest narratives, with continuity sought at the 
communal (national) level. It is because the Self is in flux that we seek to place 
ourselves within larger and seemingly more stable entities; entities that also play a 
vital role in helping construct the Self. Thus while individuals can, and often do, deal 
with change, threats to the community pose a larger threat to Self (a personal crisis), 
since the community underscores the various routines and rituals we engage in (and 
reflexively create the Self through), while also providing the very narrative we expect 
to be continuous. Ideational threats to the community thus threaten the OS of its 
members because their ability to maintain stability is called into question. Importantly, 
this means that while some entities may become ‘securitized’ when they pose an 
ideational threat to the community, they can also become ‘desecuritized’ when this 
threat recedes. None of this is to say communal narratives never change (as discussed 
below they can and do), but that individuals seek out continuity at the communal level, 
with changes usually surrounding the de/activation of derivative narratives.  
 
This argument emerged out of a larger reading of works on narrative approaches to 
the Self, evolutionary biology, and nationalist studies, that all indicate a historical 
relationship between community and OS.  Unfortunately, a majority of OS work has 
failed to critically evaluate Giddens’ conception of OS vis-à-vis modernity. Zarakol is 
perhaps the exception here, having recently examined how, going back to pre-Axiel 
societies, both religious and political institutions have taken on the role of an 
institutionalized OS provider.343 The dissertation took a slightly different tact in 
Chapter 2, examining the more general relationship that has historically existed 
between communities and individuals. Consequently, while scholars have looked at 
the relationship between nationalism and OS (Subotic, Skey),344 particularly within 
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modernity (Kinnvall, Krolikowski),345 they have not integrated the larger historical 
relationships many nationalist authors (Smith, Gellner) have noted exist between 
national/pre-national communities and individuals. 
 
Zarakol’s work can be seen as still supporting this argument, while also interjecting a 
further focus on the organizational structure of said communities as either civic or 
religious. To this end, even when religious institutions are the dominant OS provider, 
political institutions would be expected to uphold the overarching narrative of that 
community, one that would undoubtedly have, in such instances, a greater religious 
component. Conversely, in modern times, where the state has taken the larger role of 
an OS provider, communal narratives have become far more civic in nature. The 
overall relationship between individual and community however, remains the same.  
 
From this, we can argue there has been a historical interest in maintaining communal 
(national) narratives in order to maintain OS, a relationship that continues today.346 
As will be argued, this in turn helps demonstrate the importance of cognition, 
schemas, perceptions and images (agency-based) in state foreign policy decision-
making,347 while expanding on the relationship between policy-makers and the social 
structures they function within (social institutional-based). 348 At the same time, it 
reformulates the relationship between identity and interests often found in social 
institutional (constructivist) approaches, positing policymakers have an interest in 
maintaining national narrative. Inline with SRT, policymakers will thus re-present 
new information to determine if it is threatening or non-threatening to the norm (to 
national narrative). Those events seen as threatening can generate a personal crisis, 
and thus a negative image of the stimuli. This leads to appropriate schemas and 
postures aimed at reasserting national narrative.  
 
This prism also becomes the lens through which policymakers’ device plans for the 
future, actively seeking to assert and gain recognition of national narrative, a 
sentiment that touches on the importance of national role conceptions (interpretive 
actor-based), and how states plan for the future. States will thus also seek to gain 
recognition of their narrative from Others and may embed “their particular narratives 
in a shared vision of international order with other states identified as 
friends…[meaning] states seek relationships with other states that recognize each 
other’s basic principles as valid parameters for normal behavior”.349 State behavior is 
therefore related to promoting and, when challenged, reasserting national narrative.  
  
2. SRT & National Narratives: Structuring and Content   
 
SRT helps to further elucidate the relationship between individuals and society and 
the process by which policymakers’ frame and react to external stimuli. It also begins 
to establish how narratives can be both manipulated through human agency while at 
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the same time structuring human agents. This is further explored in the context of 
Anthony Smith’s work on nations and Gordon Allport’s work on reference groups.  
 
Moscovici was first to coin the term SRT in his attempts to move away from the main 
tenants of social psychology; that individuals understand and perceive the world as it 
is.350  Instead our world should be viewed as being comprised of representations, 
whose grips we can never entirely escape despite references to an outside world.351 
They are the “collective elaboration ‘of a social object by a community for the 
purpose of behaving and communicating”, turning it into reality.352 As Jaspars and 
Fraser thus show, “attitudes353 are usually defined as learned predispositions and as 
such are conceived as being social in origin”, and are often “shared by individuals 
belonging to the same social group.” Individual responses should thus be examined 
within the context of collective representations. 354 
 
Social representations work to “conceptualize the objects, persons, and events we 
encounter”, providing them with form and categorizing them so that they become 
representative of a type; “even when a person or an object doesn’t conform precisely 
to the model, we constrain it…to enter a given category.”355 This process is called ‘re-
presentation’, wherein we make the unfamiliar familiar, allowing us to cope with new 
phenomena and avoid “a sense of incompleteness and randomness”. This is why the 
“people belonging to other cultures, are disturbing, because they are like us, and yet 
not like us; So we say they are ‘uncultured’, ’barbarian’, ‘irrational’ and so on.” 356 
The need to transform the unknowable so as to maintain “predictability” relates 
directly to OS,357 as “[potentially] losing touch with what provides a sense of 
continuity, of mutual understanding is an unbearable dread.”358  
 
Society then is a “system of values, ideas and practices,” a sort of ‘consensual 
universe’ comprised of mutually shared representations where everyone feels at 
home.359 Smith similarly notes how the spatial and territorial components of nations 
helps to establish boundaries of a home360 while Kinnvall speaks to how home 
provides the “secure base on which identities are constructed.”361 By taking this sense 
of home to be equivalent to the Umwelt, we can begin to form a picture of how 
communities approach, and undertake, social interaction.  
 
Drawing from Chapter 2, we can view communal (national) narrative as one of the 
most important social representations. This narrative thus becomes the lens through 
which policymakers interpret and respond to new information. As Moscovici writes 
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of ‘home’, “all that is said and done there only confirms acquired beliefs and 
interpretations…memory prevails over deduction, the past over the present, response 
over stimuli and images over ‘reality”,362 a structuring effect Howarth views as 
analogues to ideologies; “representations of who we are, what we stand for, what our 
values are and what our relationships with others are.” 363 In short, new experiences 
enter into a preexisting reality of policymakers adopted during socialization,364 
leading Pagel to remark “it is difficult to escape the feeling that we seem to imprint 
our cultures, and in a way that is hard to shake off.”365 Legro concludes, “cultural 
biases tend to produce conclusions that reinforce, not critically assess, existing 
beliefs”, biases that are “reminiscent of the cognitive and motivational distortions 
discussed in the psychological literature (Jervis 1976; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; 
Khong 1992).”366 National narratives are thus the prisms through which stimuli are 
perceived and OS threats detected.  
 
Before further elaborating on this process (section 4), one must first address questions 
of agency and structure vis-à-vis representations. Despite their structuring effect, 
representations are formed, debated and revised by human agency.367 However, it is 
argued that it is still possible to temporally bracket representation of national 
narrative, and by focusing on key components of these narratives one can still make 
useful generalizations in regards to state behavior in line with an OS framework, all of 
which helps to overcome current gaps in ideational approaches to FPA (section 3).  
 
2.1 Agency in National Narratives:  
 
Adopting a social representation approach means national narratives cannot be an 
independent object removed from human agency; national narratives can, and do, 
change. This is a result of the ongoing consensus-building project that representations 
rely upon, with often “multiple representations of the same social objects.” This 
potential plurality allows for possible “communication, negotiations, resistance, 
innovation and transformation.”368 Narratives are thus formed as the result of, and are 
then maintained through, an inherently political process, all of which demonstrates 
individual agency.  
 
For one, this has to due with the selective process of narrative formation. Memories of 
the past play a key component in national narratives. However history is not a static 
entity; individuals creatively evoke interpretations of the past to fashion a particular 
discourse. Here, Bell emphasizes the difference between myths and memory. 
Collective memory is a “socially-framed property of individual minds” formed 
through interaction between those who directly experienced the event. In this sense, 
much of what is usually associated with ‘collective memory’ is not mnemonic but 
“mythical.”369 Tellingly, Renan writes, “forgetting, I would even say historical error, 
                                                
362 Moscovici, “The Phenomenon”, pg. 24 
363 Caroline Howarth, “A Social representation is not a quiet thing: exploring the critical potential of social representation theory” 
British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2006), pg. 79 
364 As Berger and Luckmann write, identity is thus a reference to a particular place within a particular world outside of which he 
cannot be understood. Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, pg. 150-152 
365 This is largely due to the fact that the world of ideas, or what Richard Dawkins terms as “memes”, are cultural replicators 
whose sole focus, like genes, are to be replicated. Pagel, Wired, pg. 5 
366 Legro, “Culture” pg. 121 
367 Depending on the persuasiveness of the new interpretation, a social group may form around, or a preexisting group may 
adopt, the new representation. Howarth, “Social representation” pg. 75, 77-78  
368 Ibid, pg. 79, 68  
369 Bell, “Mythscapes” pg. 65  
 56 
is an essential factor in the creation of a nation”370 a sentiment also touched on by 
Berger and Luckmann. 371 Communities such as the nation are therefore founded not 
upon memories, but upon a shared myth; a constructed “story that simplifies, 
dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and its place in the 
world…that elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past.”372   
 
Agency also arises given the overlap between legitimacy and being perceived as a 
guarantor of OS; as Ringmar writes, “the state can be understood as the political 
guardian of this [national] story-telling community.”373 Politicians thus actively work 
to maintain perceptions of continuity. To this end Marlow explores what he terms the 
“generalized, more mundane and everyday aspects” of governance and efforts “to 
create an inherently social, relatively stable and shared sense of being.” 374 By looking 
at one of the four aspects of government found in work on ‘governmentality’,375 that 
as a “‘thoughtful and rational’ activity”, Marlow argues one of the underlying 
rationalities behind modern governance “is an implicit (if not explicit) recognition of, 
and attending to, forms of ontological insecurity…within general populaces.” Politics 
thus revolves around the anticipation of public emotional reactions in an attempt to 
act accordingly, thereby forging an emotional connection that “operates as part of an 
overall matrix of OS for the public at large.”376  
 
It is perhaps more fitting, however, to see a government’s legitimacy as intimately 
tied to its ability to appear as the guarantor, rather than primary source, of OS.377 As 
Liu and Hilton note, historical charters outline the “do’s and don’ts” of a 
community.378 By abiding these rules, politicians uphold the community and preempt 
public emotional reactions to perceived discontinuity. Consequently, the legitimacy of 
a community’s governing institutions is related to its ability to provide the populace 
with a sense that past events, present actions, and future plans are all in accordance 
with national narrative. This all requires creativity and agency, and can lead to 
political debates. As Berenskoetter writes: 
 
A master narrative is sufficiently vague to exist alongside more specific, derivative 
narratives that can be either layered or interwoven, and that can be strategically 
employed without hurting the coherence of the basic discourse. Maintaining such a 
narrative, or network of narratives, is a form of governance.379 
 
Politicians will seek to legitimize present and future actions in terms of either the 
metanarrative as a whole, or in regards to specific derivative narratives. Given the 
range of perspectives based on “ethnicity, class, gender and age”, Bell argues it is 
therefore more appropriate to refer to ‘national mythscapes’; a discursive realm “in 
which the myths of the nation are forged, transmitted, reconstructed and negotiated 
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constantly.”380 This is not to say, however, that agents have complete free will to 
rewrite or rearticulate the narrative at hand. While recognizing the agency of 
individuals, especially in regards to the manipulation of derivative narratives, the 
metanarrative can not only takes on periods of relative stability, it also limits the 
extent to which manipulation and change can occur. This includes the extent to which 
debates over the past can successfully challenge the established narrative or an 
established narrative can be stretched to allow for new experiences or behavior to fit.  
 
2.2 Structures of Metanarratives:   
 
Like Bell, Anthony Smith suggests that internal diversity most likely prevents a 
“single, unified version of the communal past emerging in any relatively free 
society”. While seemingly unified to the outside, ethnic (communal) myths reveal 
“divergent traditions from which different strata and groups within the ethnic 
community may draw strength, identity, and meaning,” which can lead to “quite 
distinct, even opposed courses of action.”381 A conservative upper-class will usually 
emphasize a genealogical pedigree (biological – alleged blood ties), while more 
“radical aspirants” trumpet “ideological affinity with a model of antique nobility” 
(cultural-ideological – spiritual kinship). Moreover, myths are consistently “being 
reinterpreted and revised by various social groups in response to internal differences 
and external stimuli…[meaning] national identity is never fixed or static”.382 
 
However two important qualifications must be made, which in turn reduces the 
potential for the level of manipulation or change seen in poststructuralist accounts. 
For one, Smith argues that reconstruction by subsequent generations is conducted 
with “certain limits” in place and that even instrumentalists “must come to terms with 
the basic myths and symbols which endow popular perceptions of ethnic boundaries 
and identities…and which mediate changes in those identities set in motion by 
external forces”.383 Smith further elaborates on how competing myths found along 
social divisions “are analogous to family feuds in which each branch or individual 
aims to achieve its due within the overall nexus of kin security and status.” Despite 
their differences, because these myths “refer to the selfsame community and its 
history, different sections of the community find themselves enclosed within one 
national circle…a clearly bounded social and territorial identity…[which] it becomes 
progressively more difficult to opt out.”384 Moreover, in the long term: 
 
the rival definitions of national identity tend to merge; by provoking encounters with 
other national communities, by seeking title-deeds to disputed territories, they 
coalesce to form a community which, while still riven by social conflicts, has become 
more unified at the level of history and culture, and more sharply differentiated from 
other cultural communities.385 
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Therefore, despite the presence of ‘mythscapes’, the manifestation of a community 
necessitates a common metanarrative; “no national movement and no persisting 
ethnic identity can emerge without a bedrock of shared meanings and ideals.”386 
Similarly Ringmar notes, “through public discussions and obfuscations, some 
dominant account usually emerge [within the community].”387 Once this occurs, those 
key elements of the metanarrative begin to take on more of a structuring effect, 
especially when allied to a state.388 Subotic and Zarakol thus write, individual habitus 
is greatly influenced by one’s nation as the latter becomes institutionalized and 
“responsible for ensuring that the most different people of a society acquire the same 
characteristics, possess the same national habitus’.”389 This all provides a retort to 
postmodernists, for while nations are ‘contingent’ they are “nevertheless situated, 
ordered and bound.”390  This sentiment is reinforced by Liu and Hilton’s ‘historical 
affordances,’ the “elaborated repertoire of interrelated symbols and representations 
that not only constrains the extent to which new representations can be brought into 
play, but also contain agreed upon facts that may be exploited politically.” They are 
the stories and ‘facts’ that are presented in “media practices, monuments, educational 
textbooks, and the stories people are told as children and tell their grandchildren,”391 
further solidifying their position and limiting debate.  
 
This relates to the fact that, as Caughey asserts, we have come to place trust in 
‘vicarious social experiences’ such as those we have with the media, television, and 
politicians. 392   Because these ‘vicarious social experiences’ are constituted by 
‘historical affordances’ there is further reluctance to challenge what has become 
accepted as ‘true’. Consequently, the “agencies of popular socialization – primarily 
the public system of education and the mass media – have been handed the task of 
ensuring a common public mass culture…an idea central to Ernest Gellner’s own 
theory of nationalism”.393 Historical affordances further suggest that metanarratives 
not only limit the extent to which debates on the past occur, but also the extent to 
which new experiences, or plans for the future, can be placed within the context of the 
narrative, a sentiment similar to what has been coined the Overton Window. Here the 
“"window" of politically acceptable options…shifts to include different policy options 
not when ideas change among politicians, but when ideas change in the society that 
elects them.”394 While societal ideas can change, such processes are much slower and 
allow for temporal bracketing, a sentiment found in Hurwtiz and Peffley’s work on 
the resiliency of ‘general beliefs.’395  
 
We can equate this metanarrative to Boulding’s national image. While the powerful 
are well placed to manipulate the images of the masses, Boulding and Ringmar396 
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warn against taking this position to the extreme, with Hopf noting how society has 
repeatedly proved less easy to move than postmodernists would expect.397 Rather than 
a constructed entity forced upon the masses, Boulding notes that most national images 
are transferred from parent to child; “the image is essentially a mass image…a "folk 
image.”398 Images can also be, and often are, linked to representations of the past; 
“[t]he more conscious a people is of its history, the stronger the national image is 
likely to be. To be an Englishman is to be conscious of "1066 and All That" rather 
than of "Constantine and All That," or "1776 and All That.”399  
 
Relatively new nations can thus still posses strong, largely encompassing, national 
images derived from a common historical representation of a shared past, for example 
colonization. Indeed as Lebow notes, this is the very foundation of nationalism for 
Hans Kohn, Carleton J.H. Hayes and Karl Deutch,400 while Holsti argues historical 
rather than value based national images might be stronger; in the U.S., for example, a 
moral traditionalist and a liberal progressive are united by their common ‘history’. He 
goes on to write:  
 
The written word and public education contribute enormously to the stability and 
persistence of the national images. The Jews, for instance, are a creation of the Bible 
and the Talmud, but every nation has its bible…noble words like the Declaration of 
Independence and the Gettysburg Address - which crystallize the national image in a 
form that can be transmitted almost unchanged from generation to generation.401 
 
In new postcolonial states the ‘Bible’ could be seen as canonized revolutionary 
writings that emerged to combat the colonizers, much like the Declaration of 
Independence. Indeed Liu and Hilton note that across ethnic and regional groups 
“recent and foundational events [were] nominated by lay people more frequently than 
intermediate events in time” as paramount to national identity. 402  While modern 
society has more “dynamic and fluid representational fields,”403 the very function of 
national images has been to provide a consistent foundation for the community, 
becoming more robust as they are fused into the lay knowledge of society, with 
intuitions “lend[ing] the narrative a material infrastructure that can sustain it across 
generations.”404  To this end even Hansen, a self-touted poststructuralist, concludes, 
“it is thus misleading to say…that identity is easily changed or that history does not 
matter.” Instead: 
 
Foreign-policy problems are…not handled de novo as their solution is written into a 
discursive terrain that is already partially structured through previously articulated 
and institutionalized identities…policies that radically break with these constructions 
is not impossible, but it is a daunting task, and in particular when political opposition 
can mobilize these historically (re)produced constructions.405  
 
Therefore, as Krebs writes, “not all conceivable policies can be legitimated in the 
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public sphere, and that which cannot be legitimated cannot be pursued over the long 
haul”, with legitimation derived from how well policies can be linked to dominant 
narratives.406 While his focus is on national security narratives, we can link this to 
narratives of national identity. Indeed, he later notes, “[e]ven in times of crisis, leaders 
cannot deploy just any story before public audiences. Those stories must be faithful to 
deeper identity narratives, which are fairly stable and only occasionally challenged.” 
For example, to challenge ‘American exceptionalism’ is “to relegate oneself to the 
margins” and while the idea is “sufficiently flexible to have sustained policies that are 
diametrically opposed” debates are still centered on how to “advance their national 
mission of spreading freedom and democracy…not whether they are so obligated.”407  
Thus, while politicians have agency to manipulate narratives to facilitate policy 
change – “emphasiz[ing] some parts of the story and conveniently forget[ing] others”, 
the change still “has the fit within the overall narrative schematic template to make 
sense to the public.” 408 
 
The thesis concludes there are roughly three levels of social disruption to the 
metanarrative that provide varying room for debate, a sentiment similar to 
institutional views on change (Elman).409 The first is a fateful moment, when the 
metanarrative is overwhelmed, forcing its re-articulation. This provides room for 
more large-scale debates amongst social cleavages as to what the metanarrative ought 
to entail. The second is what was previously termed a personal crisis, wherein the 
metanarrative (or a particular derivative narrative) is not overwhelmed, but challenged, 
generating an OS threat. Here the community will seek to creatively reassert the 
metanarrative (or derivative narrative if it is in a position of power). The last pertains 
to instances when the metanarrative is not overwhelmed or challenged, but when there 
is a need to incorporate new realities. Smith thus notes how myths tend to emerge, 
“into the political daylights” during period of accelerated social and economic change, 
incipient secularization, and prolonged periods of warfare.410 In effect, the community 
must seek to determine what new realities mean the communal Self, with social 
cleavages potentially championing competing derivative narratives, but not 
necessarily challenging the metanarrative – part of the ‘consistent unfolding of self’ 
that was noted earlier.  
 
Brand’s investigation into the extent to which states alter narratives when faced with a 
crisis helps justify these conclusion.411 She found that the largest transformations 
occurred during a contested transfer of power, while only small changes occurred 
following uncontested transfers, wars (be they a perceived victory or defeat) and 
social unrest. Most of these changes, including larger ones during contested power 
transformation, primarily involved the de/activation of derivative narratives or re-
interpreting core components of the metanarrative. 412  Indeed, despite her more 
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“instrumentalized conception of narrative,”413 she writes, “[s]ome story lines may 
have such a long history in the official narrative that it would seem heretical – that is 
to say, be impossible – to remove them,”414 and later remarks on how “founding 
stories seem particularly resistant to change.”415 Consequently, while actors have 
more freedom to manipulate derivative narratives, it is really only when faced with a 
larger fateful moment that space is provided for a challenge to the metanarrative.  
 
This still leaves questions regarding the disposition of subgroups towards the 
metanarrative. As Michael Skey, building from Ghassan Hage, has argued, “different 
groups are perceived to be (and made to feel) ‘more or less national than 
others’…those groups who possess greater ‘national cultural capital’…are able to 
position themselves (and are recognised) as unconditionally belonging to the nation” 
which in turn provides a greater degree of OS. 416  Accordingly, “while, such 
frameworks are rightly scrutinized in terms of the inequalities they often generate and 
sustain” they also “underpin complex social systems that large numbers can rely 
on.”417 At the same time, while metanarratives may align more with a nation’s ‘core’ 
group – in Skey’s investigation this was England’s ‘ethnic majority’– it is also 
possible to view metanarratives as capable of encompassing social divisions.  
 
This finds resonance with Allport’s work on in-groups and reference groups. In-
groups pertain to many of the social cleavages noted above, such as family, city, class 
and race; “members of an in-group all use the term we with the same essential 
significance.” Taking from Sherif and Sherif, Allport defines reference groups as 
those which “the individual relates himself as a part, or to which he aspires to relate 
himself psychologically.”418 Importantly, he notes how many different in-groups are 
found within a larger society, meaning some minority in-groups will ultimately be 
marginalized. However, the larger society will still come to form the reference group 
for these minorities: 
 
Every minority groups finds itself in a larger society where many customs, many 
values, many practices are prescribed. The minority group member is thus to some 
degree forced to make the dominant majority his reference group in respect to 
language, manners, morals and law. He may be entirely loyal to his minority in—
group, but he is at the same time always under the necessity of relating himself to the 
standards and expectations of the majority.419 
 
E.S. Bogardus’ social experiments on ‘social distance’, investigating to what extent 
individuals in the U.S. would admit members of various ethnic and national groups, 
helps substantiate this point. Across the spectrum English and Canadians were 
consistently seen as acceptable candidates for becoming fellow citizens, neighbors, 
etc., while “Hindus, Turks, Negros” were not. Allport thus writes:  
 
we are forced to conclude that the member of an ethnic minority tends to fashion his 
attitudes as does the dominant majority. In other words, the dominant majority is for 
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him a reference group. It exerts a strong pull on him, forcing attitudinal conformity. 
The conformity, however, rarely extends to the point of repudiating his own in-group. 
A Negro, or Jew, or Mexican will ordinarily assert the acceptability of his own in-
group, but in other respects he will decide as does his larger reference group.420 
 
This correlates with the psychological principle that “concentric loyalties need not 
clash.” Reverting back to the concept of ‘mythscape’, this overview is important 
because, “the national orbit is the largest circle of loyalty that most children learn.” 
Already by the age of ten or eleven, most children have developed an “emotional 
evaluation of his national circle” learned from “teachers and parents, and adopted 
ready-made” and that “teaching ordinarily stops the process of enlargement at this 
point.” This is not to say that future circles can never be learned, but this “is not often 
achieved”.421 Consequently, for most individuals the nation has become the largest 
reference group, regardless of if the individual is also a member of a minority in-
group, leading them to subscribe to many of the features of the nation.  Such a view 
still allows for debates and contestation, especially in regards to derivative or 
subaltern narratives and/or competing myths, but it also allows for a more stable, 
albeit contingent, metanarrative.  
 
Of course some institutions allow for more contestation than others; democracies will 
most likely possess and allow for more debate on derivative narratives than an 
authoritarian régime, especially as the latter are often more dependent on narratives 
given their fragile legitimacy (Brand; Boulding). But this does not erode the fact that 
all nations rely on metanarratives or founding ‘Bibles’ for their existence. As Park 
writes, “the role of ideology as the provider [one could add varying levels] of 
legitimacy can be witnessed in every form of government even including participatory 
democracy.”422 In both instances there is a broader metanarrative, the maintenance of 
which is vital to both the governing institution’s legitimacy and the populace’s OS.  
 
Outside of institutional type, it is also important to touch on the difference between 
hegemonic, emancipated and polemical representations and their varying levels of 
contestation, recognizing that not all states align with nations. The former largely 
allow for “a people to think and act as one” due to a “resonance between historical 
representations, physical artifacts and mass media, and the current political agenda.” 
Hegemonic representations thus have a positive relationship with subgroups, what 
Cinnirella calls positive networking, as seen for example with postcolonial 
nationalism in Malaysia and Singapore.423 Emancipated representations arise when 
subgroups hold unique, but not incompatible, representations. Here some in-groups 
would be marginalized within the nation, but still view it as a reference group.424 In 
both instances, one can develop (based on the metanarrative at hand) the general 
postures a state will adapt, as described below. If an emancipated representation, one 
would then also construct various sub-expectations depending on which derivative 
narratives have been activated/ deactivated by those in power.425  
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All of this is far removed from what one finds with a polemical representation; 
contradicting dominant and sub-group representations that undermine each other’s 
identity. 426 Here it would prove infeasible for the dominant narrative to try and 
accommodate the sub counter-narrative as they are zero-sum. This can be an acute 
problem for states that emerged not out of some organic process but had borders 
imposed on them (e.g. Iraq), though as Brand notes emigration (e.g. Jordan)427 and 
diaspora communities, such as ethnic Russians in former Soviet states,428 could lead 
to similar issues. While in these instances one would still expect the governing 
institution to act in accordance with the dominant narrative, it is important to keep in 
mind this can have negative implications for sub groups,429 the focus for example of 
Croft’s work on the experience of British Muslims following 9/11.430  
 
Consequently, it is vital to ascertain levels of congruence and contestation within the 
state under review.431 This not only helps to establish temporal bracketing and 
circumvent accusations of “gross generalizations [that] are untestable [and] 
unfalsifiable”,432 but also helps recognize those instances wherein dominant narratives 
might pose an internal OS threat.433 Still, so long as one acknowledges the rift, useful 
predictions regarding foreign policy can still be developed, as well as potential 
domestic conflict that might arise. It is therefore imperative to outline the content of 
national narrative so as to discern where threats might arise.  
 
2.3 Content of National Narratives:  
 
Given the framework developed so far, it becomes vital to distinguish the “key 
discursive elements…of a collective national identity”434 in order to shed light on 
what might be interpreted as an OS threat. As Berenskoetter writes, narratives provide 
OS “by meaningfully situating individuals in a community and, by extension, the 
world by defining the spatio-temporal parameters from and towards which they can 
act as a community.”435  Consequently, and in line with works by Bell, Ringmar, and 
Smith, one must elaborate on both temporal and spatial components of national 
narratives.436 
 
The temporal component allows a community to “not only creat[e] a present; it also 
makes sense of it by inserting it into the plot which is our individual or collective 
lives.” 437 This temporal component will most likely entail an account of the nation’s 
origins (what was noted above as the “founding myth”) and its “subsequent 
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momentous events and heroic figures” establishing “perception of past and future in a 
linear historical timeline”.438 Andrews et al surmise, they “trace the (constructed) 
genealogy of an identity group back to a specific place, time, and ancestor in order to 
derive an ideological lineage and to provide a guide for future actions.”439 To this end 
Gustafsson notes how mythical representations of the past are an essential component 
for the “creation and preservation of collectives.”440 Mythology leads to a feeling of 
commonality amongst a disperse populace, letting them all know who they are and 
the stories to live by, often by referencing a heroic age; “[t]he future of the ethnic 
community can only derive meaning and achieve its form from the pristine 'golden 
age' when men were 'heroes'.”441 There is, in turn, a strong incentive to safeguard and 
promote the collective myth of one’s group, and the “infrastructure dedicated to 
keep[ing] the memory alive’…[such as] museums, memorials and school 
curricula.”442 For example, China sought to revamp school curriculums in the 1990s 
so as to counteract perceived external encroachments on identity, and have lashed out 
when Japanese official visit war museums or school textbooks are introduced that 
downplay Japanese atrocities during WWII.  
 
Revealing the temporal component of a nation’s shared metanarrative will in turn help 
signify not just how a community conceives of its past, but how it defines itself; the 
traits and values that make it unique and separate it from others as enshrined in a 
‘national bible’ and historical affordances. Actions seen as uncharacteristic of, or 
challenging the values derived from, this past, and relevant derivative narratives 
should they exist, will be interpreted as a threat to the foundation of the community.  
 
The second dimension is spatial. It was noted earlier how nations establish boundaries, 
generating the spatial demarcations of a ‘home’. As Bell writes, “[t]he spatial 
dimension tends to be rooted in particular constructions of an often-idealized bounded 
territory, for example a romanticized national landscape” and as such “includes a 
powerful narrative of place, embodying the topophilic power of a ‘here-feeling’”.443  
Berenskoetter, championing Heidegger, thus views the spatial as consisting of center, 
order and horizon. The center is a place that the Self most strongly associates with on 
an emotional level, leading to a sense of trust. As we come into the world: 
 
we encounter a dynamic and living mass providing stimulus and opportunities for the 
creation of meaning structures…the disclosed world turns into a space around’ or 
‘close to’ the Self, with closeness not understood in terms of physical proximity but 
in terms of knowledge and evaluation.444  
 
Consequently, by “insert[ing] our being into a location which is distinct from all other 
possible locations…‘we turn space into place.’” This ‘place’ is the interplay between 
experiences and a physical tangible location, generating a sense of ‘home’ that in turn 
becomes the center of the biographical narrative. Narratives we tell thus give special 
meaning to certain areas and “in this way places become our places, places to which 
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we feel allegiance and loyalty.”445 We can view this as the physical location of the 
Umwelt. Indeed Kinnvall speaks to this when she writes how OS “is maintained when 
home is able to provide a site of constancy in the social and material 
environment…[it] constitutes a spatial context in which daily routines of human 
existence are performed.”446  
 
The second component is identification with an order, which is shaped by one’s 
visions of utopia447 and dystopia – “a utopia that has gone wrong.”448 Berenskoetter 
argues it is important to move beyond the conception of order as only constituted by 
norms, as this overlooks the emotionally charged role of values. Values tell us what is 
good and bad and as such we measure distance of a place by its value to being. As 
noted above, Liu and Hilton reference how national narratives provide do’s and 
don’ts.449 They speak of a ‘Golden Age’ and hero’s we should strive to replicate, as 
well as myths of decline wherein, because “the old virtues were forgotten…the 
barbarians burst through.” 450  Places are therefore embedded within visions of 
utopia/dystopia, allowing us to envision what the place should/should not become, 
setting a horizon for what is possible; “Utopia, dystopia, chaos: these are not just 
ways of imagining the future (or the past) but can also be understood as concrete 
practices through which historically situated actors seek to reimagine their present and 
transform it into a plausible future.” 451 Narratives therefore incorporate experiences 
that transform certain spaces into places that are familiar, and which can expand or 
contract as future experiences are taken into account. Challenges to these boundaries, 
and incursions into this physical ‘home’, especially by entities seeking to inject 
contradictory values, will thus be see as a possible challenge to the narrative.  
 
These various challenges can all be seen as connected with recognition – or in this 
case non/misrecognition. Importantly, Lindemann notes the “lack of recognition has a 
distinctive significance – it is a threat to our self-image and self-esteem”, depriving 
the emotional need to avoid “uncertainty and even existential anguish, which is born 
from the ‘fragilisation’ of an identity.”452 Actions that directly challenge national 
narrative, or the more generalized failure to adequately recognize this narrative, 
consequently pose an OS threat. We can conclude states will thus represent new 
information to see if it is deviating away from, or conforming with, the national 
narrative. Given the components of national narrative outlined here, a few preliminary 
assumptions can be made:  
 
1. Competing historical representations of the past central to narrative, or actions 
that challenge/undermine key values derived from the national myth, will be 
represented as challenging national narrative. 
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2. Similarly, actions seen as blurring the distinction with the Other will be 
represented negatively.  
3. On a spatial level, alterative narratives pertaining to a certain place and what 
that place should/should not be, leading to potentially deviant policies in 
regards to that territorial area, will be viewed as a threat to the ‘home’. 
4. This all relates to a broader failure to adequately recognize national narrative, 
which is seen as tantamount to rejecting the Self, and thus an OS threat.   
 
Following this analysis, it now becomes possible to further expand on how national 
narratives influence policymakers’ images and perceptions of other groups. In 
particular OS helps overcome gaps in current ideational approaches to FPA, including 
the cognitive function of identity and the role of national images in influencing state 
postures.  
 
3. The Role of National Narrative in Perception  
 
The role of identity in perception453 is a fairy well established concept. For example 
Hopf454 employed experimental psychology to show how identity functions as a 
cognitive economizing device,’ while Hurwtiz used cognitive-psychology and social 
cognition, exemplified by Fiske and Taylor, to construct a schematic approach to FPA, 
with identity providing shortcuts or ‘cognitive heuristics. 455 The social characteristics 
of the group thus become inseparable from how phenomena are represented and made 
intelligible.456 This is a top-down approach with old information filling in gaps as 
complexity increases, with the international arena being a prime example. 
 
In a similar vein Lasas outlines the role historical perceptions and memories play in 
decision-making; “In the context of uncertainty…these legacies can become crucial 
anchoring points that help in interpreting current events and making judgments about 
other actors’ motives and intentions.”457 Thus Liu and Hilton note how “a group can 
use its collective wisdom to manage present crises through its memory of past 
ones,”458 an argument similarly found in the work of Levy,459 while on a broader scale 
Patterson and Monroe argue narratives are how we uniquely make sense of reality.460 
Similarly, groups can draw different lessons of the same event depending on their 
representation of the past. Lasas shows how this process impacted Baltic perceptions 
of the Russian intervention into Georgia, leading to a strong response when compared 
to the rest of Europe despite strategic or economic interests.461 
 
All of this corresponds with the works of Herbert Simon and James Voss, Terry 
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Greene and Timothy Post462 on problem solving, providing a link between schemas, 
perceptions and action. In short, national narrative (identity) is the prism through 
which policymakers forge assumptions. These assumptions are in turn one of the most 
important factors underlying decisions, a concept fiercely employed by Jervis, Cottam, 
George and Spiegel.463  However, while cognitive functioning goes some way in 
explaining the importance of identity in state decision-making, there is a need to 
include the influence of OS and national narrative in this process. 464 This allows one 
to more firmly explain the emotional connection between individual and group, and 
why the identity of the latter is of such importance. 
 
For example, Hopf argues social structures and identities consist of three facets: 
consequence (will action be rewarded/punished), appropriateness (how we should 
act), and habit (we don't actively think since answers are engrained in us). Here, 
identities “emerge as shortcuts to bounding probable ideas, reactions, and practices 
toward categorized others. These are the human needs for ‘ontological security’.” 
Consequently he writes his is a “cognitive theory of identity because the presocial 
need for identity is psychological.”465 However, as seen earlier, OS has far more to do 
with the role rituals play in sustaining the Umwelt and self-identity. Hopf by contrast, 
despite referencing OS, focuses strictly on the cognitive implications of socialization 
(i.e. reading events through a certain identity terrain), examining the “natural, 
unquestioned, mundane daily practices that constitute everyday life and commonsense 
lived reality.”466  Again, while communal identity has cognitive implications, it is also 
the foundation of OS, meaning we have an interest in its maintenance. It is therefore 
not necessarily the daily taken for granted rituals that are of interest, but the larger 
narrative they are embedded within.  
 
Hopf thus focuses on the shift under Khrushchev away from Stalin’s “New Soviet 
Man” (NSM) and towards acceptable “difference”, which aligned with the wider 
societal identity previously oppressed under Stalin. He argues this shift explains the 
1957 Sino-Soviet split. What is left unclear, however, is why this would lead to 
conflict. By contrast, an OS framework would examine those elements fundamental to 
Soviet national narrative, which indeed Hopf places as an area of congruence under 
Stalin and Khrushchev; both held “the Soviet Union as a modern, developed vanguard 
for the world, Russia as the center and apex of the Soviet Union with premodern 
developing peripheries subordinate to it...an elder brother for other, non-Russian 
peoples.”467 Consequently, China’s increasingly assertive and independent position 
following Khrushchev’s rise challenged this narrative, generating an OS threat. 
Works on identity in FPA could in turn gain great insights by examining the 
relationship between metanarratives and OS and the impact this has on perceptions. 
 
To this end, OS also helps to account for some of the shortcomings in Boulding’s 
work on national images; the notion policymakers “do not respond to the "objective" 
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facts…but to their "image" of the situation.” Images simplify and provide guidelines 
in foreign policy, as shown by Eldridge, Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Holsti, and 
Kelman.468 This is true for both the “ordinary citizen and the powerful statesman”.469 
Behavior is therefore determined by decisions that are in turn comprised of the 
ordering and selection of perceived options, the structure and breadth of which are 
determined by images. However, outside of references to conceptions of friends, 
threats and perceived national strength, Boulding does little to conceive of what goes 
into framing these images. Indeed these characteristics need to be developed in their 
own right; what determines the image of a friend?  
 
An OS framework helps refine how these images of others are constructed. In brief, 
negative (or positive) images are formed through re-presentation, wherein the 
entity/event is interpreted as contradicting (or supporting) national narrative. These 
images in turn underscore foreign policy schemas, which lead to more specific foreign 
policies. At the same, time national narrative hold prescriptive elements, constituting 
national role conceptions. The drive for OS then is not just reactive, as most works 





4. Specifying an Ontological Security Framework 
 
It was noted earlier that through the process of re-presentation, policymakers are able 
to discern threats to, and thus maintain, OS. This is a two-part process. First re-
presentation “clarifies” a situation, transforming new information so as to maintain a 
sense of order and predictability. Once determined, our opinions of the category to 
which it is compared are transferred, with the phenomena taking on the characteristics 
of that category’s ideal prototype. The primary goal is ‘anchoring’, determining if the 
phenomenon conforms with, or deviates away from (threatens or non threatens) the 
norm.471 National narratives then are not only the lens through which policymakers 
make sense of interaction, they are also the referent point against which other groups 
or stimuli are juxtaposed. 
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While often times we will try and instinctively misrecognize, distorting reality so that 
an event confirms narrative, such distortions may prove impossible to achieve.472 In 
such instances we are faced with a ‘personal crisis’, when an event punctures the 
Umwelt leading to a sense of alarm. Above it was shown challenges could relate to 
our mythical representations of the past, the story we tell of a specific place, or failure 
to provide adequate recognition to our narrative overall. For example when 
comparing themselves to other Europeans “early-seventeenth-century Swedes came to 
suffer from what can only be described as an acute sense of inferiority.” In order to 
gain more favorable recognition, Sweden compiled narratives to bolster a more 
grandiose image based on references to the ‘ancient Goths’ and Sweden as a 
Protestant state. While this narrative was recognized by the Swedish masses, 
recognition from other princes proved less forthcoming, leading the Swedish King to 
surmise, “we have not shown ourselves as strong as other nations and our reputation 
has suffered as a result”. 473 Consequently, Sweden entered the Thirty Year War, bent 
on forcing others to recognize its narrative. 
 
It does not take much imagination to envision similar arguments arising in post-
colonial states. Having achieved independence, these states were forced to address 
questions over the national “I”. The narratives formed as a response to this question in 
turn demanded recognition from others (a sentiment that relates to the proactive 
component of national narratives touched on below). This is especially true for states 
such as the DPRK, whose national narrative must be maintained not only for OS but 
also as the primary source of legitimacy, further compounding sensitivity  
 
Ringmar outlines three possible responses when narrative fails to be recognized. The 
first, identity abandonment, pertains to the “‘lost tribes’ that sometimes appear in the 
footnotes of our history books: the people of d’Oc, [and] the Gaels in Cornwall.” We 
could equate this to groups that underwent fateful moments and were, overtime, 
subsumed, and later generations socialized, within the new, larger, group. The second 
option, to accept the rejection and assume the externally placed description, “was the 
policy adopted by the Scots, the Welsh, the Norwegians, the Finns, the Estonians and 
the Lithuanians who remained as communities but under foreign domination.” Again 
we can equate this to a fateful moment, but one more attune to colonization, wherein 
narrative is re-articulated to account for the new setting but still remains distinct from 
the colonial entity. The last option is to take action to reassert narrative and prove it is 
indeed true and must be recognized.474 This pertains more to a personal crisis; rituals 
have not been overwhelmed and forgotten (abandonment) or rearticulated 
(acceptance), but are punctured, compelling one to reassert narrative.475  
 
Chernobrov, turning to Todorov’s work on the first meeting between the Spanish and 
American Indians, thus notes “[c]ollectives exist with a positive view of themselves 
and their behaviors…leading them to defend this conception when faced with 
alternative practices. Protecting, cherishing, and leaving self unquestioned becomes 
the essence of self’s existence”. 476  Howarth similarly writes, “when others’ 
representations of us are negative…we find strategies that resist and reject such 
                                                
472 Chernobrov, “Ontological Security”, pg. 585 
473 Ringmar, Identity, pg. 157, 182 
474 Ibid, pg. 185 
475 In this way, the OS framework helps to further showcase why non-recognition of a group can be of great importance for its 
members.  For a discussion see Lindemann, Causes of War, pg. 17-18, 24-28 
476 Chernobrov, “Ontological Security”, pg. 587 
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representations and so protect our sense of self. 477  When recognition is not 
forthcoming we will thus try and make the Other recognize us478 while at the same 
time presenting the deviant stimuli as something negative. This is more likely to occur 
when entities outside the community are behind the challenge, rather than fellow 
members.479 In this way, representations of national narrative help to constitute the 
images policymakers form; entities and events seen as challenging or 
non/misrecognizing the narrative will become associated with negative categories, 
becoming negative in their own right.  
 
This all holds insights for schematic approaches to FPA, as foreign policy postures 
are selected inline with these more general negative or positive assessments. As noted 
above, Hurwitz argues that since humans are “cognitive misers”, using old knowledge 
to deal with the present, “attitude structure centers primarily on the linkages between 
abstract and concrete idea elements, where the former are assumed to "constrain" the 
latter”, a sentiment that builds from findings in constraint research showing a 
“considerable consistency between policy positions and more general idea 
elements.”480  
 
Encouraged by similar investigations by Conover and Feldman, Carbonell, and 
Jervis,481 Hurwitz sought to further pursue vertical constraint theory in relation to 
FPA, developing a three-tiered diagram. At the bottom are specific foreign policies 
(such as deploying nuclear weapons in Europe) that are limited by the second tier – 
normative beliefs or “postures”, which convey more general interests, for example 
interest in an isolationist foreign policy. These postures are in turn informed by one’s 
core values, which on their own do not contain even generalized government policies 
but instead represent fundamental general beliefs (schemas), for example 
ethnocentrism. Given how biographical narratives were found to be the pillar stone of 
nations it would only make sense to view these as the most important ‘general belief’.  
 
In their work on U.S.-USSR relations, Hurwitz and Peffley outlined three distinct 
postures within the U.S. - militarism, isolationism and containment – underwritten by 
more general views on the USSR as a threatening entity. This includes how we 
perceive intentions, which in turn frames response. 482 While varying levels of threat 
vis-à-vis the USSR were found, leading to different postures, there was still a 
consensual anti-Soviet sentiment. They argue this related to fundamental U.S. beliefs 
and values, concluding “the electorate's views on national security issues 
are…strongly shaped by postures, that postures are dependent to some degree on 
perceptions of threat from the Eastern bloc, and that threat is tied closely to values of 
patriotism and moral traditionalism.”483  Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson replicated 
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 71 
these findings in in Costa Rica where core beliefs played an even more crucial role, 
directly impacting policies.484  
 
From these findings we can argue that threat levels are proportional to perceived 
threats to narrative. Thus the USSR was even more threatening to conservative 
Christian patriots who strongly aligned with the ‘American way of life’. Foreign 
policies might then vary to some extent depending on if these individuals (parties) are 
in power and/or, which derivative narratives are activated and deactivated. This helps 
to account for the four graduated change types in foreign policy outlined by Hermann. 
These are 1) adjustment – a change in level of effort, 2) program – a change in 
methods or means, 3) problem – a change in goals that policies were aimed to 
achieve, and 4) international orientation – a change in international role and 
activities.485 Here, adjustment and program change would be attributed to a shift in 
posture aimed at countering the same OS threat. By contrast, a change in goals would 
have to be accompanied by a change in perceived threat, leading to a different set of 
postures, while re-orientation would be equated to a shift in national narrative.  
 
While unable to account for specific policies,486 one can still account for the general 
postures adopted by policymakers. Those events re-presented and then interpreted as 
negative, as threatening the norm of historical narrative, take on negative qualities - a 
negative image - leading to appropriate postures. While policymakers may then 
debate amongst each other in regards to specific policies that are based off of these 
postures, they will still be united by the fact the postures are underwritten by the same 
general beliefs and a similar re-presentation process. This helps explain why, as 
Rathburn and Chittick, Billingsly and Travis have all shown, foreign policy attitudes 
tend to be clustered.487  We can label this the reactive process, which has been the 
focal point for much of the current literature on OS. The OS framework presented 
here also seeks to account for the proactive component of identity maintenance, 
interpreted as intertwined with national role conceptions.  
 
4.1 The Proactive Process of Ontological Security: 
 
Addressing the proactive component of narrative maintenance strengthens FPA by 
revealing not only how a group might react, but also the proactive steps it might take. 
“Narrative thus “connec[t] us with our past and links us via our political projects to 
the future [emphasis added].”488  SRT is again of great use, for representations also 
hold a prescriptive element; “our manner of thinking, and what we think, depend on 
such representations.”489 This in turn helps with what Giddens termed ‘life-planning’ 
and ‘colonization of the future’. It also relates to Holsti’s work on national role 
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conceptions, comprised of “policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of 
decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, 
if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis.”490  
 
While Holsti was limited in the extent to which he developed the relationship between 
domestic variables and national role conceptions,491 the OS framework’s emphasis on 
national narratives helps to further elucidate this process. Berenskoetter perhaps 
outlines this best, arguing that by incorporating into our narrative what we want the 
future to be, we not only alleviate anxiety over the future but also allow the Self to be 
further known.492 Images of utopia at times coupled with dystopia therefore become 
important aspects of narrative and of the Self, and can come to play a critical role in 
decision-making, as seen in Carr, Boyle, and Williams. 493  In order for these 
(dys)utopic images to become accepted, they must be embedded within familiar 
understandings of being in the world (which we can relate to a group’s field of social 
representations), entertain the possibility for the Self to become something it is 
currently not, and be simple or vague enough to allow for broad base adoption and 
flexibility. The interplay between past and future is thus a dialectical relationship. 
Significant experiences of the past are sorted in line with what we hope for in the 
future, but these myths also places limits on the range of futures we construct.494  
 
To this end Liu and Hilton note how the historical charter of a society is also 
“prescriptive”, defining the role of the group – for example as “(‘defender of the free 
world’, ‘light of civilization’, or ‘beacon against militarism’, etc.).” They go on to 
conclude, “[h]istory provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we 
came from and where we should be going [emphasis added].”495 National narratives 
are not just the prisms for analyzing events; they also help device plans for the future. 
All of this becomes the basis for Holsti’s various national role conceptions.  
 
Within the DPRK, as will be elaborated in the next chapter, this could include roles 
(as devised by Holsti) such as “Independent” (focused on one’s own interests), “Anti-
imperialist” (agents against the evil of imperialism), and “Regional Sub-system 
Collaborator” (a commitment to fostering the communist movement). Acting in 
accordance with national narrative and appropriate postures in turn helps ensure 
perceived continuity. States will also seek to gain recognition of the roles they have 
devised for themselves. While the content of these ‘roles’ may be derived from larger 
intersubjective processes (for example being a sovereign state is derived from an 
international post-Westphalian understanding496), and must take into account the 
external environment,497 they are still selected in line with a state’s own narrative.498 
                                                
490 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”, pg. 245-246 
491 He cites geography, access to resources and capabilities, local values, bureaucracy, government type, and ideologies.  
492 As Mannheim noted, “The innermost structure of the mentality of a group can never be as clearly grasped as when we attempt 
to understand its conception of time in the light of its hopes, yearnings, and purposes.” Cited in Gordin, Tilley and Prakash 
“Introduction”, pg. 5 
493 EH Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, (Palgrave, 2001); Boyle, “Utopianism”; M. Williams, “What is the national 
interest? The neoconservative challenge in IR theory” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2005) 
494 Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 273-274; This is markedly different from works on collective remembering or collective 
memory. Patrick Devine-Wright and Evanthia Lyons, “Remembering Past and Representing Places: The Construction of 
National Identities in Ireland” Journal of Environmental Psychology, Vol. 17, (March, 1997) 
495 Liu and Hilton, “How the past”, pg. 538, 537; see also Subotic, “Narrartive”, pg. 3  
496 For an expanded examination on the influence collective identities have on the international system and vice versa see Rodney 
Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems (Columbia University Press, 1999); see 
also Ringmar, “The International”, pg. 13 
497 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”, pg. 246 
498 “The knowledge and the ‘recovery’ of one’s history is therefore, particularly in the case of collectivities, always the first step 
towards the formation of a capacity to act ‘together’ and thus ‘politically’…[and] allows us to conceive of roles and obligations 
 73 
Moreover “a state’s role identity can exist without its recognition by other political 
entities and instead obtains its confirmation by actors on the domestic level.”499 Of 
course this still leaves the potential for misrecognition by other states, as in the case 
of Sweden noted above, which could in turn result in a perceived OS threat and an 




To surmise, by integrating SRT with OS, it becomes possible to further elucidate the 
relationship between individuals and society, and the process by which policymakers’ 
frame and react to external stimuli, forging images and assumptions. Social 
representations constitute both the individual Umwelt and group identity, forging an 
emotional connection between individuals and their community and explaining why 
national identity is a critical factor in forming images of Others. Going back to the 
literature on North Korea, this seemingly critical element is missing in Suh’s 
historical intuitionalist account of DPRK policy, which has perhaps gone the furthest 
in pursing an ideational account of DPRK behavior. In line with SRT, policymakers 
thus perceive external stimuli through the social representation of national narrative, 
with new information forced to conform to preexisting categories associated with this 
narrative. While these narratives are not static entities, it is possible to temporally 
bracket them as shown in work on national images, historical affordances, and 
governmentality.   
 
As policymakers’ re-present new information they seek to determine if it is 
conforming with, or deviating away from (threatening or non threatening) the norm – 
i.e. national narrative. Those events re-presented and then interpreted as negative, as 
threatening the norm of national narrative, take on negative qualities - a negative 
image - leading to appropriate schemas and postures. An OS threat will in turn be 
perceived when: 1) there is competing historical representations of the past central to 
national narrative, 2) there is alternative narratives pertaining to a certain place and 
what that place should/should not be, and 3) the failure of one narrative to adequately 
recognize another. This is a reflexive process, meaning states do not blindly follow 
routines but adjust behavior to accord with national narrative.  
 
While unable to account for specific policies, the framework developed here does 
allow one to account for the general postures adopted by policymakers. While they 
may then debate amongst each other in regards to specific policies based off of these 
postures, seen earlier for example in McEacherns works on debates within the DPRK, 
they will still be united by the fact their postures are underwritten by the same general 
beliefs. At the same time, national narratives hold prescriptive elements, meaning the 
drive for OS is both reactive and proactive. This framework in turn allows one to 
generate different foreign policy expectations than those derived from traditional 
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Chapter 4 
North Korea – A Hard Case Study 
 
The remainder of this thesis turns towards applying the OS framework developed 
over Chapters 2 and 3 to the case study of North Korea, a relatively hard case within 
the context of security studies. Because small states – defined by a “limited capacity 
to: (1) influence the security interests of, or directly threaten, a great power; and (2) 
defend itself against an attack by an equally motivated great power”501 – are viewed 
as even more susceptible to systemic influences, DPRK behavior should be even less 
driven by domestic factors than larger states; “[p]ut more formally, weak state foreign 
policy presents a crucial test for domestic level theory.”502 
 
Section 1 thus outlines traditional security study behavioral expectations for the 
DPRK. Section 2 then goes on to outline the framework of the case study, 
establishing how discourse analysis can be applied to generate rival expectations for 
North Korean behavior in line with the OS framework. The section then goes on to 
outline the specific temporal components that the traditional and OS behavioral 
expectations will placed against in Chapters 5 and 6, allowing one to verify which 
framework provides the more holistic account of DPRK behavior. Section 3 consists 
of the first phase of empirical research, examining the results of discourse analysis 
conducted on the DPRK and then generating behavioral expectations. 
 
1. North Korea: A Hard Case 
 
When examining the current literature, it would appear as though the foreign policy of 
a small state, such as the DPRK, should be relatively straightforward to predict. As 
Thuycides famously penned, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must” while Morgenthau focused predominately on Great Powers since small 
nations “have always owed their independence either to the balance of power…or to 
the preponderance of one protecting power…or to their lack of attractiveness for 
imperialist aspirations”.503 
 
Neorealism elaborates slightly more on the issues at hand. According to these studies, 
small states’ preoccupation with survival and their small room for error504 drastically 
increases the need to conduct analysis at this systemic level. Indeed, Elman shows 
how there is a general consensus 505  within traditional security studies on the 
dominance of systemic factors in small state foreign policy; even U.S. policy was not 
seen as being dictated by domestic politics until it became a unipolar power.506 Walt 
thus writes small states “are more vulnerable to pressure, and they can do little to 
determine their own fates.”507 Rosenau meanwhile argues small states’ lack of 
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security resigns them to focus almost exclusively on external demands, a sentiment 
similarly championed by Snyder and Wolfers.508 Schweller “concludes that 'extreme 
systemic constraints' can account for weak state foreign policy and military 
behavior”509 while Robert Rothstein surmises, “Great Powers and Small Powers in 
historical systems indicate that one of the basic differences between them rests on the 
degree to which their behavior is conditioned, even determined, by the nature of the 
system itself.”510 Overall, as Elman writes, “[i]n light of this scholarly consensus, 
small state foreign policy poses a hard case for domestic level theory while it is easy 
on alternative systemic/structural explanations.”511 What then does the international 
system tell us?  
 
Waltz writes that in a bipolar world chain-ganging and buck-passing512 are non-
issues. A Great Power will not intervene on the behalf of a reckless small state (whose 
continued support is less critical), while at the same time it cannot afford to buck-
pass, as it is the only counter to its rival. This would seem to indicate that during the 
bipolarity of the Cold War, small states like North Korea would be more restrained 
due to diminished commitment from patron powers. Waltz also writes that in a bi-
polar world the Great Powers will seek to “perpetuate an international stalemate as a 
minimum basis for the security of each – even if this should mean that the two big 
states do the work while the small ones have the fun.”513 The burden sharing of small 
states would therefore be expected to diminish within a bi-polar world; the DPRK 
could free ride since its contribution to the security of the Soviet Union (upon which 
its own security was intertwined) would be trivial. Consequently, Christensen and 
Snyder conclude, “[t]he structural consequences of bipolarity, unlike those of multi-
polarity, do lead to a determinate prediction about alliance strategy, even though 
empirically the behavior of the superpowers sometimes falsifies that prediction.”514  
 
Meanwhile, the prospect of balancing or bandwagoning has led to some debate. Walt 
argues that while large states are more likely to balance, especially when they are 
close to the rising threat, the inverse holds for small states, which are more likely to 
(reluctantly) bandwagon - unless they could be the difference maker in the alliance in 
which case they would balance.515  Additionally, “weak states will be concerned 
primarily with events in their immediate vicinity and can be “expected to balance 
when threatened by states with roughly equal capabilities but they will be tempted to 
bandwagon when threatened by a great power.”516  Michael Handel, Jack Levy and 
Robert Rothstein also take this position while Annette Baker Fox argues small states 
try to remain neutral “but eventually tilt their allegiance to the winning side.”517  
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Therefore, because small states face an acute security dilemma and have a smaller 
margin of time and error, they are more apt to bandwagon. By contrast, Lab, citing the 
historical record, argues small states are more likely to balance against Great Powers. 
Lab lays out the ranking for small state policy options as found in most works: 
 
1.Nonaligntment – Great Powers will oppose the threat and can thus free-ride 
2. Bandwagon – rather than free ride there is a hedging of bets  
3. Balance and not fight – will contribute little but the threat from joining is high  
4. Weak States Alliance – if no other Great Powers will fight then form an alliance 
with other small states  
5. Balance and fight – join and contribute max resources 
6. Fight Alone  - decide to fight alone  
 
Lab’s work shifts the order of these preferences to: 
 
1. Nonalignment 
2. Balance with a protecting Great Power for a free-ride  
3. Balance with a protecting Great Power and fight  
4. Seek an alliance of weak states  
5. Fight alone 
6. Bandwagon 
 
Despite these internal debates, there is still a potential to draw out some main themes. 
Overall, 5 main expectations for DPRK foreign policy can be generated:  
 
1. While non-alignment is as an ideal, it is often an unattainable position.518 During 
the onset of the Cold War, North Korea – geographically close to the USSR and faced 
with a divided country, had little option but to align with Moscow,519 a sentiment 
adopted by Rothstein.520 The division of the Peninsula has further implications, since 
the presence of a local threat “increase[s] the probability that the threatened minor 
would prefer an alliance with a great power”, or alliances with other regional 
powers.521 Unable to balance against the ROK/U.S. threat internally, North Korea 
should be predominately focused on external balancing. For all these works, fighting 
alone would be considered a last (or second to last) option. 
 
2. The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and parity between North and South 
Korea (only to increasingly shift in Seoul’s favor) should indicate a North Korea 
propensity to retain a defensive posture, fearing Moscow would not be chain-ganged 
into a larger conflict initiated by Pyongyang. Moreover, the fact “North Korea never 
had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.-ROK alliance”, or 
matched ROK GNP, precludes attempts to employ preventive war and power 
transition theory to the Peninsula.522 
 
3. Given this security dependency, one would also expect the DPRK not to chastise or 
jeopardize its relationship with the Soviet bloc; “the status of great powerhood means 
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that other actors will take what they consider to be the great power's interests into 
account, even in its absence.”523 As Waltz writes, “[a]lthough concessions to allies are 
sometimes made, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union alters its strategy or 
changes its military dispositions simply to accommodate associated states.”524 At the 
same time, it could also become a free-rider, since the comparatively small 
investment it could make into defense would do little to change the balancing 
equitation vis-à-vis the U.S. – USSR dyad;525 “[b]ecause of the vast differences in the 
capabilities of member states, the roughly equal sharing of burdens found in earlier 
alliance systems is no longer possible.”526  Fears of abandonment should then lead 
North Korea to show deference to the Soviets, or exaggerate a common threat, so as 
to solidify Moscow’s security commitments. While fear of abandonment will often 
lead states to hedge and acquire their own private security,527 the inability of North 
Korea to internally balance against an ROK supplemented by U.S. forces would have 
made alliances all the more important, and continued free-riding a practical path.  
 
4. Rothstein also suggests small powers (both aligned and nonaligned) will be focused 
on maintaining the bipolar system and ensuing “that no crisis gets so out of hand that 
it leads to war. Thus DPRK efforts should be directed at “facilitating any settlement 
which appears to reduce tensions, irrespective of the quality of the settlement.”528 
 
5. Meanwhile the onset of the Sino-Soviet split poses a problem for traditional 
studies, since, as mentioned, they are fairly indeterminate on whether North Korea 
should seek to be nonaligned or balance against/bandwagon with China. If possible, 
they would most likely expect North Korea to remain nonaligned so as to reap 
rewards from both sides, and only bandwagon or balance if pressed to do so. 
 
 2. Setting Up the Case Study  
 
Having outlined behavioral expectations derived from traditional security studies, it 
now becomes important to formulate a second set of behavioral expectations inline 
with the OS framework. This requires conducting discourse analysis so as to reveal 
key components of national narrative in North Korea. One must then go on to outline 
the specifics of the research design; that is how to verify which framework affords the 
more holistic account.  
 
2.1 Phase 1: Generating Ontological Security Expectations:   
 
Abdelal et al, providing perhaps one of the best accounts of how to employ identity as 
a variable, promote discourse analysis as one of the main investigative tools; “the 
qualitative and interpretive recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to 
describe and understand social phenomena.” The purpose of such an endeavor is to 
capture, through the reading of related discourses (speech, written documents and 
                                                
523 Neumann and Gstohl, Small States  
524 Waltz, Theory of, pg. 170 
525 Sara Beth Hower, Do Small States Make Bad Allies (ProQuest, 2008), pg. 31-32 
526 Waltz, Theory of, pg. 169 
527 Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the free ride: alliances and security in the postwar world” International Organization, Vol. 49, 
No. 1 (Winter 1995) 
528 Rothstein, “Small Powers”, pg. 410 
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social practices), the “intersubjective context of some social phenomenon-in our case, 
a collective identity-in order to account for an empirical outcome.”529 
 
When conducting discourse analysis one must rely upon the “explicit discursive 
articulations” regarding conceptions of the Other and the Self. While not a fixed 
independent entity, “it is possible to analyze the relative ability of a discourse to 
present a construction of identity which is not (seen as) highly internally unstable.”530 
Similar signs found to be employed consistently throughout DPRK discourse is thus a 
strong indicator of a consistent national identity. All of this requires not simply taking 
one sign as indicative of these conceptions, but that one locates the larger system of 
linking and differentiation within which multiple symbols operate.531 
 










This process helps to offset critics of discourse analysis who argue there is a seeming 
inability to evaluate results. Hansen counters this is not necessarily the case given that 
there are certain criteria; “one has to pay careful analytical attention on how signs are 
linked and juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others, and how they legitimize 
particular policies.” Failure to adequately undertakes these processes will thus lead to 
“weaker” readings, though she does admit it is impossible to “exhaust all others.”533 
Again, a pragmatist philosophy of science helps to further buttress discourse analysis 
against claims of relativism, as does Pouliot’s approach outlined in Chapter 1.  
 
When “reading” political identity, one must locate the components of national 
narrative outlined in Chapter 3. This included the temporal - mythical representation 
of the past; the spatial - narratives pertain to a certain place and what that place 
should/should not be depending on images of utopia and dystopia; and lastly what 
Hansen terms ‘ethics’ and Berenskoetter ‘values’ - the notion of order that is forged in 
line with images of utopia and dystopia for a specific location.534 Again, these 
components overlap; stories and myths are directly related to a specific area, meaning 
the temporal and the spatial are intertwined.535  
 
One addition to this overview is drawn from White’s work on propaganda using 
‘value-analysis’. Value analysis is a three-step process wherein one codes each goal 
and value-judgment found in a speech, tabulates these findings, and then “interprets 
                                                
529 Abdelal et al., “Identity” pg. 702 
530 Hansen, Security, pg. 29 
531 Hansen elaborates by making note of two competing systems that Spaniards held of the Indians. While both held a symbol of 
the Indian as savaged, one held additional symbols that indicated they could be saved and converted while the other held they 
were beyond repair and should be eliminated.  
532 Adopted from Hansen, Figure 3.1, pg. 42  
533 Hansen, Security, pg. 45 
534 Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 275-276  






each numerical result in the light of the picture as a whole.” It then becomes possible 
to find “values which are mentioned most often and with most emphasis, the most 
frequent evaluative descriptions of a given person or group, the groups which are 
most often mentioned as "objects of concern," etc.”536 In his work, White found the 
major difference in Roosvelt and Hitler was the latters “continual dwelling on 
exaggerated ideas of persecution”, allowing aggressive action to appear defensive in 
nature and  “predetermines the way in which any ambiguous crisis-situation will be 
perceived.”537 A similar approach conducted in conjunction with discourse analysis 
could in turn provide further context regarding DPRK national identity.  
 
As an example of these two processes, one can examine the following excerpt from 
Kim Il Sung’s “Report at the 20th Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of the 
D.P.R.K”:   
 
With the foundation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, our people who 
had been deprived of their country by foreign imperialists and suffered every kind of 
humiliation and insult, became a mighty and dignified nation whom no one dares to 
flout, a sagacious people of a sovereign independent state who builds their country 
with their own efforts, firmly holding power in their own hands. The birth of the 
Republic enabled the Korean people to escape once and for all the bitter fate of being 
a ruined nation and enter a new stage of their history under the banner of a full 
fledged independent state. It enabled our country, which had long been eclipsed on 
the world map, to enter the international arena on par with all large and small 
countries.538 
 
From this passage, persecution and independence/self-reliance were recorded as the 
two main values. A number of signs of Self-Other were also recorded; Self: 
‘independent’, ‘on par with other countries’, ‘power in own hands’, ‘mighty and 
dignified’ and ‘sagacious’; Temporal Self: ‘suffer every kind of insult’, ‘ruined 
nation’, ‘eclipsed on the map’; and Negative Other: ‘foreign imperialists’.  
 
This same process is conducted for each paragraph of the document under review, 
allowing one to extract the values and signs of Self-Other the document creates. The 
results from each document are then compared against each other, allowing one to 
ascertain key components of, and degrees of change in, DPRK national narrative, 
highlighting its spatial, temporal and ethical components. This raises the question 
however of what documents one should focus on when conducing discourse analysis.  
 
2.2 Textual Selection:  
 
Of the three models provided by Hansen, this thesis works off of her model 1, 
examining official foreign policy discourse; that is on those in a position to make (e.g. 
political leaders) and enact (e.g. generals, diplomats) foreign policy. Within North 
Korea, official discourse is the only “politically and analytically pregnant” discourse - 
the only one of influence. This also follows a similar undertaking by Herrman and 
Fischerkeller who analyzed verbal behavior to empirically determine the images held 
                                                
536 Ralph K. White, "Hitler, Roosevelt, and the Nature of War Propaganda" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 44 
(1949), pg. 159-162 
537 White, "War Propaganda," pg. 169-171 
538 Kim Il Sung, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the Banner of Freedom and Independence for our People and a 
Powerful weapon for Building Socialism and Communism” Kim Il Sung Selected Works, Vol. V (Pyongyang Foreign Language 
Publishing House, 1972), pg. 141-142 
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by leaders,539 building from the works of George and White.540 Renshon’s work on 
public statements and private beliefs helps to further validate this emphasis on public 
discourse, as he was able to obtain the same results for the operational codes of JFK 
regardless of if he examined only public speeches or private transcripts.541  
 
Works on DPRK culture and literature help to outline those sources most important to 
DPRK national narrative. Particularly insightful is Sonia Ryang’s work Reading 
North Korea, which employed the anthropological process, developed during the 
limited movement of WWII, known as “culture at a distance.” Her aim was to 
“abstract the cultural logic that runs through North Korean society” by critically 
examining literature, treating these texts as sources of data.542 In the 1960s, Ryang 
found that North Korea began to establish hyeongmyeongjeontong (revolutionary 
tradition), which stressed the replication of Korean anti-Japanese guerilla attributes as 
found in their memoirs and biographies. By the 1970s, as Kim’s “teachings became a 
sacrosanct form of Gospel”, there was a shift towards memorizing his works, 
“(including public speeches, committee reports, and so on) by heart”.543 After 1982 
(and Kim’s 70th birthday) emphasis again shifted, this time towards novels and 
movies, both of which became “the major object of leisure consumption as well as 
voluntary self education.” The aim was no longer to understand his works, but to 
“sense or feel Kim Il Sung’s potency” and be able to “confidently perform songs from 
feature movies and reproduce catch call phrases and slogans.”544 Ryang suggests this 
was due to the aging of Kim (and subsequent decrease in his publications), the 
corresponding deaths of many former guerillas, and the increasing influence of Kim 
Jong Il in the production and guidance of North Korean culture.  
 
Meanwhile one of the main sources of official foreign policy discourse is the annual 
New Year Eves Address (NYEA) - the DPRK State of the Union. For example 
Hymans used the NYEA to ascertain DPRK national identity conceptions through 
content analysis. 545  Fortunately, records of the NYEA date back to 1974, and 
therefore coincide with the transition away from an emphasis on the works of Kim Il 
Sung.  There is then, for the most part, access to the key texts referenced by Ryang. 
The majority of these works have also been translated by the DPRK itself into English 
through the Pyongyang Foreign Language Publishing House in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This helps to overcome much of the uncertainty that can surround using translated 
material. Similarly, even though the Foreign Broadcast Information Service translated 
the NYEA documents, these materials have been accepted for use in similar 
investigations (White also used translated materials for his work), while their 
domestic and foreign focus for consumption satisfy Hansen’s criteria. 546 
 
                                                
539 Herrman and Fischerkeller, “Beyond the enemy image”, pg. 427 
540 White, "War Propaganda"; Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in 
World War II (Row, Peterson, 1959); and Brett Silverstein, "Toward a Science of Propaganda" Political Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 
1, (1987) 
541 “The theoretical assumption behind operational code analysis is that “a leader’s public behavior is constrained by his public 
image and that, over time, his public actions will consistently match his public beliefs”…In other words, the speech of leaders 
(almost always) contains information that is indicative of their true beliefs.” Jonathan Renshon, “When Public Statements Reveal 
Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Codes at a Distance” Political Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), pg. 652 
542 Ryang, Reading, pg. 13 
543 Ibid, pg. 25 
544 Ibid, pg. 27 
545 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions and Capacities: A New Approach” Journal of East Asian 
Studies, Vol. 8 (2008), pp. 259-292; Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
546 White, "War Propaganda”, pg. 158 
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In line with the above guidelines, the following texts were selected. Starting in 1946 
and going through to 1973 two speeches per year were selected from Kim Il Sung’s 
Selected Works Volumes I-V.547 In going through these works, explicit articulations of 
Self and Other and the main values for each paragraph were recorded. By 
incorporating these earlier works, (Volumes 1-2 cover 1945-1960) it also becomes 
possible to place this initial discourse against later speeches. Moreover, these earlier 
works were published in 1965 before the introduction of Kim’s monolithic ideological 
system and adoption of religious overtures in 1967. This will help establish to what 
extent DPRK national narrative has remained consistent in light of these internal 
structural changes. Meanwhile, starting in 1974 and going through to 1995,548 the 
thesis conducted the same exercise but with a focus on the annual NYEA.  
 
Analysis also incorporated some additional materials. The first was Kim Il Sung Short 
Biography Volumes I and II, published in 1972. Scholars such as Ryang and Myers 
have indicated the image of Kim generated through his biographies became an 
important component in defining North Korea. Given these two volumes are novels, 
not political speeches or writings similar to those found in The Selected Works, the 
focus here was more on, through a close reading of the two novels, extracting how 
Kim Il Sung, and through him the history of North Korea, is portrayed. Analysis also 
sought to extract images of Self-Other constructed in the three DPRK constitutions 
forged during the years under review, while also examining the “Ten Great Principles 
of the Establishment of the Unitary Ideology System” (1974), which Hwang stresses 
is “is the key to understanding North Korean society.”549  
 
These analytical results are then cross-referenced against works on the conceptual 
histories of key aspects of DPRK ideology. This is important since it allows one to 
more fully grasp, by examining formation and social context, the political vocabulary 
and “discursive codes” employed within DPRK discourse. As Hansen notes, this 
allows one to make note of their conceptual histories, revealing how the 
representations have been altered, how they were developed in the first place, and 
what other representations they managed to marginalize. It also becomes possible to 
further contextualize DPRK identity by examining works of high-level defectors 
involved in the creation and dissemination of DPRK ideology, as well as works on 
more low-level defectors that capture glimpses of daily life.  
 
2.3 Phase 2: Verification:  
 
Following the generation of behavioral expectations as derived from discourse 
analysis, Chapters 5 and 6 seek to verify which expectations provide a more holistic 
account of DPRK foreign policy. In addition to looking at specific behavior, 
behavioral expectations will be cross-referenced against archival records of 
previously classified DPRK allied documents. It then becomes possible to see if the 
recorded narrative translates into ‘behind door’ stances.550 These sources are primarily 
housed by the North Korean International Documentation Project551 and have been 
                                                
547 1947, 1949, 1952, and 195656 were unrepresented in these texts and only one speech was found for 1953, 1954 and 1971. 
Where possible, extra speeches were taken from the year immediately predating or preceding these gaps and as close to the 
beginning/ending of the year as possible. A full list of texts used can be found in the bibliography.  
548 Here 1987 was missing.  
549 John H. Cha, Exit Emperor Kim Jong-Il: Notes from His Former Mentor (AbbottPress, 2012), pg. 45 
550 Silverstein, “Towards a Science”, pg. 56 
551 See https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/north-korea-international-documentation-project  
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utilized in various capacities by leading scholars and been widely accepted by the 
academic community.  
 
The dissertation focuses on the most important trans-historical events involving the 
DPRK as derived from multiple timelines of major incidents – such as the ‘CRS 
Report for Congress “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007”.’552 This was 
often done in conjunction with existing works on North Korea so as to eliminate 
potentially biased selection.  These events also follow important structural changes, 
both internally and externally. This includes the decline of the DPRK economy, the 
rise of South Korea, the fall of the Soviet Union, normalization of relations between 
South Korea and China/Russia, and regime change in the DPRK. This is important 
for, if the OS framework developed here holds, the DPRK would be expected to 
undertake similar policies despite these structural changes (so long as the national 
narrative remained consistent). This would in turn further justify the framework while 
exposing the shortcomings of rival approaches.  Roughly six periods of DPRK 
behavior will be reviewed over 2 chapters.  
 
The first period, 1945-1953, revolves around the lead up to and prosecution of the 
Korean War. The second period, 1953-1958, was dominated by internal purges aimed 
at expunging Soviet and Chinese influence in the DPRK and the establishment of 
nationalist economic policies, all of which flew in the face of patron powers and led 
to extreme tension with Moscow and Beijing. The third period 1959-1969 witnessed 
the “2nd Korea War”, domestic anti Sino and Soviet propaganda campaigns, and 
overt aggression in the form of the Blue House raid and capturing of the USS Pueblo, 
all of which directly challenged the express wishes of the two superpowers.  
 
The fourth period, 1971-1973 is of great interest for it contains the first diplomatic 
advance in DPRK-ROK relations, the 1972 Joint Communiqué. Following a 
breakdown in talks the North soon reverted to a renewed policy of brinkmanship. This 
leads into the fifth period of review, 1973-1979, characterized by DPRK aggression 
along the DMZ and the Northern Limit Line. The sixth period then looks at how the 
DPRK reacted to drastic changes to its international standing, the international 
system, and the DPRK-ROK dyad throughout the 1980s. The last section then seeks 
to contextualize the North’s nuclear program, which largely came to light in the 
1990s. While often viewed as a response to structural and internal changes at that time 
(collapse of the USSR, famine, and the death of Kim Il Sung) the section explores the 
larger trajectory of the DPRK nuclear program back to the 1950s, and the 
implications this history has for current perceptions. 
 
3. Empirical Results of Discourse Analysis  
 
The first phase of empirical research was to conduct discourse analysis on the DPRK, 
thereby allowing one to generate behavioral expectations inline with the OS 
framework. Applying the guidelines noted above, the following results were found. 
First, drawing from discourse analysis on Kim Il Sung’s Selected Works Vol. 1-5 
(1946-1973) and the annual NYEA address (1974-1995) images of Self and Other 
were recorded, in order of frequency, and presented in Table 2. 
                                                
552 Hannah Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007”, CRS Report for Congress (2007); See also timelines by 
The Committee or Human Rights in North Korea found at https://www.hrnk.org/publications/timeline.php and the Wilson Center 
Modern Korean History Portal found at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/theme/modern-korean-history-portal/timeline 
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Table 3 shows the results from value analysis of the same documents. Two columns 
are found here. The first, “Frequency”, simply ranks values by the overall percentage 
of texts in which they are cited at least once (for example recording what percentage 
of overall texts cited ‘self-reliance’ at least once). The second column, “Weighted” 
ranks the values by their weighted frequency; that is which values the texts spent the 
greatest amount of time discussing overall. Here, values found in each text were 
scored depending on what percentage of the text it was discussed. This was done by 
placing values into one of 6 different categories, each with an assigned score: 
 
Category 1: 0-9% of text (0 score)  
Category 2: 10-19% of text (10 score)  
Category 3: 20-29% of text (20 score) 
Category 4: 30-39% of text (30 score) 
Category 5: 40-49% of text (40 score)  
Category 6: 50+% of text (50 score)  
 
For example if ‘self reliance’ was found to be 10% of a text on 10 different occasions, 
and 20% of a text on 2 separate occasions, it would receive a total score of 140. 
Column 2 thus ranks the values by their overall score. Analysis then discusses the 
‘stories’ that were told in these texts and changes that occurred over the years under 
review, before going on to further contextualize these findings.   
 
Table 2: Images ranked by percentage of time found in all speeches    
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Table 3: Value Analysis  
 
Frequency Weighted 
Self-Reliance Political Unity (960) 
Persecuted Self-Reliance (680) 
Political Unity Heavy Industry (600) 
Heavy Industry/Ideological Driven Econ. Persecuted (550) 
Light Industry/ living standards Light Industry/advance living standards (430) 
Unification Unification (270) 
Beat Back Aggression Modernization (170) 
Modern Beat Back Aggression (170) 
 
Third World  Cultural Revolution (80) 
Cultural Revolution  Third World (70) 
Rising International Position July 4th Joint Statement (40) 
Soviet Union Praise Democratic Confederation of Korea (30) 
Democratic Confederation of Korea Rising International Position (10) 
Foreign Trade US to Sign Peace Agreement (10) 
Nuclear Weapons  
July 4th Statement 
US To Sign Peace Agreement 
NWFZ 
Tripartite Talks 
North Korea Nuclear Weapons 
 
In terms of Self, North Korea has consistently stressed its independence, a sentiment 
found in almost every speech. It has also stressed its firm, independent economy, 
socialism, and its cohesion/unity along with being a mighty, modern, patriotic entity. 
Other characteristics found relatively frequently were self-defense, heroic struggle 
(though if combined with references to the anti-Japanese struggle, this moves up) and 
references to being brilliant/creative/cultured. This would all appear a marked 
increase from their temporal self, dictated by exploitation and backwardness. These 
descriptions parallel the South Korean Other, described as a fascist dictatorship and 
stooges of imperialists. Regarding positive Others, the North most frequently 
associated itself with “anti-imperialists” those seeking “world peace” and friendly 
socialist states. Later, Third Word Countries, Non-Aligned States and the “World 
Progressive People” became increasingly referred to.  By contrast, the USSR and 
China are not nearly as referenced, and while they appear somewhat frequently early 
on, after 1960 there is a significant drop. Finally, the North seems to cite both 
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imperialism (generally) and U.S. imperialism (specifically) as its main negative 
Other; U.S. imperialism in the context of South Korea was also referenced frequently. 
The Other was also shown as being overly aggressive, exploitative and colonial.  
 
The DPRK is thus independent, with an independent economy, and is a unified, 
dignified, honorable, socialist, modern and advanced state capable of self-defense - 
the embodiment of the anti-colonial struggle and an ongoing heroic struggle. It is 
allied with the anti-imperialists, those seeking world peace, and the non-aligned and 
world progressive peoples. It has overcome the exploitation and backwardness that 
defined Korea of the past and continues to define the colonialism and stooges of 
imperialism that is South Korea. It opposes imperialism (generally) and U.S. 
imperialism (specifically) and those who are aggressive, exploitative or colonial.   
 
Perhaps given this narrative it is not surprising that value analysis found a consistent 
reference to, and emphasis on, unity, self-reliance, heavy industry, and persecution.  
A few cursory notes should be made. For one, “Party” was used to account for talk of 
the Party in general. While in the latter stages this often referred primarily to unity or 
correct policy as a result of the Party, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s this was 
often matched with lengthy discussions on training party cadres, working on how to 
improve party organization and structure, the need for better processes, etc. This in 
turn accounts for the Party value at times being recorded as such a high percentage of 
some works. The second is that “Party” talk on a united front – mostly in the 1950s, 
was incorporated under the “Unification” value. Overall, the value analysis seems to 
correlate with much of the articulations of Self and Other found though discourse 
analysis, emphasizing an independent unified North Korea with an independent 
economy, intent on beating back aggression or imperialist incursions and forging a 
unified state.  
 
This all supports what high-level DPRK defectors who either created or disseminated 
work on Juche have revealed. As Hwang Jang Yop (who in the 1960s was tasked with 
developing Juche for Kim Il Sung) writes: 
 
To summarize Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology at that time, it was to oppose toadyism 
whereby the people unconditionally looked up to powerful countries and belittled 
their own country, and doctrinairism whereby the people imitated anything from 
powerful countries; and it required them to apply Marxism-Leninism creatively to 
their specific and practical situation…Opposition to toadyism, I thought, should be 
understood as opposition to interference by and the domination of powerful countries 
and persistence in seeking the benefits of the Chosun people, the Juche, rather than 
applying Marxism-Leninism creatively to us. Consequently, along with the opinion 
that Marxism should be creatively applied to practical situations, I also added 
opposition to toadyism and maintaining one’s independent stance to be the basic 
factors of the Juche ideology. Later on, Kim Il Sung chose independence and 
creativity as the fundamental policies and publicized them as the essential line: Juche 
in ideology; independence in politics; self-reliance in economics; and self-defense. 
These were the fundamentals of Juche ideology.553 
 
Again what we find is a strong emphasis on genuine nationalist sentiments and 
resentment regarding North Korea’s colonial past, resulting in a sensitivity towards 
                                                
553 Hwang Hang Yop, “Theoretical Birth of the Juche Ideology, Hwang Jang Yop’s Memoirs -31” (June, 2010) Accessed at 
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02400&num=6515   
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those who might impede independence. Providing a more in-depth account of three 
speeches in particular – selected given their in-depth account of DPRK history during 
commemorative celebrations across three decades (1948, 1958 and 1968) - helps to 
further showcase how the main ‘plot points’ of this narrative emphasize independence 
and self-reliance. They also underscore the presence of a consistent metanarrative, 
one that resonates with the biographies of Kim that gained prominence in the 1970s 
and with the three DPRK Constitutions drafted between 1948-1992.  
 
In 1948, on the founding of the Korean Peoples Army, Kim stated: 
 
the Korean people, who had been subjected to all sorts of persecution and suppression 
under the bayonets of the Japanese imperialists, took power into their own 
hands…we now have our own full-fledged army capable of defending the country 
and nation…[a] long cherished desire of the Korean people…Now all the people of 
the north and the south can take pride before the whole world in having their own 
modern, regular army to fight for the freedom and glory of their country.554  
 
Founding such an army in South Korea was “inconceivable…[since it] is under U.S. 
military administration and…pro-Japanese elements and traders to the nation”.555 The 
DPRK army was founded to promote “complete independence of all Korea on a 
democratic basis” as this is the only way for a country “to become a completely 
independent state”. This was compounded by the fact Korea’s “unification and 
independence have been retarded…as a result of the vicious maneuvering by the U.S. 
imperialists and their lackeys to split our nation and turn our land once again into a 
colony.”556 Consequently, while following liberation North Korea was able to take 
“advantage of the favorable conditions created by the Soviet army [allowing] our 
people…[to lay] the political, economic and cultural foundations for building a 
democratic independent state”,557 this progress was now under threat. The Koreans 
could not “wait for anyone to give us independence…[but] must build a democratic, 
independent state entirely by their own efforts”. 558 
 
In 1958 Kim again recounted the history of the DPRK, starting with the numerous 
“Korean patriots, headed by the Communists, [who] waged a long, bloody struggle 
solely for the liberation of the nation and the restoration of their country, never 
yielding to the brutal suppression of the Japanese imperialists.”559 This allowed the 
people of Korea “who had lived through age old oppression, humiliation, darkness 
and suffering” to guide “their own destiny as masters of their country.”560 While in 
1948 war was forewarned due to U.S./ROK aggression, in1958 Kim remarked how 
“war [was] forced upon us by the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, the Syngman 
Rhee clique…[and] the invaders from 16 countries of the world…[and] brought 
untold distress and suffering to our people.”561 This “three years of war played havoc 
                                                
554 Kim Il Sung “On the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Workers Party of Korea (Report Delivered at the Celebration of 
the 20th Anniversary of the Worker’s Party of Korea, October 10, 1965)” in Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. IV (Foreign 
Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1968), pg. 58 
555 Ibid, pg. 60 
556 Ibid, pg. 59-60 
557 One free from “foreign interference” and separate from the remnants of Japanese imperialism. – see Kim Il Sung “Report to 
the Second Congress of the North Korean Workers Party on the Work of the Central Committee (March 28, 1948)” in Kim Il 
Sung Selected Works Vol. I (Foreign Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1965) 
558 Kim Il Sung “On the Occasion”, pg. 60 
559 Kim Il Sung “Report at the Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(September 8, 1958)” in Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. II (Foreign Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1975), pg. 194  
560 Ibid, pg. 195 
561 Ibid, pg. 196 
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with our national economy and greatly deteriorated the living conditions of our 
people” who had just managed (without reference to the Soviets) to overcome the 
“backward economy and culture left behind by the colonial rule of Japanese 
imperialism” 562 Following the War the “Party laid down the basic line of postwar 
economic construction…giv[ing] priority to the growth of heavy industry…This was 
the only correct way.” By relying upon “the indomitable fighting spirit and 
inexhaustible creative energy of our working people who had rallied around the 
Party…[and] the economic and technical aid of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the 
People’s Republic of China an other fraternal counties”, the economy was rebuilt.563  
 
In 1968, Kim marked the 20th Anniversary by recounting how given the “colonial 
ruling machine of Japanese imperialism…Korean Communists and patriots organized 
the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army” carrying on a “heroic armed struggle” for national 
independence. Following liberation, North Korea “on the basis of Marxist-Leninist 
line of peoples power” and experiences “gained during the anti-Japanese armed 
struggle” set about rebuilding the country.564 The foundation of the DPRK, “the 
embodiment of the unanimous desire of our nation to attain the freedom and 
independence”, provided for the people who had “been deprived of their country by 
foreign imperialists and suffered every kind of humiliation and insult”, a “mighty and 
dignified nation whom no one dares to flout, a sagacious people of a sovereign 
independent state who built their country with their own efforts, firmly holding power 
in their own hands…to enter the international arena on par with all large and small 
countries.”565 These efforts for the transition to socialism “were interrupted by the 
piratic armed invasion of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys” leading to “a life-and-
death struggle…However, the enemy could not subdue our heroic people who rose as 
one in the righteous war of resistance”. Given the “justice of our cause and the 
dynamic external activities of our party…the peoples of the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries supported us materially and morally, and the Chinese people 
dispatched volunteers who shed their blood to help us in our righteous struggle”. 566  
 
Following this “fierce anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle” North Korea was 
“confronted with the pressing need to rapidly rehabilitate the devastated national 
economy”. The subsequent focus on heavy industry was the only “correct line”, a 
“creative one based on the application of the Marxist-Leninist theory…to the specific 
realities of our country…[so as to] speedily build an independent national economy in 
the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.” 567  It was at this time, “anti-Party 
factionalists within the Party betrayed our revolution and carried out conspiratorial 
activities to overthrow the leadership of our Party and Government.” These efforts 
were repulsed, and “upholding the revolutionary banner of Marxists-Leninism, our 
party and the government of the Republic confidently led our people towards a great 
surge in socialist construction.”568 This success was, in the mid 1960s, placed on hold, 
however, given U.S. aggression; “Only when we make the nation’s defense 
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impregnable, even though this may somewhat affect our economic development, can 
our socialist achievements be defended”.569 To this end, “a potent all-people defense 
system based on the monolithic political and ideological unity of the entire people 
[was formed]…The International prestige of our republic has been enhanced 
constantly thanks to the resolute anti-imperialist, anti-US position and the principled, 
independent foreign-policy of our party and government.”570 
 
The central components of national narrative and iterations of Self and Other found in 
these three speeches were similarly codified in the biographies of Kim Il Sung. On the 
first page of Volume I, it states “[h]is was a patriotic and revolutionary family which, 
since the 1860s, had fought for several generations against foreign invaders for the 
independence of the country and the freedom and liberation of the people.” His great 
grandfather “distinguished himself in the battle in which the U.S. pirate ship General 
Sherman…prob[ing] the possibility of invading Korea, was sunk”.571 His father, “a 
man of exceptionally strong anti-Japanese patriotic spirit”, championed self-reliance 
when he “repudiated the futile attempt of the bourgeois nationalists to achieve 
national independence by “petitioning” the Japanese imperialists or with the “help” of 
other imperialist powers.” He subsequently developed Chiwon, “the unshakable spirit 
of national independence”, by the “the broad anti-Japanese patriotic forces 
themselves”, a struggle Kim’s mother also dedicated herself to. 572 During the “great 
national suffering” of Japanese imperialism, a young Kim, while drawing from 
socialism, also understood he could only achieve his goals of independence through 
“independent development”. In the 1930s, “in accordance with the great Juche 
idea…[he] put forward an independent line and policy”, premised on fighting 
“imperialists by our own strength” and ensuring political cohesion. 573 
 
It was around this time Kim Song Ju’s comrades renamed him Kim Il Sung, for he 
was seen as the “future sun” for the nation.574 During the war against Japan it was 
Kim who proposed “cementing militant solidarity with the communists and other 
revolutionary people of China”.575 It was also Kim who, in 1932, “made the obstinate 
and ferocious Chinese commander bow his head” after ethnic purges against Korean 
forces. Following this, the Anti-Japanese Guerilla Army become “an invincible armed 
force”, educating and strengthening the Chinese and other anti-imperialist forces, 
while making sure “opportunists’ attempts to set up a Soviet form of government 
were smashed and a people’s revolutionary government was established” in guerilla 
zones.576  Given these experiences, and  “holding fast to the Juche idea” allowed 
North Korea “to overcome all difficulties after liberation”, forging a “new path to 
national liberation for the colonial countries”.577 Throughout the War sparked by the 
ROK surprise attack, Kim “held fast to the independent stand of solving all 
problems…by the Korean people themselves”,578 demonstrating the strength of those 
fighting for independence.579 The same principles guided the transition to socialism 
following liberation, during postwar economic construction, and “through the struggle 
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to establish Juche” thereby allowing “political independence [to be] better maintained 
and an independent national economy and self-defense capability” established.580 
 
The overt nationalist sentiments found in the Selected Works and Kim’s biographies 
can similarly be found in DPRK institutions. While the 1948 Constitution in many 
respects reads like a traditional constitution, establishing basic rights and laws and a 
fairly centralized power structure under the Presidium of the Supreme People's 
Assembly (Article 32, 47), Cabinet (Article 52, 54), and Premier (Article 59), in terms 
of Self-Other images, a few interesting points stand out. For one, unlike most socialist 
states it contained no direct references to either socialism or communism, (though it 
did abolish the tenancy system). Instead, it largely focused on defining itself against 
the Japanese and Japanese sympathizers in Korea (Article 5, 12, 85).581 In terms of a 
positive Other, focus fell predominantly on fellow revolutionaries, granting asylum to 
“foreign nationals persecuted for fighting for democratic principles or national 
liberation movements”  (Article 26). This resonated with its stance outlining “the duty 
of every citizen of the D.P.R.K. to defend the homeland…the highest duty and honor 
of every citizen” while betraying the homeland was “the most heinous of crimes” 
(Article 28). The KPA was thus “to safeguard the sovereignty of the fatherland and 
freedom of the people” (Article 100), a major aim of the state budget (Article 95). The 
Premier, Vice-Premiers and ministers were also required to take an oath, which 
included a promise to “dedicate all my power and ability to the safeguarding of the 
sovereignty” of the DPRK (Article 61). 
 
The 1972 Constitution compounded these nationalist sentiments, placing them firmly 
under the ideology of Juche.  As Jeongwon Park writes, it was a “kind of declaration 
of independence, and the word “independent” appeared in the constitution with 
unusual frequency.” 582  It stated the DPRK is “an independent socialist state 
representing the interests of all the Korean people” (Article 1), with an independent 
economy (Article 2), and imbued with the “brilliant traditions” of the anti-Japanese 
guerillas (Article 3). Foreign relations were to be based on equality and independence 
and the principle of non-interference (Article 16). The document also implemented 
ideological sentiments like Chollima and the Taen Work System (Article 12, 13, 30) 
and stated the DPRK “is guided in its activity by the Juche idea…a creative 
application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country” (Article 4). Indeed 
Juche was referenced so systemically throughout that it has been dubbed the Juche 
constitution.583 This increased emphasis on Juche would seem to compound the 
nationalist sentiments noticeable in 1948, while the elimination of references to 
protecting minorities was seen as a sign of purging elements potentially adopted from 
foreign entities.  However a few key differences stick out.  
 
Socialism and Marxism became far more prevalent, in both iteration and practice 
(Article 12, 13, 33, 49, 68). Pyongyang, not Seoul, was also noted as the capitol of the 
DPRK. At the same time, it was stated the DPRK “strives to achieve the complete 
victory of socialism in the northern half, drive out foreign forces on a national scale, 
reunify the country peacefully on a democratic basis and attain compete national 
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independence” (Article 5). Meanwhile, new structures were forged (including the 
Office of the President) to reflect power transitions that had occurred within the state 
(article 91, 93, 100, 101), representing a further consolidation of the centralized 
power structure already present in 1948. This coincided with the introduction of the 
Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System in 1967 (and 
officially adopted in 1974). Throughout this text, major emphasis was placed on the 
absolute authority of the Great Leader. Only through endless loyalty and becoming a 
single unified body under his absolute authority could the revolution go on. He gave 
the Korean people their political will and their life and thus they “must never 
compromise our political belief and revolutionary principles.” Instead they must learn 
from the Great Leader and accept his revolutionary ideas and adopt them as their own 
creed, thereby allowing them to become “juche communist revolutionaries.”584 
 
The 1992 constitution sought to make further organizational changes necessary to 
facilitate the transfer of power to Kim Jong Il, allowing him, and not the President, to 
be head of the military, while the National Defense Council (headed by Jong Il) was 
promoted. The 1992 constitution also responded to international events such as the 
fall of the USSR. While still referring to itself as a socialist state, references to 
Marxism were eliminated and further emphasis was placed on Juche as a departure 
(not a creative interpretation of) Marxism;585 “The DPRK is guided in its activities by 
the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people. A revolutionary ideology for 
achieving independence of the masses of the people”(Article 3). It also called for 
“joint ventures and cooperation in enterprise with foreign corporations and 
individuals” (Article 37), though the state remained in control of the means of 
production and all foreign trade, which was to be conducted on the basis of complete 
equality,586 indicating affinities with similar calls in the 1960s/70s.   
 
Despite these structural changes, the crux of Self-Other conceptions largely remained 
in tact. The DPRK was “an independent socialist state” (Article 1), a “revolutionary 
power which has inherited brilliant traditions formed during the glorious 
revolutionary struggle against the imperialist aggressors, in the struggle to achieve the 
liberation of the homeland and the freedom and well-being of the people” (Article 2). 
It has an “independent national economy” (Article 19, 26, 38) and a stated goal to 
“reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and 
great national unity” (Article 9). “Independence, peace, and solidarity” underscored 
foreign policy, with relations dictated by “principles of complete equality, 
independence, mutual respect, noninterference in each other's affairs and mutual 
benefit” (Article 17), while “self-reliant defense” (Article 60) focused on protecting 
the “socialist system and the gains of the revolution from aggression and…the 
freedom, independence and peace of the country” (Article 59). It favorably viewed 
individuals “persecuted for struggling or peace and democracy, national independence 
and socialism” (Article 79) while opposing “infiltration of imperialism and any 
tendency to return to the past” (Article 41). 
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The three constitutions, coupled with the analysis on Kim’s speeches and biographies, 
reveal the DPRK metanarrative and Self-Other conceptions have remained fairly 
consistent, with two exceptions. The first pertains to the varying levels of 
acknowledgment regarding the roles played by the Soviets, socialist allies, and China, 
as well as potential relations with capitalist states and the prospect for peace with the 
US. This would appear to be a derivative narrative that has been activated/deactivated 
at various times. Of course even when reference has been made to these external 
actors, their role has been consistently played down or justified. Similarly, the 
constitutions showcase fluctuations regarding iterations of Marxism, again suggesting 
it is a more flexible component of DPRK identity. For its part, while Juche only 
became directly codified in the 1972 constitution, its nationalist sentiments had 
already been codified in 1948, suggesting more of a refinement rather than change. 
 
The largest difference to emerge then appears to be the increasing fusion between a 
seemingly genuine hyper-nationalism with the personality of Kim. Consequently, 
while DPRK narrative remained the same, it was slowly grafted onto Kim, securing 
his legitimacy, as he became both the very embodiment of what it meant to be 
‘Korean’ and the leading figure in DPRK national ‘history’. To this end, the 
constitutions clearly demonstrate how power structures came to be legitimated 
through national narrative, in a further shift towards Weber’s “charismatic” model of 
legitimacy587 and establishment of what Wada Haruki, taking from Clifford Geertz, 
termed a “theater state”, with centralized power structures and, importantly, “public 
art and mass spectacles” imbued with the ideology of Juche.588  Juche thus became 
emblematic of DPRK identity; by embodying Juche Kim simultaneously came to 
embody the Korean nation, securing his position. This in no way detracts from the 
genuine nationalist sentiment or continuities in Self-Other images, but it does 
represent the grafting onto this nationalism a distinct hierarchical structure of 
governance, a sentiment reinforced by further examining the evolution of Juche.   
 
3.2 Contextualizing Results:  
 
First introduced in 1955, during a speech in which Kim stressed the need to 
“eliminate dogmatism and formalism”,589 Juche has been defined as ‘autonomy’ or 
‘self-reliance’, though “the actual meaning of the word ‘Juche’ itself does in fact 
mean “subject,” or “principal body.” Overtime it would be argued that “Juche “unites” 
the people of North Korea and the Party into one body to be led by the leader” with 
Kim Il Sung “the father of a blood-united “family state.””590 It is therefore argued that 
while Juche eventually developed into a legitimating pseudo philosophical-religious 
entity, its most important characteristic, and founding principle, is its nationalist-
infused narrative. To focus solely on its legitimizing characteristics is therefore 
imprudent, overlooking the widespread nationalism its foundation embodies and 
distinct versions of Self and Other it propagates. Moreover, all political ideologies 
maintain some legitimizing characteristics, including in democracies. 591  In order to 
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be successful, however, and as Lerner notes, requires conformity “to the nation's 
heritage and already existing beliefs”. Consequently, Juche’s appeal:  
 
also reflected the population's fierce sense of nationalism…strengthened by Korean 
history, since most of the nation had come to resent decisions made by the nation's 
leadership under the Yi Dynasty to become essentially a vassal state of China for 
hundreds of years.592 
 
Accordingly, Cha cautions against those who presume Juche “is merely a name 
plate”, with power premised only upon oppression. Instead, its dominance was 
achieved by tapping into postcolonial nationalism, juxtaposing self-determination 
against the South’s ““sadaejuui”…being a slave or servant to another big power” (the 
U.S.). Consequently, the North view themselves as the true authentic Koreans; the 
“emphasis on Korean uniqueness, homogeneity, and pure bloodedness …[and the] 
theme of independence from predation by outside great powers was [a] mandate that 
all Koreans believe in.”593 There is also reason to believe that a large plethora of 
North Koreans ascribe to this national narrative. During the height of the famine in 
the 1990s, Jang Jin-sung (a high-ranking defector) wrote how “the towns people 
continue to be concerned more for their leader’s well-being then for their own, 
although they were in a wretched state.”594 Demick’s work Nothing to Envy, looking 
at various North Korean defectors, also provides a trove of analogies demonstrating 
support for the regime up to, and during, the famine. For example: 
 
Well past the point when it should’ve been obvious that the system had failed 
her…[Mrs. Song] remained unwavering in her faith. “I lived only for Marshall Kim 
Il-sung and for the fatherland. I never had a thought otherwise”.”595  
 
Similarly, a large majority of DPRK refuges have cited economic conditions, and not 
political freedom or fear, as their main impetus for leaving. This of course has 
changed in more recent years, as seen in the South Korean survey in Table 4, but still 
suggests congruence regarding national narrative for the period under review.    
 
Table 4596  
 
Motive China Survey (2004-2005) South Korea Survey (2008) 
Economic Conditions 94.7 56.7 
Political Freedom 1.8 27 
Religious Freedom 0.2 1.0 
Fear (afraid of doing anything 
wrong) 
1.8 8.0 
Other 1.6 7.3 
Total  100 100 
 
To this end, it is fruitful to delve into the tenants of Juche. While Juche has taken 
from Marxist-Leninism Maoism, Confucianism, and in more recent years elements of 
religious doctrine, it is a wholly distinct entity. It holds man, not class struggle, as the 
mover of history, with politics guided by national, not class, consciousness. It 
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advocates for the mass line and centralized decision-making at all levels, but also 
espouses the role of intellectuals in its threefold class alliance; Maoism primarily 
emphasized peasants. Cha thus nicely surmises it main tenants as “(1) man is the 
master of his fate; (2) the master of the Revolution is the people; (3) the Revolution 
must be pursued in the self-reliant manner; (4) the key to revolution is loyalty to the 
supreme leader”. 597 Meanwhile, noting Kim’s warning against the "negation of 
Korean history" with foreign ideas, David-West argues the most substantial influence 
on Juche were Korean works by Pak Yônam and Chông Tasan, and the “indigenous 
sirhak (practical learning) school of Reformed Confucianism.” 598  
 
Because Tasan’s works were never enacted, it was possible to highlight him as 
“something of a proto-socialist”, while his hostile view of tributary relations with 
China fit well with post-colonial nationalism. Moreover, his elitist background meant 
he favored feudalism, monarchy and social division, as well “the practice of moral 
ideas and moral cultivation in government as a remedy for social ills.”599 This had 
growing importance following the introduction of the monolithic ideological system 
in 1967, which Kim claimed was necessary for ideological unity and the revolution,600 
and the cultivation of Kimilsungism by Kim Jong Il following his promotion to head 
of the OGD in 1969,601 culminating in the Ten Principles. 
 
From this point on, Juche was presented more as a philosophy. This was, in actuality 
“a political religion in the sociological sense, [operating] in a premodern and 
prescientific conceptual mode.” There were no philosophical arguments or reasoning, 
but assertions “composed of an elementary and recursive set of axioms, slogans, and 
syllogisms.” Here, man is a material and a social being composed of three essential 
features. The first is independence (chajusong), the “life and soul” of man, which 
relates to his essential desire to shape both the world and his own destiny. Second is 
creativity (chajosong), which pertains to mans’ ability to enact these desires. Finally 
there is consciousness (uishiksong), a prerequisite for man to have “desire, will and 
ability.” This centrality of man is argued to define Juche as a distinct philosophy, but 
it leads to “subjective idealism and indeterminism” becoming “a "cult of abstract 
man" that inevitably leads back to idealism and religion.”602  
 
The religious connotations of Juche grew in 1982 when Kim Jong-il began to expand 
on its philosophical underpinnings.603 Man, it was argued, is composed of both a 
physical life and of social and political integrity. “The physical life is what keeps a 
man alive as biological organism; social and political integrity is what keeps him alive 
as social being.”604 In the same treatise, Kim was also elevated as the only true 
interpreter of Juche, further underscoring its growing religious connotations.605  
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The evolution of Juche, in conjunction with changes to the constitution, demonstrates 
how the legitimization of the Supreme Leader was grafted onto existing post-colonial 
nationalism.606 Still, as the scholars above warn, we should not take an overly 
instrumentalist view, even as North Korea has taken this further than many other 
states. Kang argues such a utilitarian view is representative of larger problems with 
literature on totalitarian systems in general. Nationalism has not merely been 
propagated by the government (macro), but has become integral to, and replicated in, 
the daily lives of (borrowing from Bourdieu) the ‘habitus’ of North Korean citizens 
(micro). In pursuing this logic he reverts to Giddens who argued, in “modern nation-
states’ “totalitarian” rule had an elective affinity with nationalism, and this state 
power depended upon the ability to penetrate citizens’ daily activities and change 
them from below.” Thus Stalinism, let alone the mass movement of Nazism, was not 
simply a political system, but rather “a set of values, a social identity, and a way of 
life.”607 This is not to overlook these regimes employed force to further instill and 
maintain their message, but merely to highlight that often the message was 
reciprocated from below as it was integral to individuals’ habitus in a “marriage 
between macro and micro politics.”608  
 
His argument is accompanied by qualitative in-depth interviews with North Korean 
defectors, which found that prior to its ability to inoculate its population from outside 
information, many had already developed anti imperialist and American sentiment as 
a result of colonization and the Korean War. As the DPRK’s ability to control society 
grew it sought to further emphasize this collective memory and militant nationalism 
within daily life.609 In turn, there was further fusion between the macro and the micro, 
from education and commonly invoked phrases (American imperialist bastard is 
among the worst insults),610 to children’s games611 and active participation in military 
or pseudo-military organizations.612 This socialization has transcended North Korea’s 
rigid social classification hierarchy as well its generations, and while there was some 
discrepancy found in those with ‘bad’ family backgrounds, “political perceptions and 
behaviors of extreme enmity against America were held by ordinary people and 
commonly found in most defectors’ testimonies.”613 Again, it was not as if the regime 
fabricated this nationalism, much of it had grown organically, allowing for a genuine 
fusion between the macro and micro as Juche took on a more legitimizing role.  
 
Part of this resonance could also relate to the relative harmony between DPRK 
narrative and Koreans’ historical views of their nation, which has traditionally 
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surrounded the notion of shared blood.614 This stemmed from a “sense of external 
threats as well as specific Korean historical experiences (for example, colonization)”, 
forging the “rise and continued dominance of an ethnic, organic conception of nation, 
which stressed internal solidarity and submission to collectivist goals.” To this end, 
“careful examination reveals a great deal of similarity in terms of their [North and 
South’s] view of the Korea nation, their use of nationalism in politics, and their 
appropriation of transnational forces for nationalist agendas.”615 There are, of course, 
important differences that stem from the unique experiences of each. Seoul’s 
“incorporation into a world capitalist system…constrained the South from developing 
xenophobic nationalism as seen the North.”616 By contrast, the experiences of the 
eventual guerilla leadership of the DPRK prior to liberation resulted in an even more 
fervent interpretation of traditional Korean nationalism. 617  
 
A defining moment for the guerrillas was betrayal by their Chinese Communist allies 
during the war against Japan. This was optimized by the Minsaengdan massacre, 
when the Chinese, perturbed with the overly nationalist views of Korean guerrillas, 
undertook mass ethnic purges over feigned accusations of spying. While the guerillas 
were originally some of the firmest advocates of the purge, angered by the prospect of 
betrayal, as the ethnic component was revealed support quickly diminished. The 
purges decimated the guerilla leadership, leaving Kim the de facto head and helping 
him gain prestige as he played an intricate role in bringing about their end. Most 
importantly, however, the purges generated a ‘do it alone’ mindset, as ethnic 
segregation was imposed.618 This mindset was reinforced following Moscow’s call for 
CCP and Korean forces to retreat into Manchuria, allowing the Japanese to crush 
what infrastructure the guerrillas had managed to build, further impressing on the 
guerrillas the need “to count the interest invested in the Korean revolution first and 
foremost” and avoid Great Power subservience. All of this provides a “historical 
backdrop” as to why the DPRK prize “not only juridical sovereignty but also 
substantial independence from China and other big powers.”619   
 
This mindset led to, as Gwang-Oon Kim argues, a tug of war between former 
guerillas seeking to preserve autonomy, and external powers seeking to influence 
post-independent North Korea. From the outset of Soviet occupation following the 
end of WWII, there was a great amount of animosity due to the presence of foreign 
troops and large Soviet expropriations and investment to try and solidify extractive 
economic interests. This in turn helped to generate a fervent nationalist sentiment in 
the populace; “[i]n opposition to the Soviet other, the northern Korean nation was 
born” and the Juche institution emerged. 620 This was spurred on by Kim’s political 
success and dissemination of nationalist policies.  The former was largely attributable 
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620 Gwang-Oon Kim “The Making of the Juche State in Postcolonial North Korea” in Jae-Jung Suh (ed.) Origins of North 
Korea’s Juche pg. 67, 68 
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to his relative notoriety thanks to high-profile exploits during the war.621 Soviet 
directives after 1940, forcing Kim’s guerillas to focus on party building, also helped 
lay the groundwork for grassroots support and a “united democratic national front.” 
Meanwhile, the experience of the guerillas helped them form a distinct, appealing, 
and coherent identity that was elevated as the ideal for all groups, again underscoring 
the genuine national sentiment of the populace at this time. Kim’s earlier experiences 
also taught him how best to ‘tacitly maneuver’ around other factions while always 
making sure to maintain control of the military, espousing Mao’s later dictum 
““power comes from the barrel of the gun.”622  
 
Given this dominant position, Kim’s guerillas were able to quickly influence post-war 
life. Following the collapse of Japanese control mechanisms in 1945, local peoples 
committees took the initiative and immediately began to fill the void, with the Soviets 
only ex post facto calling for their direct participation.623 After the first elections in 
1946, and the establishment of the North Korean People’s Committee in 1947, there 
was an active movement to diminish Soviet influence. This included initiatives that 
decreased translation of Soviet material into Korean at a time when the Soviets were 
actively seeking to disseminate these works aboard. This nationalist agenda was then 




From the very outset, one finds Kim’s guerilla group championing a distinctly 
nationalist, quasi anti-foreign line focused on overcoming the legacies of colonialism 
and perceived duplicity by Great Powers (China and Russia) during, and immediately 
after, the resistance period, a line mirrored by a receptive populace. The discourse 
analysis indicates this early narrative, and its distinct versions of Self and Other, has 
remained, for the most part, fairly consistent; North Korea is independent, with an 
independent economy, and is a unified, dignified, honorable, socialist, modern and 
advanced state capable of self-defense - the embodiment of the anti-colonial struggle. 
It has persevered through hardships to continue an ongoing heroic struggle and strives 
to achieve the independent unification of the nation. This narrative soon became 
embodied in the ideology of Juche. While in the 1970’s legitimating components in 
the form of religious cultivation for the leadership were grafted onto Juche, its 
foundation and tenants of postcolonial nationalism still persists and remains in tact.  
 
All of this provides insights into what might be interpreted as an ideational threat by 
North Korea; i.e. what discourses or actions might be perceived as invalidating, 
questioning or threatening key components of Self or eroding its differentiation from 
the Other, triggering a personal crisis. To this end, North Korea will be expected to: 
 
1. Maintain a hypersensitivity to foreign influence, exploitation and Great Power 
chauvinism in an effort to uphold independence, ‘dignity’ and ‘pride’; 
                                                
621 Kee Kwang-seo “The Historical Origins and Formation of the Monolithic Political System in North Korea” in Han Jong-Woo 
and Jung Tae-Hern (eds.) Understanding North Korea: Indigenous Perspectives (Lexington Books, 2014)  
622 The songun concept espoused under Kim Jong-il, can be traced to this period. Kim “The Making of the Juche State”, pg. 72 
623 Kim “The Making of the Juche State”, pg. 75 
 97 
2. Maintain an independent economy. This is not to say it will abstain from 
engaging in trade or receiving aid,624 but instead, will not allow a foreign 
entity to influence North Korea as a result of economic considerations; 
3. Where possible it will seek to ‘go it alone’ and rely on its own forces;  
4. Distance itself from the ‘colonial’ South Korean Other, and from Korea’s own 
past as an exploited colony with backward ideas; 
5. Assert independence and anti-imperialism while also working to become a 
modern and advanced state; 
6. Unify the nation to forge an independent unified Korea, though the emphasis 
on ‘independent’ indicates these efforts will not sacrifice the principles of 
sovereignty to achieve their aims.  
 
Having established behavioral expectations for North Korea form both a traditional 
and an OS perspective, it now become possible to verify which of these frameworks 






























                                                
624 Kim himself stated, “It is impossible to make a revolution by depending on other countries…We are not the people to reject 
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Publishing House Pyongyang, 1975), pg. 380; “On Improving and Strengthening the Work of Commodity Circulation (Speech 
Delivered at a National Conference of Activists in Trade, February 14, 1957)” in Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. II (Foreign 
Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1975) pg. 328, 329 
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Chapter 5  
DPRK Foreign Policy: 1950-1969 
 
From the planning of the Korean War in the 1950s through the end of the Second 
Korean War in 1969, Pyongyang seemingly pursued ideational interests at the 
expense of material ones, forging policies often contradictory to the expectations of 
traditional security approaches. Consequently, one must question why Kim advocated 
for war despite inhospitable systemic factors and why during the course of the war he 
repeatedly rejected Chinese military assistance, instead wanting to rely on his own 
forces. Following the war, Kim’s guerilla factions’ adherence to a nationalist 
economic line led to fractious relationships with key allies. This defiance continued 
throughout the Sino-Soviet split, during which Pyongyang didn’t remain neutral so 
much as pursue ideational policies that carried economic and security implications. 
Pyongyang was also reluctant to fully balance against these threats over fears of 
sacrificing an independent foreign stance, while simultaneously conducting the 
Second Korean War, much to the displeasure of Moscow and despite being on the 
verge of armed conflict with China.  
 
1. “Through Our Own Forces”: The Korean War  
 
The Korean War was in many ways unavoidable. Prior to the North’s invasion, there 
was already a de-facto war and mutual guerilla campaigns underway.625 Combined 
with frequent ROK calls for a “northern advance”, forcing the U.S. to refrain from 
providing offensive weapons, the North’s invasion was in many ways believed to be 
preemptive.626 Given the geopolitical landscape at that time, however, the timeline of 
events pose some important problems for traditional security studies.  
 
For one, Kim pushed for an invasion long before it was strategically feasible and 
when the more sensible action was to defensively balance. Second, throughout the 
war Kim sought to “fight alone” against a Great Power and later hindered cooperation 
in the war fighting effort over issues of sovereignty, only acquiescing to allied 
demands after great personal loss. Third, the war itself demonstrates the agency of 
small states. Stalin’s policy towards the Korean Peninsula from 1945, when partition 
was introduced, until 1950, was limited to preventing it from becoming a future 
springboard for invasion by Japan.627 It was Pyongyang who began in 1947, following 
South Korea’s failed 1946 autumn uprising, to encourage reunification.628 North 
Korea, while dependent on the Soviets,629 was in this sense no puppet; it pushed its 
own line630 and in doing so brought Great Powers into direct conflict.  
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626 Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World 1950-1992 (Columbia University Press, 2013), pg. 14-
15  
627 Zhukov and Zabrodin, “Korea, Short Report,” 29 June 1945, AVP RF, Fond 0430, Opis 2, Delo 18, Papka 5, 1. 18-30. Cited 
in Weathersby, “Soviet Aims”, pg. 12-13 
628 AVP RF, Fond 1 DVO, Opis 7, Delo 2, Papka 3; AVP RF, Fond I DVO, Opis 7, Delo 14, Papka 5; Fond 07, Opis 12, Delo 
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629"Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky," March 09, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive (HPPPDA), 
APRF, Listy 131-132, Fond and Opis not given and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 149-150; “Telegram 
from Shtykov to Vyshinsky,” March 16, 1950, HPPDA, APRF, Listy 133-140, fond and opis not given; "Telegram from Shtykov 
to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky," February 07, 1950, HPPPDA, APRF, Listy 125-126, Fond and Opis not given 
and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 145-146 
630 Kathryn Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War”, CWIHP, Issue 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pg. 30 
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1.1 Onset of the War:  
 
A 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry report on the history of the Korean War indicates that 
as early as 1948 the North sought to “unify the country by military means, without 
devoting the necessary attention to studying the possibility that existed at that time for 
peaceful reunification”.631 Kim himself told Stalin in March 1949 “we believe that 
this situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through 
military means” and the Koreans “are very anxious to be together again to cast off the 
yoke of the reactionary regime and their American masters.” 632  The timing is 
important since the situation on the Peninsula at that time was anything but conducive 
for invasion; most observers, ironically, discussed preventing a southern invasion. 
 
For one, North Korea was relatively weak, with Pyongyang itself admitting that 
without Soviet aid it would be ‘difficult to grow’.633 From a strategic standpoint Kim 
himself reported there were approximately 20,000 U.S. troops stationed in South 
Korea and, while the North had infantry units, he requested support in creating naval 
defenses.634 His position was further undermined by a February report from Soviet 
Ambassador Shtykov complaining the North “did not have enough trained personnel, 
adequate weapons and sufficient numbers of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions 
from the South.”635 Stalin thus rejected Kim’s invasion request given the undeveloped 
DPRK forces,636 China’s ongoing civil war, which Mao had informed Kim would 
preclude assistance,637 and the almost certain intervention of the U.S. given its force 
presence. Withdrawal had already been pushed back and it was not until April 1949, 
that Rhee announced final withdrawal was underway.638  
 
In September 1949, Kim requested a more limited incursion into the southern 
controlled portion of the Ongjin Peninsula to preempt a reportedly planned attack. 
The growth in DPRK capabilities and U.S. withdrawal (though military advisors 
remained) seemed to somewhat justify the call, but certainly not Kim’s claim the 
South could be seized “in the course of two weeks, maximum 2 months.” 639 Still, 
given the changes, a reserved Stalin seemed to grow at least somewhat interested in 
the operation.640  
 
Despite his bravado, Kim seems to have been aware of his strategic terrain, calling for 
a more minimal incursion given fears a “larger invasion was “politically 
disadvantageous" and “under present conditions it is impossible to count on a rapid 
victory.” Importantly, however, he seems to have been undeterred by these realities, 
admitting there was a strong potential for even the limited action he sought to lead to 
                                                
631  Foreign Ministry background report, author(s) not indicated, “On the Korean War, 1950-1953, and the Armistice 
Negotiations,” 9 August 1966, Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (post-1952 Central Committee Archive), Fond 5, 
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CWIHP, Working Paper No. 39 (July 2002), pg. 4 
633 “Meeting between Stalin and Kim Il Sung,” March 05, 1949, HPPDA, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 10-20. 
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638 Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations of 
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such a war, in the event of which Seoul would most likely benefit from the U.S. who 
can “send Japanese and Chinese [soldiers] to the aid of the southerners; support [the 
South Koreans] from the sea and air with their own means; American instructors will 
take immediate part in organizing military actions.” It also appears Kim was uncertain 
of Southern support, stating “they should not count on substantial help from the 
partisans” and more minimal partisan activity “will not be able…at the beginning of 
the campaign, maybe later.”641 Depsite these factors, Soviet Ambassador Shtykov 
later recounted how Kim questioned “why don’t I allow him to attack the Ongjin 
peninsula, which the People’s Army could take in three days, and with a general 
attack the People’s Army could be in Seoul in several days.” 642 One is thus left to 
wonder if Kim’s call for the attack on Ongjin might indeed have been intended to 
instigate a larger conflict aimed at unification despite the strategic landscape.   
 
Again then, Pyongyang seems to have been working against its strategic setting, 
which was inhospitable to Northern aggression. For their part the Soviets decided the 
“northern army is insufficiently strong to carry out successful and rapid operations 
against the south,” which would result in a prolonged war with American 
intervention,643 and concluded effort should be placed on strengthening Southern 
partisans.644 It was not until 1950 the North benefitted from the return of 14,000 
guerillas fighting for Mao. This was somewhat counteracted however by the fact pro-
North guerilla forces in the South were largely destroyed during the winter of 1949-
50.645 Despite this, the end of the Chinese Civil War seems to have given new 
urgency to Kim; the Chinese victory had “made it intolerable to Kim that Korean 
communists were not allowed similarly to liberate the rest of their country.”646 In a 
January meeting Kim pressed Moscow on the need for Korean unification following 
success in China,647 noting Mao’s pledged support after the Civil War’s conclusion. 
Finally, on January 30, 1950, Stalin informed Kim of his support for invasion, 
seemingly swayed by Soviet nuclear developments and U.S. preoccupation with 
NATO following a January speech by Dean Acheson, leading Stalin to conclude the 
U.S. would most likely not intervene.648   
 
Up to this point one could argue that, despite the North’s seeming willingness to 
dismiss its strategic setting, DPRK actions were still constrained by Great Powers – 
i.e. the USSR.  However, Kim’s actions immediately prior to invasion bring up 
additional questions that seem to indicate continuity in this seemingly principled 
approach to foreign policy. Importantly, Stalin had conditioned his support on 
assurances the U.S. would not interfere649 and that China would support the invasion. 
Kim stated the U.S. would not interfere given Soviet-Chinese backing and that: 
 
Mao Zedong said on a number of occasions that after the Chinese revolution is 
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completed, China will help us, if necessary, it will provide troops. However, we want 
to rely on our own forces to unify Korea. We believe that we can do it.650 
 
In his subsequent meeting with Mao, Kim was promised Chinese support should 
Washington intervene, and asked if China should already deploy troops on the border 
and send the Koreans military supplies. Kim, declined, as support was being provided 
by the Soviets (even though Stalin had explicitly stated only Chinese, not Soviet, 
forces would intervene) and that for Kim the meeting was a mere formality to inform 
the Chinese of his decision. When Mao warned the U.S. might send Japanese troops 
to South Korea, Kim agreed, but added, this “could hardly change the situation in a 
serious way, because Koreans would be fighting in such a case even tougher.”651  
 
The eagerness for invasion by the DPRK despite favorable conditions, and its refusal 
to allow for allied assistance, would seem to bring into question DPRK rationale. If, 
as realists suggest, actors are focused on the attainment of power/security through 
rational calculations, then Kim should have been primarily focused on defensively 
balancing against the stronger ROK-U.S. forces. Turning towards DPRK national 
narrative is helpful here, as it would have found the re-occupation of the South to be 
intolerable from a strategic and, perhaps more forcibly, an ideational viewpoint. For 
Kim, the aim of the war was the formation of a unified, sovereign, and independent 
Korean nation. Only when narrative is taken into account can the risk of invasion be 
viewed as more favorable than the status quo. This hyper nationalism was thrown into 
sharp relief during the immediate run up to the invasion, explaining why, contrary 
traditional studies, Kim opted to “fight alone”.  The importance of the independent 
narrative would continue to play an important role throughout the course of the war.   
 
1.2 Course of the War: 
 
While relations between Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing’s were plagued by 
mistrust, the Sino-DPRK relationship proved particularly turbulent, hindered by North 
Korea’s sensitivity towards their historical “big brother little brother relationship” 
both in the historical context of Chinese domination and more recent purges against 
Korean guerillas in Manchuria; “the North Koreans chafed at being junior partners to 
the Chinese (Mao liked to call Kim Il Sung, affectionately but condescendingly, Xiao 
Jin – “Little Kim”).”652  
 
Troubles flared from the outset, with DPRK forces launching their offensive across 
the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 having failed to inform the Chinese of the specifics 
beforehand (Beijing learned of the invasion through the press). Following U.S. 
intervention in July, the Chinese sought to provide strategic advice and stationed 
troops on the border,653 but their support was rebuffed.  The Korean’s also sought to 
maintain an operational distance form the Chines, with access to high-ranking North 
Korean officials remaining intermittent, military intelligence not shared, and requests 
to send observational staff officers refused.654 This all had dire consequences. As 
Zhou complained to the Soviets, “the North Korean leaders had ignored Mao’s 
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repeated warnings that US military intervention was imminent” and attempts by Mao 
in August and September to convince the KPA to fortify Inchon (the eventual landing 
site of U.S. forces) and other strategic locations, given the possibility of invasion, 
unheeded. Kim himself felt the war could still be swiftly won (even after U.S. 
intervention).655 While throughout 1950 “China still behaved generously”,656 North 
Korea still refused to cooperate for mutual defense planning. By July, North Korea 
was thus engaged in a war with a Great Power (U.S.), yet continued to rebuff allied 
assistance. 
 
This continued even after U.S. forces successfully managed to land behind DPRK 
frontlines through the Inchon landing in September, with Beijing complaining about 
the lack of information they were being provided. 657 Moreover, despite the rapidly 
deteriorating strategic position, Kim delayed in seeking China’s aid658 despite the 
CVA stating its readiness to intervene on September 21; “except for being told by 
Kim that, “the Korean people were prepared for a long war,” Beijing had received no 
further information from Pyongyang,” despite Soviet instructions to ask China for 
assistance.659 It was not until September 28 that an emergency meeting of the KWP 
Politburo was called to discuss the issue. On the 29th Kim: 
 
reiterated [to Stalin] his earlier stated desire to unify the country by his own means, 
he stated that he wanted to form 15 divisions and to continue the struggle, but it was 
not clear for him whether the adversary would cross the 38th parallel or not.660  
 
In the same telegram Kim also stated that should the enemy seek to cross the 38th 
parallel (a prospect Kim was uncertain of) the North, “would be unable to form new 
troops and they would have no means to render any serious resistance to the enemy.” 
The following day Kim sent a telegram reaffirming his commitment to ensure “Korea 
will not be a colony and a military springboard” and requested Soviet, and if unable 
(which Kim would have foreseen given Stalin’s previously explicit statements), 
Chinese intervention, should the 38th parallel be crossed.661  
 
While originally Mao delayed in committing to Stalin662 on October 8, Kim was 
informed separately by both Stalin and Mao of Beijing’s commitment to send, “after 
some time”, nine divisions.663 The situation again changed, however, when, during 
follow-up negotiations between China and Russia, Zhou Biao (perhaps due to 
personal opposition664) expressed hesitancy. In response, Stalin proposed Kim retreat 
to Northeast China, and suggested as such in a wire sent October 13. Upon hearing 
this Kim “stated that it was very hard for them, but since there is such advice they will 
fulfill it,”665 informing colleagues they would have to wage a guerilla war from China. 
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The following day however, Kim was informed of Mao’s renewed pledge for support.  
 
Importantly then, there was a 24hr period during which Kim believed he had been 
abandoned. Mansourov concludes it was then Kim began “distancing himself from his 
Soviet handlers.” 666 Two points should be made here. For one, Stalin had repeatedly 
told Kim there would be no intervention. While most likely discontent with Moscow, 
the blame was therefore still at the feet of Beijing. Secondly, the incident would have 
only reinforced Pyongyang’s preexisting distaste for (and distrust of) Great Power 
chauvinism, developed during the anti-Japanese campaign and showcased through 
efforts to reduce Soviet influence in the 1940s (Ch. 4).  
 
Following the introduction of Chinese forces, additional problems arose. The fact 
these forces were not placed under DPRK, or mutual, command, as requested by Kim, 
was interpreted as an insult. 667 This had been a point of contention from the outset, 
and while waiting to be resolved resulted in a serious (and as times deadly) lack of 
coordination, with Peng Dehuai, the head of the CVA, noting “the CVA’s ability to 
fight has been hindered.”668 Kim even refused requests in November to relocate his 
headquarters to form a more centralized command, or allow for KPA troops to be 
integrated with larger CVA divisions. It was not until December 3, after a failed 
attempt by Mao to establish a unified command in November that Kim finally yielded 
to Soviet directives supporting the proposal. Zhihua concludes,  
 
The Koreans were concerned about national sovereignty. Korea’s long-standing relationship 
with China as a subsidiary and tributary state made handing over the command of their army 
very difficult for them to accept. For the Chinese, victory was paramount. Both in military 
power and in combat experience, the Chinese held a clear advantage.669 
 
While the North would have thus benefited from a Joint command, the war effort was 
for some time undermined given DPRK concerns of pride. A second problem 
revolved around the launch of the third campaign, during which Kim pressed for a 
more aggressive line aimed at forcing U.S. withdrawal. By contrast, Peng advocated a 
more tactical - and realistic – advance, as U.S. forces had managed to remain intact 
following the first phase of the offensive. On January 11, during a heated exchange, 
Peng told Kim, “You are just hoping for a quick victory and are not making concrete 
preparations, and this is only going to prolong the war.”670 Armstrong notes how the 
North later interpreted this reluctance as the cause of the eventual stalemate and re-
partition of the county.  A large disagreement also arose when, in an attempt to 
increase the efficiency of the railway system, Peng sought to forge joint control. The 
ensuing protests by Pyongyang led to sustained inefficiency in delivering sorely 
needed supplies. Despite this, Kim backtracked from the first negotiation of a joint 
command in December 1950, following concerns over the potential infringement on 
Korean sovereignty. This led to a series of negotiations during which Pyongyang 
repeatedly undermined a joint organization.  
 
Follow-up negotiations in which concessions were made to the Koreans faced further 
problems. The Chinese argument that, given most of the trains, maintenance and 
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transportation troops and train crews were Chinese, Beijing should control the Joint 
Transportation Command, was repeatedly rebuffed; “the management of railroad 
transportation involved questions of national sovereignty, and therefore must be 
controlled by the Koreans.”671 While Zhou at first believed the position to be a result 
of the Soviets, a telegram from Stalin demonstrated it to be a solely Korean stance: 
“From the consul’s report, it is clear that Prime Minister Kim supports this idea, but 
the Korean ministers seem opposed to it. They believe this plan is detrimental to 
Korean sovereignty.”672 While it is unclear if Kim himself was also opposed, either 
way, Pyongyang’s stance was constrained by the sovereignty issue. This was again 
only resolved when, following drawn out debates and combined Sino-Soviet pressure 
matched with demands of the war effort, Kim was finally compelled to acquiesce. 
 
Again what we find are repeated instances of DPRK national narrative influencing 
foreign policy and leading to outcomes seemingly unexplainable by other frameworks.  
From Kim’s reluctance to allow China’s entry into the war, to issues of sovereignty 
hindering the North’s war fighting capability, Kim repeatedly deferred to ideational 
rather than purely traditional strategic considerations and limited the extent to which 
it could balance against the U.S. and the ROK by taking advantage of a Great Power 
alliance. While Kim did eventually allow for China’s entry into the war, and later 
acquiesced to organizational structures, he did so only after a considerable degree of 
damage had been inflicted and the North’s very survival was at stake.   
 
1.3 Ending The War:  
 
Despite the tremendous destruction of the War, the Koreans seem to have been 
reluctant to finally enter negotiations. In June 1951 the Chinese and Koreans decided 
to begin pursuing negotiations, though only from a position of strength.673 By 1952, 
Weathersby argues the DPRK appeared to be advocating for an end to conflict, citing 
a meeting wherein North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hon-Yong informed Peng the 
Korean people “demand peace” but would “overcome any difficulties and hold to 
their position” if requested to do so.  However Pak clarified this was his personal 
opinion, “not the opinion of the CC of the Labor party and the Korean 
government.”674 By contrast, in an April telegram to Stalin, Kim wrote “Korea, which 
has suffered from American aggression but is prepared to defend to the end its 
freedom and independence.”675 Similarly a Romanian report in March on the DPRK 
domestic situation noted how “Vice-Premier Pak Heon-yeong said, “the war in Korea 
will be a long war,””676 all of which suggests Pyongyang was prepared to carry on.  
 
                                                
671 Ibid, pg. 18 
672 Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 25 March 1951, Cited in Zhihua, “Sino-North Korean”, pg. 18 
673 Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meeting in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung," June 13, 1951, 
HPPPDA, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 31-32 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 31-32; 
"Handwritten letter from Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung to Stalin, with 13 June 1951 handwritten letter from Mao Zedong to Gao 
Gang and Kim Il Sung," June 14, 1951, HPPDA, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 57-60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 
5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 35-37; "Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)," June 30, 1951, HPPPDA, APRF, Fond 
45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 90-91; "Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 2 July 1951 telegram from 
Mao to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Kim Il Sung," July 03, 1951, HPPPDA, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 14-15; 
Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong," February 03, 1952, HPPPDA, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 78 
and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80 
674 APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 81-83 presented in Weathersby, “New Documents”  
675  APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 60-61 presented in Ibid 
676 "Report on the Korean War, the Armistice Negotiations, and the Domestic Situation in Korea," March 13, 1952 HPPPDA, 
Polish Foreign Ministry Archive  
 105 
Mao wrote to Kim in July stating, “to accept the proposals of the enemy in the present 
situation will inevitably make the enemy even more ambitious and undermine our 
prestige.” At the same time, Mao justified past and prospective Korean and Chinese 
losses; North Korea and China had been defended, their might strengthened, 
American imperialism confronted, and they had become an inspiration for others.  On 
July 16, Kim concurred with Mao’s position and suggested undertaking “aggressive 
military operations” as opposed to a continued passive defense,677 telegramming 
Stalin on the 17th to request  “cover for the most important sites and to go over to 
active operations.”678  
 
Overall, while Kim was certainly pushing for a quick end to negotiations given 
ongoing losses, and there appears to have bee some disagreement over the speed of 
concluding negotiations,679 he also appears to have been prepared to renew offensive 
measures. By 1953, however, China was eager to end hostilities, as was the post-
Stalin leadership of Russia.680 In response to the 1953 Soviet directive to move 
towards an armistice, Kim stated “It is necessary…either actively to carry out military 
operations or to end the war; a further dragging out of the existing situation is not in 
the interests of the DPRK and PRC.” 681  Mao meanwhile justified the move, 
stipulating the American’s military position was “not in a condition to advance on 
land…[and] not able firmly to hold and defend the line of the front.”682  
 
2. “An Independent National Economy” 
 
While North Korea suffered tremendously during the war,683 it received immense aid 
from the Soviets, East Europe and, despite Kim’s reluctance, China.684 For Kim’s 
guerilla faction, the aim was now to forge a nationalist oriented economy focused on 
heavy industry.685 This was opposed both by domestic elements, supporting short-
term economic gain, and external powers seeking to cajole Pyongyang to capitulate 
and reverse nationalist policies. The result of these feuds was a more centralized 
power structure in Pyongyang and deteriorated relations with allies that risked 
alienation and potential régime change. Pyongyang’s subsequent “slide into economic 
disaster [was also] due in no small part to [this] insistence…on “self-reliance”.”686  
 
Unfortunately, much of the analysis on the immediate post war period has focused 
strictly on the internal struggles between the Soviet faction (ethnic Koreans from 
Russia), Yan’an faction (Koreans who fled to Chia during Japanese occupation) and 
Kim’s Gaspan faction.687 However these “factions”, more akin to “lose social groups,” 
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were only termed post hoc by Kim to justify purges. 688 Person thus perhaps more 
aptly refers to the dissenters as the “consumer goods group” (CGG) given their 
oppositional development plans; the DPRK at this time still adhered to Leninist 
“democratic centralism, allowing debate before policy directives.  
 
When events came to a head in August 1956 it was not, as Lankov previously argued, 
a full-blown coup. Instead as Szalontai and Person show, opponents “made a final, 
desperate attempt to convince the North Korean leader to adopt post-Stalin Soviet-
style reform…[and] to rid the party of nationalist elements hostile to foreign 
influences, and place limits on the growing personality cult in North Korea.”689 In the 
words of his detractors, issues surrounded “improving the material situation of the 
population, overcoming the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung…the elimination of 
sycophants and careerists, the history of our party, and party propaganda.” 690 Internal 
KWP frictions were thus threefold: economic, ideological (cult of personality and 
Kim’s nationalist line), and procedural (reasserted influence of the CGG).691 Kim’s 
steadfast determination to maintain his economic and nationalist line, and 
corresponding power moves to safeguard it, were the basis of the problem.692 In this 
sense, the economic debates were entwined with a larger struggle over the identity 
and narrative of North Korea; the success of Kim’s guerilla faction in turn enshrined 
their interpretation of DPRK national identity.     
 
The implications of Kim’s determination bring to bare important questions that 
traditional approaches struggle to account for. Unable to balance internally against the 
ROK and U.S., the DPRK should have sought to underscore its relations with Beijing 
and Moscow while also extracting as much aid as possible. Instead, by adhering to an 
independent line derived from the above nationalist economic policies, Pyongyang 
seemingly championed ideational rather than material interests. In doing so it 
jeopardized key relationships that, while resulting in decreased aid, also risked the 
potential isolation of North Korea and generated at least some discussion of Kim’s 
possible removal by Moscow and Beijing.  
 
2.1 The Course of Economic Debates:   
 
Kim introduced his postwar reconstruction plan during the August 1953 Plenum of 
the Central Committee (CC). The CGG favored a focus on light industry, further 
alignment with post-Stalinist modernization policies, and integration into the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). By contrast, Kim’s faction argued 
only through industrialization could the North increase independence and power, 
offsetting South Korea and forgoing the colonial-esc relationship of COMECON; “he 
would not willingly subjugate his country by entering into a new suzerain system of 
“serving the great” (sadae) with the Soviet Union.”693 Person thus notes, “the issue 
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was Soviet hegemony versus national economic self-determination”,694 a nationalist/ 
independent position that became the main source of criticism for his dissenters.695  
 
The CGG felt its position was emboldened following a food crisis that emerged as a 
result of the Three-Year-Plan’s (1954-1956) emphasis on heavy industry and local 
self-reliance at the expense of agriculture. Breaking with democratic centralism, they 
began to criticize Kim’s economic policies while championing those of China and 
Russia. Kim perceived that the CGG was thus seeking to replicate foreign policies 
and trying to undermine the nationalist economic line; given the onset of famine696 the 
Soviets had already compelled Pyongyang to make minimal policy concessions in an 
effort to avoid the social unrest seen in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.697 At the 
same time, and foreshadowing events to come, the Soviets, “well aware of North 
Korea’s extreme sensitivity to any perceived interference…[were] wary of pushing 
too hard or appearing to scold or lecture the Koreans for their “errors.””698  
 
Kim sought to reassert his position and warn his would be critics to “refrain from 
factional struggle” during the April 1955 CC Plenum.  He also emphasized how his 
economic policies allowed North Korea to promote “independence and socialist 
construction by overcoming the old ideological remnants that hinder the forward 
march of the Korean people.”699 For example, talking with the Hungarians, Kim 
complained of the need to import cement and the shortcomings, due to legacies of 
colonialism, of rushed initiatives to domestically increase its production. 700 
Meanwhile during the April Plenum, Kim claimed the grain failures were the result of 
those seeking to dogmatically copy foreign techniques to the unique Korean position, 
a seeming rebuke of the Soviets and those seeking to inject foreign influence.  
 
To further preempt dissenters taking advantage of Moscow’s growing anti-Stalinist 
line to promote economic and political reforms, Kim began to attack Soviet-Koreans 
in 1955.701 This was a calculated move premised on Khrushchev’s relaxation in 
domestic interference and China’s unease over de-Stalinization, limiting possible 
retaliation. Kim would thus seek to “eliminate foreign influences from the KWP 
leadership” and demonstrate the cost of criticizing nationalist economic policies.702  
His line of attack was accusations of dogmatism within Soviet-Korean propaganda 
work, a position that culminated in his December 1955 speech introducing Juche and 
the following party decree entitled ‘About the Future Struggle against Reactionary 
Bourgeois Ideology in Literature and Art’. The implications were immediately clear; 
it formed the basis for accusations of anti-party behavior (and for Kim’s post hoc 
‘factional’ labeling).703  
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Person surmises, “[w]hen first introduced, Juche served as an anti-foreign or anti-
hegemonic slogan designed to discredit those who sought to mechanically import 
Soviet and Chinese practices to North Korea.”704 It was a  “development strategy that 
emphasized the primacy of ideological power in the construction of utopian 
society”705 and “did not exclude seeking economic aid, so long as North Korea did not 
become economically over-dependent and lose its freedom of action.”706 Armstrong 
perhaps surmises best, writing,  “[i]t was also more than an attack on Kim’s political 
opponents…Kim’s speech marked in retrospect the beginning of North Korea’s 
divergence from the Moscow-dominated international Socialist community”.707  
 
The situation became more problematic for Kim following Khrushchev’s launch of 
de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence in February 1956. In response, KWP 
leaders argued the problems cited by Khrushchev were inapplicable to the North. 
Meanwhile Kim, still “uneas[y] over the power of Soviet influence…reiterated his 
earlier warning against dogmatism, formalism and using foreign examples of 
communism” 708  and published ‘For the good of understanding of Juche!’. His 
defiance continued at the April KWP Third Congress where Soviet representative 
Leonid Brezhnev urged the Koreans to import Soviet consumer goods rather than 
focus on heavy industry. By contrast, Kim introduced a new Five-Year-Plan 
emphasizing heavy industry (and thus a nationalist economy) and continued his anti-
American bravado - foregoing peaceful coexistence.709 He also began an intensive 
Koreanization process, eliminating foreign cultural influences,710 while quarrelling 
with the Soviets over perceived interference in Korean affairs.711 
 
CGG members soon began to express their displeasure to Soviet representatives over 
Kim’s refusal to embrace the new international communist line712 and the country’s 
ongoing economic struggles.713 For example, Vice Premier Pak Ui-wan “expressed 
the hope that Kim Il Sung's [upcoming] trip would bring changes in economic policy 
and with regard to the people.”714 They also complained Kim was reinforcing his 
position through nepotism 715  and historical revisionism, 716  and opposed North 
Korea’s increasingly nationalist stances and attempts to limit “Soviet culture.”717  
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Following the failure718 of Kim’s foreign counterparts (at the behest of the CGG)719 to 
convince him to “restore proper ideological and economic policies, as well as the 
influence of the two foreign supported groups,”720 a confrontation was planned for the 
August Plenum of the CC. 721 Kim, aware of these moves,722 thwarted their attempts, 
with opposition members either expelled from the Party or demoted. 723 
Problematically, the harsh penalties were in contrast to the more lenient lines of 
Beijing and Moscow724 who viewed the moves as the result of DPRK “nationalism”, 
and as creating an “unhealthy situation”.725  
 
2.2 Implications of Nationalist Economics: 
 
The recent release of Anastas Mikoyan’s papers has helped to showcase the extent to 
which Moscow and Beijing were angered by Kim’s policies, revealing the risk 
associated with his ardent nationalist line. In particular, it now appears as though at 
least nominal conversations were held on possibly removing Kim; indeed the fact 
Mikoyan had at this time recently unseated Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary should have 
proved a stark warning to Kim. While Beijing and Moscow agreed they “trusted” 
Kim, and Mao stated “it would be incorrect right now for one group to overthrow 
another in Korea since the group which had been overthrown might begin the struggle 
all over again” they also concluded they could not “regard the unacceptable methods 
in the work of the KWP leadership with approval.”  Mao also stated the KWP “has a 
feeling of hostility” toward Moscow and Beijing, believing “that our Parties are acting 
with respect to the KWP the same way as they acted with respect to Yugoslavia at one 
time” (Mao believed Stalin was to blame for the earlier Soviet-Yugoslav split).726 
Seemingly showcasing DPRK propensity to respond to ideational threats (and in so 
doing disregard strategic considerations) Mao also noted that while Kim: 
 
understood that we do not want to overthrow him [indicating China would not 
support a Soviet proposition to overthrow Kim]…It is necessary to let [him] know all 
the same that he cannot remain in the leadership without correction of the mistakes. 
But…it is necessary to be prepared for extreme steps from Kim Il Sung. He might 
even raise the issue of the withdrawal of the Chinese volunteers from Korea. Of 
course, the Chinese units want to return home, but we know that the Americans are 
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strengthening their positions in South Korea and we consider it necessary to leave our 
volunteers in Korea.727 
 
It was decided that a joint Sino-Soviet delegation headed by Mikoyan and Peng would 
travel to Pyongyang in September. While reassuring Kim of his position and seeking 
to maneuver around “difficult positions” for DPRK “prestige”, they explained 
“mistakes [that] had been committed” would have to be corrected. Kim was asked to 
cease his political attacks and reinstate expelled members.728 His reaction was little 
more than lip service; attacks ceased only temporarily, Sino-Soviet demands were 
soon reversed, and the intervention was never publicly discussed.729 In short, Kim 
would not bend to even joint Sino-Soviet pressure,730 which served only to increase 
his resentment towards these patron powers.731 Even before the intervention, it was 
noted: 
 
the Koreans do not listen to the advice of the Communist Party of China. In 
connection with this we [Mikoyan] said that, as is well known, Kim Il Sung agreed 
with the advice of the CPSU CC, but acted otherwise.732  
 
Rachenko notes how this was a “remarkable admission of the limits of Beijing’s 
political influence on North Korea, all the more remarkable, in fact, in view of the 
continued presence of more than 400,000 Chinese troops on the Korean soil”;733 a 
presence that further underscored the risk of Kim’s continued defiance. Somewhat 
ironically, he also notes that Kim was most likely saved from being removed due to 
China’s own growing disdain of Soviet chauvinism. Consequently, having weathered 
the storm, Kim’s development policies and power were further institutionalized and 
there was further integration between the Party and the masses, with former guerillas’ 
“ideological commitments” emphasized as “Korean traditionalism.” 734  
 
While Kim was fortunate to have avoided a potentially more severe foreign 
intervention, there were further consequences to his factions’ nationalist economic 
policies, in particular to foreign trade/aid. Given the bi-polar system of the time, the 
DPRK was aware it would not be able to extract aid elsewhere, while Hungary and 
Bulgaria represented contemporary reminders regarding the consequence of dissent. 
When combined with Khrushchev’s openly critical stance of DPRK policies until 
1957, one would have expected a more affable Pyongyang. Instead, Kim remained 
focused on asserting a nationalist position. As a result, the Soviets dropped their aid in 
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1956 due to “Soviet parsimony and because of North Korean insistence on self-
reliance”,735 meaning Pyongyang effectively helped sabotage its main source of 
income. In December Kim stated the Five-Year-Plan would subsequently be funded 
primarily through domestic means, indicating a willingness to sacrifice in order to 
maintain the nationalist line. While able to gain some aid from China, Kim 
subsequently undermined this relationship through the reinstitution of purges in 1957, 
infuriating Mao 736  and leading to further aid being denied. Following Kim’s 
proposition for UN intervention on the peninsula and removal of foreign forces, Mao 
reprimanded Kim stating he “wants to drive the CPV army out of Korea. He might 
follow J. B. Tito’s road, or even Imre Nagy’s steps.””737  
 
The domestic strain was somewhat reduced by a new Soviet trade pact in 1957, the 
result not of DPRK flexibility but of Soviet perceptions that, while still pursuing 
incorrect economic and ideological lines, Kim was changing for the better. 738 
Tellingly, Kim’s response was to ratchet up efforts to forge cultural purity. “To the 
chagrin of the diplomatic corps, in 1957 hardly any foreign plays, operas, or musical 
compositions were performed in the DPRK.” When the Deputy Minister of Education 
and Culture attempted to ease these moves he was purged739 and in 1957 extended aid 
was again rejected by the disgruntled Soviets;740 even after aid was renewed in 1959 
the Soviets still complained how Pyongyang took “no account of the possibility of 
cooperation…and for wanting to produce everything by themselves.”741  
 
Importantly, this continued defiance was launched under the belief Beijing would be 
unable to offset the Soviets,742 undermining the notion Kim was merely playing sides 
off one another, or even balancing against Moscow. Fortunately for Kim, Mao – who 
was at growing odds with Khrushchev and ideologically inline with Kim – endorsed 
the Five-Year-Plan743 and agreed to assist Pyongyang. Mao also apologized to Kim 
for the 1956 interference into domestic affairs and said Chinese forces, which 
Pyongyang had come to view as a quasi-occupational force, would be withdrawn.744 
Furthermore, Mao stated Korean aid during WWII was far greater than what China 
contributed to the Korean War. This line of thought, already championed in 
Pyongyang, would become part of the official narrative,745 justifying China’s role as a 
debt repayment. 
 
Kim’s response to the fortunate turn of events, however, was to again showcase 
independence, this time from China. In December he introduced chaju - self-
determination in foreign affairs and “complete equality, respect for territorial 
integrity, national independence, and non-intervention”746 In 1958 he went further, 
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introducing the Chollima movement, a mass mobilization campaign in an effort to 
complete the Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule (completed May 1958) and make each 
province (and thus the nation) self-sufficient; a program heavily criticized by 
Khrushchev.747 In a rebuff towards Beijing, it was also touted as a uniquely Korean 
approach to economic construction geared towards the fulfillment of Juche, 
emphasizing “the domestic production of machine tools, use of Korean anthracite 
rather then imported coal for fuel, and even self-sufficiency in food.” Then, in 
October 1960, criticism against the practice of sadaejuui or “flunkeyism” was raised. 
As Armstorng notes, in traditional Korean “sadae” referred to “Korea’s subordinate 
relationship to China,”748 the implication being the DPRK was not only rejecting 
Soviet (the Juche speech) but also Chinese encroachment.  
 
Throughout the economic debates of the early 1950s and subsequent traversing of 
foreign relations, one recurrent theme seems to have dominated the calculations of 
Kim’s guerillas. In the words of Soviet Comrade Yulin “most of the mistakes 
noticeable in the DPRK are attributable to one thing, namely, the exaggerated national 
pride of the Korean people.”749 Domestically, Kim eliminated rival narratives (though 
again not necessary rivals to his power), cementing economic development policies 
that correlated with his interpretation of DPRK independence. This was done at the 
partial expense of jeopardizing more cordial relations with important economic 
benefactors. Kim’s handling of external ideational threats further jeopardized these 
relationships as he sought to eliminate foreign influence and strike a distinctly 
independent path economically, culturally and politically. This not only undermined 
the North’s ability to perhaps extract higher levels of external aid, it also partially 
resulted in the reduction of aid as a portion of GDP from 33.4% in 1954 to 2.6% in 
1960 (ROK dependency remained at 50%). Kim was thus forced to declare 1960 a 
“buffer year” to prepare for the next Five-Year-Plan, and because “the last three years 
had been exhausting for the workers.”750 
 
The geopolitical landscape at the time makes such maneuvers hard to account for 
from a traditional perspective. The DPRK, far from a neutral state in the Cold War 
context, was unable to internally balance against the ROK and U.S., was in need of 
external aid, and had witnessed in Hungary and Bulgaria the fate of small state 
deviance. Arguments Pyongyang may have been trying to play Moscow and Beijing 
off one another are undercut by behavior undermining the extent to which aid was 
extracted. As Armstrong writes, “[s]elf-reliance was only partially of virtue born of 
the necessity of getting by without foreign assistance. It was also a conscious choice 
made by leaders who wanted their country to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union, 
China, or any Great Power”.751 Consequently, the influence of “national pride” 
referenced by the Soviets, and the championing of ideational over material interests, 
again demonstrates the influence of ideational rather than systemic considerations. To 
this end Kim was responding to genuine ideational threats that can only be accounted 
for by taking into account national narrative. As the Soviet-Sino divide deepened, this 
pattern would continue in a more extreme fashion.  
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3. “Equality and Respect”: The Sino-Soviet Split  
 
In the midst of the Sino-Soviet divide Kim remarked to the Hungarians “that while 
certain people claimed that he would fall between two stools, Korea actually had its 
own stool, on which it sat firmly.” 752  While the quote is insightful for its 
encapsulation of the North’s fiercely independent position, it would have been more 
accurate to describe the stool as wobbly. It is argued that far from remaining neutral - 
extracting aid and balancing when needed - Pyongyang’s behavior was more the 
result of responding to ideational threats while simultaneously pursuing offensive 
strategies aimed at unification, despite high-risk consequences and friction with allies.  
 
3.1 Reunification V Peaceful Coexistence:  
 
Throughout the 1950s, Kim had feuded with the Soviets over the DPRK’s nationalist 
economic policies and cult of personality. While not as prominent, he had also 
disagreed with Khrushchev’s introduction of peaceful coexistence; 753  indeed 
Szalontai notes how Kim’s economic polices were representative of his aggressive 
views on reunification.754 Additionally, as the Hungarians noted, it would have meant 
“peaceful coexistence with US imperialism, which for any Chinese, Korean or 
Vietnamese is at least difficult to understand, given that for them the US represents 
their fiercest national enemy”. 755 Pyongyang’s renewed focus on unification – having 
addressed economic redevelopment – and Khrushchev’s repeated emphasis on 
peaceful coexistence, thus laid the groundwork for a new clash.   
 
Tensions had already emerged when Kim adopted a more aggressive unification 
policy following the failure of the Geneva Talks; in October 1959 the KWP CC 
reportedly “considered the situation as ripe for the unification of the country.”756 A 
slight reprieve did emerge in 1960 following the ouster of Syngman Rhee,757 leading 
Kim to view negotiations, and Khrushchev’s Korean confederation proposal,758 as a 
viable option. However the increasingly repressive Park Chung-hee government soon 
dashed these hopes,759 leading Kim to scrap proposed policy changes,760 much to the 
displeasure of Khrushchev. Kim was careful though to maintain a neutral stance 
between the two powers,761 both due to China’s inability to match Soviet aid762 and to 
                                                
752 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," October 20, 1966, HPPPDA, MOL, 
XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1966, 74. doboz, IV-250, 005007/1966  
753 Bernd Schäfer, “Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict: The GDR and North Korea, 1949-1989” CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 14/15 
(Winter 2003/Spring 2004), pg. 26 
754 Balazs Szalontai, “‘You Have No Political Line of Your Own:’ Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1953-1964” CWIHP Bulletin, 
Issue 14/15 (2004), pg. 89 
755 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 2 July 1960, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 8. 
doboz, 5/f, 0029/ RT/1960 presented in Szalontai, “No Political Line” 
756 “Information Report Sent by Károly Fendler to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, “Conversation with Comrade Kim, 
Interpreter of the Korean Embassy””, 30 October 1959 MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 006373/1959; “Report, Embassy 
of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry”, 16 December 1959 MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 
001711/ 1/1960 presented in Ibid 
757 Information Report Sent by Lajos Karsai to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, “Visit of Korean Provisional Chargé 
d’Affaires Paek Chong-won,” 27 June 1960 MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 005061/1960 presented in Ibid; See also 
Jong-dae Shin, Christian F. Ostermann, and James Person “North Korean Perspectives on the Overthrow of the Syngman Rhee, 
1960” North Korea International Documentation Project, E-Dossier No. 13 
758 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea”, 2 July 1960  
759 "Some Problems of North Korea," August 11, 1961, HPPDA, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136 
760 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 25 August 1960," August 25, 1960, HPPPDA, AVPRF, fond 
0102, opis 16, delo 7, listi 72-101; "Note about a Conversation in the Soviet Embassy with Comrade Puzanov," August 30, 1960, 
HPPDA, SAPMO-BA, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED (ZPA), IV 2/20/137; “Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. 
Puzanov for 5 June 1960,” June 05, 1960, HPPDA, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 16, delo 6, p.188-208 
761 "Some Problems of North Korea," August 11, 1961  
 114 
avoid overdependence on China.763 However this changed when, during the October 
1961 CPSU Congress, Khrushchev accelerated attacks on Mao, reemphasized 
peaceful coexistence and escalated his attacks on Albanian insubordination (critiquing 
Soviet-Yugoslavian rapprochement and de-Stalinization).  
 
As with the economic debates of the 1950s, Kim’s ideological commitments again 
came to undermine his relationship with the Soviets.764  Pyongyang suspended Soviet 
radio and newspapers and provided tacit support for the Albanians, who were seen as 
seeking to protect their independence.765 While Khrushchev sought to mend relations 
and proposed to visit Pyongyang, Kim stalled, most likely to seek out Beijing’s 
opinion, 766  subsequently undermining the Soviet overtures. By October 1963, 
Pyongyang had sharpened its attack in an editorial entitled ‘Let us Defend the 
Socialist Camp’, condemning interference into domestic affairs, which assertions of a 
cult-of-personality had merely been a pretext for,767 and labeling COMECON a threat 
to economic independence.768  
 
In a further rebuke to Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence, and in support of a more 
aggressive unification policy, Pyongyang also heightened its militaristic rhetoric. In 
March 1962 DPRK officials told GDR counterparts that unlike peaceful coexistence 
in Germany, “other methods were needed [in Korea], “we cannot wait until the 
population of South Korea starves to death!””769 In September a DPRK official while 
in Berlin, criticized the Berlin Wall, suggesting East Germans should take the 
offensive, and later sought to “confuse” the East German ambassador in North Korea 
with Kim calling for restraint while his colleagues “expressed the opinion that one 
cannot do without a war.”770 In February 1963 the Hungarians reported an anecdote 
given by the Czechoslovak ambassador to North Korea: 
 
Major General Ch’ang Chonghwan, the Korean representative on the Panmunjom 
Armistice Commission, approached him after dinner and put the following question 
to him: “What would you do if some day the enemy took one of the two rooms of 
your flat?” Comrade Moravec replied, “Whatever happens, I would resort to methods 
that did not run the risk of destroying the whole building or the whole city […].” 
Thereupon [Major] General Ch’ang threw a cigarette-box he had in his hand on the 
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table, and left him standing.771 
 
This rhetoric was matched by an intensified militarization campaign beginning in 
May 1961, as soon as it was realized Pak was not the revolutionary they had hoped, 
with the KWP calling for measures to “drastically militarize the state.” The Seven-
Year-Plan was also put off until 1963, allowing the North to “concentrate forces on 
strengthening national defense”772 and in April militarization was accelerated under 
the new concept “arming the whole people.” During a secret meeting at the Party 
Center in June, it was also decided “the two focal points of the next year’s plan 
[would be] the development of agriculture and the development of the defense 
industry,” a policy termed “equal emphasis.”773  
 
DPRK rhetoric and behaviour forced the East Germans to conclude that by 1961 
Pyongyang had shifted from a neutral position to one markedly closer to China774 and 
it was soon commonly held that the DPRK had “taken sides” with the Chinese.775 
Questions therefore arise over what drove the DPRK to such ends. One could argue 
Pyongyang still acted as some traditional approaches might expect; as interests 
diverged from Moscow it sought to shift towards Beijing. However such an argument 
is problematized by their struggle to account for the very DPRK interests that led to a 
break; militarization and an aggressive unification strategy makes little sense at that 
time from a traditional viewpoint.  
 
The largest obstacle facing Pyongyang was the continued presence of U.S. forces, 
meaning any conflict risked escalation. Conversely, only by threatening its 
relationship with Moscow could the North undermine its relative state of security. 
Indeed the recent excommunication of Albania provided a tacit example of this risk, 
one not lost on Kim who, according to East European reports in spring 1962, 
instructed the KWP to prepare itself for a similar outcome.776 It should also be 
highlighted that DPRK military investment predated perceptions of reduced Soviet 
reliability as a result of appeasement during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October.777 
Prior this, Pyongyang should have been focused on cementing its lucrative 
relationship with Moscow. After the crisis, it would then have wanted to extract 
various internal deterrence capabilities against future ROK aggression, while seeking 
to reaffirm its alliance. However, again showing deference towards a nationalist line, 
Pyongyang instead ramped up criticism of the Soviet’s Cuba policy and later publicly 
advocated (against Moscow) for China’s position in its border dispute with India. As 
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a result, the Soviets “deferred” their decision on DPRK requests778 for military 
equipment and modern anti-aircraft systems,779 with Khrushchev cutting Soviet aid 
from 1962-1964.780  
 
Additionally, while China’s anti-imperialist stance made it the perfect ideational ally, 
its ability to provide material support was wanting;781  tellingly, reports in 1967 noted 
how as a result of siding with China, “the standard of the People’s Army was 
approximately 10-12 years behind modern requirements.” 782  At the same time, 
Pyongyang also limited the degree to which it was willing to shift towards China. Part 
of this was political, wanting to maintain some semblance, albeit questionable, of 
neutrality. It also had to do self-reliance, with the Korean’s emphasizing their non-
conformity;783 for example the Albanians noted there was never a full congruence 
between Pyongyang and Beijing and that “[t]he Koreans have shown much 
reservation for the publishing of Chinese articles” as well as embracing China’s role 
during the War.784 Pyongyang also came to resent its growing dependency on China, 
which it believed Beijing was attempting to augment.785  
 
Taken together, the DPRK should have been resigned to defensively balance against 
the ROK with the more affluent Soviet Union, a posture that required little investment 
given the lack of ostensible threat.786 Indeed the Soviets and East Europeans viewed 
DPRK mobilization as “a rather unusual measure in peacetime” especially given 
specially given Pyongyang’s “difficult” economic situation, 787  with the GDR 
concluding, “[t]he decision on arming the people is not based on any military need 
whatsoever.”788 Even after renewed Soviet military assistance, military operations 
seemed questionable, with reports in 1967 surmising it would be “inappropriate to 
conclude…the essential militarization of the country, would render it possible for the 
DPRK to carry out successful military actions.”789 Last but not least the Soviets had 
already proven unreliable supporting actions that might lead to a larger conflict, with 
the 24hr period of seeming abandonment by allies during the Korean War certainly in 
the back of the DPRK leaderships’ mind.  
 
The early onset of militarization coupled with behavior after the Cuban Crisis would 
therefore seem to support Czech accounts that, despite the strategic environment, 
DPRK militarization was the “result of increasing efforts to achieve unification of the 
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country by avanturistic means,”790 replicating a broader Vietnamese style war. 791 This 
stance can be seen as derived from Pyongyang’s desire to “struggle against 
imperialism…in all areas” and which, given the “fascist regime” established by the 
U.S. in Seoul, precluded a “policy of peaceful coexistence with respect to the 
American occupiers.”792  Further highlighting Pyongyang’s seemingly ideational 
motivations, a Hungarian report noted “there is an undeniable identity of Korean and 
Chinese views in the line of foreign policy, which manifests itself primarily in that 
both regard the anti-imperialist struggle and the colonial-national [sic] liberation 
movement as the most important task of our time”793 while the Czechs later concluded 
Pyongyang shifted toward Beijing due to “the special geographical location of Korea 
and her whole history, from the fact that it is a divided country, from strong 
nationalism, and…from low theoretical level of party cadres.”794  
 
Therefore, despite signs of domestic unrest in 1960,795 Pyongyang’s shift was not “the 
self-defense of the regime of personality cult” as some East Europeans originally 
indicated. For one, Kim had already secured his position in the KWP796 and was able 
to again downplay CPSU remarks on cults of personality as solely a Soviet problem. 
Secondly, the Soviets assurances of non-interference into DPRK domestic affairs,797 
coupled with overtures to mend relations in 1963 and 1964798 (both of which 
Pyongyang turned down), indicate Moscow was inclined to continue working with 
Kim. Pyongyang’s negative perception of the renewed emphasis on peaceful 
coexistence is thus best explained by looking at the ideational threats it generated.  
 
For one, it hindered the ability of the North to maintain an aggressive diplomatic799 
and unification stance vis-à-vis South Korea. Given the North’s narrative as staunchly 
opposed to U.S. occupation, and history of sustaining revolution in adverse 
circumstances, maintaining a firm foreign policy and domestically developing 
military capabilities at the expense of foreign aid was a justified calculation.  This not 
only allowed Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for the “Second Korean War” of the 
late 1960s, but to also publicly assert its rejection of peaceful coexistence’s 
capitulation to imperialism. Khrushchev’s chauvinism was also distasteful. 
Pyongyang’s subsequent policies were thus not only a rebuke of Khrushchev’s 
seeming ambivalence to imperialism, but also an expression of their independent line.  
 
Importantly, this ideational commitment and criticism of Khrushchev’s “revisionist 
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point of view regarding peaceful coexistence”800 was unwavering in the face of 
material consequences. As DPRK officials exclaimed in December 1962, “The Soviet 
Union is pressuring, but no matter how much pressure, we will never go down on our 
knees and beg…Self-reliance is very important, and the Soviet Union is opposed to 
this…no matter how they shout, we will still march down our own path.”801  
 
Pyongyang was thus forced to contend with both Soviet blowback802 and limited 
Chinese compensation803 while simultaneously increasing military spending in an 
effort to prepare for future engagements. 1963 thus witnessed the formal introduction 
of chawi (self-defense in national defense) and “equal emphasis”, with military 
investment, rising from 6% to 30% between 1964 and 1967. 804  This further 
augmented pressure on the economy805 and hastened the onset of economic decline.806 
As Kim would later claim, “no country had suffered as much from the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry…North Korea had been unable to develop economically, and instead had been 
forced to endure four years of stagnation since 1961.”807 Yet this was largely the 
result of DPRK refusal to be swayed from its policies (derived from national 
narrative) - as Kim would later tell Kosygin, Khrushchev “wanted to force his will 
upon the smaller parties…[the KWP] pursued an independent policy, one could not 
make them go out of their way by putting pressure on them.”808  
 
In the end, DPRK military investment constituted a “very heavy burden for the 
national economy…[and] played a role in the fact that they had to prolong the Seven-
year Plan.”809 What we find then, is Pyongyang sacrificing its main source of external 
revenue, limiting potential (though reduced) compensation, and foregoing domestic 
investment into economic growth, so as to pursue a more militarized policy towards 
an ROK that, at the time, posed no imminent threat. From a DPRK standpoint, 
however, it had once again asserted its independence, continuing to stand up against 
imperialism and Great Power chauvinism, while refusing to be cowed into adopting 
policies contradictory to national narrative. To this end, it was willing to begin 
investing a substantial portion of domestic resources into defense in an almost natural 
progression towards further self-reliance, and while Pyongyang was “not rejecting” 
aid from fraternal countries, the more important task was “mobilizing [their] own 
resources.” 810  To this end, DPRK military investment continued after the 
reintroduction of Soviet military aid, something allies viewed as “partly unnecessary,” 
and “one of the major causes of the Korean economic difficulties”.811    
 
                                                
800 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," April 05, 1962, HPPDA, MOL, XIX-J-1-j 
Korea, 13. doboz, 27/a, 0025/RT/1962  
801 "Cable from Hao Deqing, 'On The Talks between Pak Geum-cheol and Ambassador Hao'," December 08, 1962, HPPDA, 
PRC FMA 106-00645-04, 118-119  
802 Shen and Xia, “Post-War”, pg. 36 
803 "Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and North Korean Government Trade Delegation," November 04, 1962, 
HPPPDA, PRC FMA 106-01381-02, 41-47  
804 "Memorandum on a Meeting with a Delegation from the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK on 3 July 1967," July 18, 
1967, HPPPDA, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/2.035 
805 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea” 15 February 1963  
806 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg.  136 
807 Schaefer, “Weathering”, pg. 31 
808“Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” January 08, 1965, HPPPDA, National 
Archives of Hungary (MOL), XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965 
809 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” May 08, 1967 
810 "Record of a Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovsky," February 16, 1965, 
HPPPDA, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Fund 02/1, folder 96/101, pgs. 1-26  
811 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," October 20, 1966, HPPPDA, MOL, 
XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1966, 74. doboz, IV-250, 005007/1966  
 119 
Korea’s militarization in the early-mid 1960s was therefore a precursor to the onset of 
the Second Korean War, with renewed Soviet military assistance in 1965812 providing 
further resources for the prearranged military campaign.  
 
4. “Unification” & “Respect”: The Second Korean War 
 
By 1964 Kim had decided to increase attacks against the ROK813 and in October 1966 
“defined the “liberation of South Korea” as a “national duty,””814 that could not be 
delayed. Military engagements instigated by the DPRK815 followed shortly after,816 
leading to what has been dubbed the Second Korean War, a series of sustained low 
level military engagements across the DMZ and along the coastlines from 1966-1970 
purported by the North to be the result of Southern partisans in the hope of sparking a 
popular rising.     
 
Figure 1: Second Korean War Figures817 
 
Year # DMZ Attacks US Deaths ROK Deaths 
1966 15 6 29 
1967 69 16 115 
1968 175 18 145 
1969 21 35 10 
 
The War confounded policymakers in both the East and West.818  Subsequent debates, 
Lerner notes, have mainly focused on immediate variables, in particular the Vietnam 
War. Other arguments include Kim’s desire to exploit the Cultural Revolution (CR) to 
forge more of a leadership role in the socialist bloc819 while also feeling unfettered by 
allies whom he had successfully played off one another. 820 Still others cite growing 
ROK stability as the main trigger, with Kim seeking to spark a rebellion or, knowing 
this was not possible, trying to tip the scales himself.821 Finally there are those who 
champion domestic factors, including an attempt to ratchet up tensions so as to justify 
DPRK domestic woes. By contrast, Lerner emphasizes the importance of Juche in 
framing these variables, suggesting domestic troubles coupled with uncertainty 
following the CR encouraged “Kim to behave in ways that demonstrated that he could 
still act to defend Korean nationalism and independence”.822  
 
This view, however, is problematized by the fact that DPRK preparations for war 
predate these variables. Moreover, it is argued domestic woes and deteriorated 
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relations with China were the result of, not a threat to, Juche. Instead, the war was the 
culmination of Pyongyang’s post-1961 unification policy.  
 
4.1 Juche And The Run Up To War:  
 
Lerner suggests the DPRK had stable economic and political relations in the 1950s 
and early 1960s and held a correspondingly benign view towards unification. As 
shown however, this is not true, the North had turbulent relations with the Soviets 
throughout the 1950s (and for briefs stints of time with the Chinese) given ideological 
disputes. Pyongyang’s post-1961 militarization and unification policy then led to a 
second split with Moscow. Despite economic hardships, it was only after 
Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 that relations began to mend, when Kim 
perceived renewed “signs of a very correct course, of an anti-imperialist course”823 
and Kosygin ensured Kim he would not force a discussion on peaceful coexistence, 
and that they “share[d] a mission to fight with imperialism for peace and 
socialism”. 824  A series of meetings in November 1964 and February 1965 
subsequently renewed “mutual assistance and co-operation”825 as Kim reasserted a 
more centrist (rather than pro-Soviet) line; indeed Pyongyang maintained its criticism 
of previous Soviet policy regarding Cuba, Vietnam, Albania, and for “what [they] did 
to Stalin” as well as Soviet attacks on Korea’s (correct) policy of “regeneration 
through one’s own efforts.” 826  
 
Secondly, in contrast to Lerner’s characterization of Pyongyang’s deteriorated 
relationship with Beijing forcing Kim to re-assert Juche, it is more useful to view 
Juche as partially to blame for the breakdown. By 1965 China was seeking to cajole 
Vietnam and Cuba into rejecting Soviet aid in an attempt to increase its own clout, a 
position Pyongyang interpreted as undermining the unified battle against 
imperialism.827 Moreover, “[a]ttempts were made by the Chinese leaders to pressure 
the Korean leadership [to adopt the CR]. This forced it to make changes to relations 
with China”,828 with a 1967 Hungarian report noting DPRK anger over attempts by 
Beijing to introduce a “feudalistic” relationship; “when a weak man, if slapped by a 
strong one, was required to turn the other cheek so as to get a second slap.”829 Given 
that it was DPRK efforts to push back against these incursions830  that led to the split, 
it is perhaps best to view the deteriorated relationship as the very expression of Juche. 
 
Of course ideational threats did arise from China’s rebuttal to Pyongyang, 
challenging its anti imperialist credentials831 and its growing leadership role832 as the 
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only “party that follows a right Marxist-Leninist road.” 833 Kim’s heighted efforts to 
spread the teachings of Juche in the late 1960s were thus partially in response to his 
growing competition with China. Indeed Soviet officials (seemingly highlighting the 
importance of ideational variables) noted, “Anti-Chinese actions in the DPRK [were] 
of a retaliatory nature. It is supposed that the Korean leaders will act that way in the 
future when it is a matter of DPRK prestige in the international arena.”834 They were 
also an expression, however, of Pyongyang’s historical role in championing anti-
imperialism and the non-aligned movement.835   
 
Pyongyang’s inroads with the Third World dated back to KWP participation in the 
1955 Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tension. Pyognyang’s 
place among these states grew in 1961 with a flurry of new trade relations836 and in 
1963, during celebrations of its founding, Pyongyang claimed to be the “model of 
self-reliant development and anti-imperialist independence for the entire Third Word” 
as it boasted the presence of 22 foreign (many non-socialist) delegations. In April 
1965, Kim sought to further solidify his internationalist independent stance at the 
tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference on Afro-Asian solidarity, reaffirming 
the tenants of Juche and pledging to strengthen the independent, anti-imperialist 
movements of the Third World, much to the unease of allies.837 Pyongyang thus 
doubled these efforts partially to counter Chinese questioning of its revolutionary 
credentials.  
 
Kim’s split from China resulted in a far more volatile relationship than had ever 
occurred with Russia, leading to an acute security problem.838  Restricted DPRK 
propaganda began accusing “the CPSU of displaying "weakness" toward the U.S., of 
"colluding" with the U.S. to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons” and of 
“interference in the affairs of fraternal Parties."839 However Kim restricted direct 
attacks840 over fears of Chinese efforts to sow domestic unrest and challenge his 
leadership.841  Still, the situation quickly grew volatile, with border skirmishes, loud 
speakers blasting anti-Korean propaganda, and, as Kim would later claim, the two 
countries coming close to war in 1969.842  Importantly, despite these tangible threats, 
Kim refused to fully balance with the socialist camp;843 while 1967 saw increased 
Chinese aggression, the same year Moscow complained of Pyongyang’s continued 
public advocacy against Soviet policies.844 Much as in the early 1960s, the split with 
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Beijing, and subsequent refusal to balance with the Soviets despite security concerns, 
were both expressions of Juche.  
 
This still leaves questions regarding the influence of the Vietnam War in DPRK 
policy. While certainly reducing the chance for U.S. retaliation (though Pyongyang 
admitted this was still a possibility),845 it is unlikely the provocations were aimed 
solely at aiding the Vietnamese struggle. A 1965 treaty between Japan and South 
Korea meant the ROK would continue to grow given its relations with an increasingly 
militarized Japan, regardless of Vietnams outcome. The North would therefore have 
been far more intent on facilitating U.S. withdrawal from Korea, thereby “creating the 
main prerequisite for unification of the country,”846 rather than disrupting collusion on 
Vietnam. This is not to say Kim was disinterested in Vietnam. Following the ROK’s 
entry into the War in 1965, Kim successfully advocated for the deployment of a 
DPRK contingent of fighter pilots847 and continued the shipment of supplies (started 
in 1963). Moreover, this aid was voluntary, and while the ROK received vast 
economic payments for its support, Kim would later admit the diversion of resources 
had partially contributed to the North’s economic collapse. 848  
 
This flows into the notion that Kim engaged in conflict to divert attention from 
domestic shortcomings. However these shortcomings were a direct result of DPRK 
foreign policy (resulting in reduced foreign aid) and policy of ‘equal emphasis’, 
initiated in conjunction the post-1961 unification policy. It would therefore seem odd 
to use conflict to offset domestic hardships that were the result of policies aimed at 
facilitating just such a campaign.  
 
There is no denying that Kim certainly played up the conflict849 for a domestic 
audience that had grown restful.850 Indeed, the North’s low living standards forced 
Kim to contend with yet another internal challenge following the KWP Second 
Congress, when some officials questioned equal emphasis851 and the grooming of 
Kim’s (unqualified) brother, Kim Yeongjoo, as a possible successor.852 While little 
threat to his rule, efforts were made to backtrack on equal emphasis, reduce Kim’s 
cult of personality, and portray Pak Geumcheol as the more suitable successor.853 
Kim’s response was the establishment of the Monolithic Ideological System, which 
would “suppress policy debates within the KWP, particularly when Kim Il Sung 
believed the alternative—reducing expenditures on national defense…would have left 
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the country in a weakened and dependent position.”854 By April 1967, the dissenting 
officials had been purged and a monolithic dictatorship established. Kim’s response to 
the challenge, just as before, was thus a further centralization of power, not military 
operations – which had commenced prior to the incident coming to a head. 
 
The Second Korean War thus appears to have been the product of North Korea’s 
more militarized unification policy in effect since 1961 when it began to heavily 
increase domestic military spending, indicating the North was prepared to go it alone. 
It was only by happenstance that Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 and Moscow 
reinstated military aid. At the same time, the Second Korean War was initiated just as 
relations with China were becoming an acute security concern. Refusing to balance 
with the Soviets in the face of this threat in turn made the War an even riskier 
endeavor, especially as Moscow remained opposed to actions that risked a broader 
conflict.855  Within the context of DPRK national narrative however, the rewards far 
outweighed the risks, demonstrating non-subservience to Great Powers and 
countering Chinese questioning of DPRK identity while seeking to finally attain 
unification. The risks associated with the strategy, and Kim’s commitment to Juche, 
are best exemplified by the DPRK decision to capture the USS Pueblo in 1968 and 
shoot down a U.S. EC-121 in 1969.   
 
4.2 Sovereignty: The USS Pueblo & EC-121:  
 
As noted above, the Soviets were already disgruntled with DRPK behavior vis-à-vis 
the second Korean War.856 Capturing a U.S. ship was sure to enrage them further, 
especially as it contradicted vital Soviet interests by setting a dangerous precedent 
regarding naval spy operations. Szalontai also notes how “Pyongyang’s most 
provocative acts were closely followed by particularly virulent manifestations of 
Chinese hostility”, 857  further compounding risks associated with the operation. 
Moreover, this was a period of time when, as Kim himself admitted, open war with 
China was a real possibility, raising further concerns should a conflict with the U.S. 
arise, a prospect compounded by Washington’s implementation in September 1967 of 
a new rotation system that “placed four maneuver battalions on the DMZ and a fifth 
in reserve as a quick reaction force.”858  All combined, capturing the Pueblo was 
immensely risky and posed to greatly irritate Moscow at time of immense DPRK 
hostility with China.  
 
This leaves questions regarding motivation. Some have suggested the Pueblo was 
intended to support the Tet Offensive 8 days later. However Lerner argues the capture 
brought unwanted attention to Asia just as the NVA was hoping for U.S. ambivalence 
to events in the region outside of the real diversion at Khe Sahn. He also notes how 
the incident actually sparked the U.S. to increase force levels in the region, including 
a number of B52 bombers subsequently deployed during Tet.859 Incidents like the 
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Pueblo also played into Washington’s hand, justifying their hardline stance in the 
region and potentially undermining Giap’s grand political design.  
 
Instead, the Pueblo appears to have been a response to two factors. The first was 
frustration over the failed assassination attempt of President Park on January 21st. The 
second appears to have been the U.S. failure to heed multiple warnings issued by 
Pyongyang regarding U.S. naval incursions violating DPRK sovereignty. Specific 
warnings were also raised against the Pueblo during the DPRK’s 8-day observance 
period, the last coming on January 20.860 While the DPRK was thus frustrated with 
the failed assassination, and potentially looking for a diversion following its failure, it 
was perhaps more incensed (and motivated) by U.S. chauvinism. For example in 1971 
DPRK officials stated:   
 
The Americans let us know that it’s not their intention to fight the Koreans 
again…[we told] the Americans that we didn’t want it either, but to be careful and 
keep away from us, because if they create situations like Pueblo and E.C. 121, then 
we are entitled to capturing them or to shooting them down. We keep our business to 
our territory, we don’t do it in the waters of the United States of America.861 
 
On January 23, the DPRK made its move and seized the boat, seemingly ready to risk 
disruptions to its relationship with Moscow and engender ROK and U.S. reactions. In 
response, the U.S. public, and various lawmakers, called for immediate retaliations,862 
and many of Kim’s allies believed he was on the precipice of war,863 or at least a 
serious conflict, while also noting difficulties resulting from Soviet hesitancy to 
provide military assistance. 864  Pyongyang, however, had yet again asserted its 
independent nationalist position while forcing the U.S. to finally capitulate, given the 
North’s “firm stance”;865 after a year of negotiations the crew was finally returned in 
exchange for a written apology (that was publicly repudiated). The subsequent use of 
the boat for mainly propaganda purposes, as outlined by Lerner, justifies the 
ideational rationale behind its capture.  
 
This interpretation gains further credence in light of new evidence regarding the 
DPRK shoot down of a U.S. EC-121 plane the following year (killing all 31 
servicemen). While the conventional wisdom has been, following the work of Hersh, 
that the downing of the plane was an accident, Jackson argues it was a “deliberate act” 
which stemmed from the fact that North Korea “if attacked, will automatically 
reciprocate…[since Pyongyang believes] to do otherwise would bring on war 
anyway.”866 Much as with the Pueblo, DPRK official Pak Seong told the Soviets:  
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This time the aircraft violated DPRK airspace, and therefore it was shot down by 
DPRK aircraft. Our forces are in constant readiness to rebuff any aggressor who 
intrudes across the boundaries of our territory on land, sea, or air…If the enemy fires 
on us in this region with machine guns we respond with machine guns; when he uses 
artillery, we also use artillery…If they try something, then we will also act. We have 
nowhere to go from our country. This incident is somewhat reminiscent of the 
Pueblo. If the Americans had decided to fight then, we would have fought. 867 
 
In a separate meeting, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Heo Dam similarly told the 
Soviets “our government has repeatedly warned the US imperialists that aggressors 
who dare to infringe on our sovereignty will be vigorously halted” and that as “Kim Il 
Sung pointed out, our country is completely ready to respond to retaliation with 
retaliation, and to total war with total war. 868 Perhaps even more insightful is the fact 
that when pressed on the possible consequences, Pak declared: 
 
When our pilots shot down the aggressor’s aircraft which intruded into DPRK 
airspace they were not thinking of the further course of events. We also have not been 
thinking about it. [Translator’s note: “?!” was written in the left margin next to the 
underlined portion]. If we had started to think then we would have to ask, the aircraft 
would have flown away further.869 
 
This all helps to underscore the DPRK rationale, derived from the hypersensitivity to 
independence enshrined in national narrative, that violations to sovereignty must be 
responded to. This also seems to have been connected to lessons garnered from past 
Self’s (i.e. the seeming weakness of the Yi Dynasty that led to colonization). Thus: 
 
If the US imperialists continue to violate our border this means that they want to find 
some pretext to attack us. It’s good for them to know that we won’t sit with folded 
arms…If we sit with folded arms when a violator intrudes into our spaces, two planes 
will appear tomorrow, then four, five, etc. This would lead to an increase of the 
danger of war. But if a firm rebuff is given, then this will diminish the danger of an 
outbreak of war.870  
 
To this end there appears to be an overlap between DPRK efforts to maintain national 
identity and efforts to also establish a form of conventional deterrence.871 However, 
views on the latter seem to be framed by of the former. While the Soviets stressed the 
need to refrain from a larger conflict, Pak countered “[w]hy do we…speak only of the 
fact that socialism will be damaged, that socialism might perish, and we are not 
considering the consequences of war for capitalism” and, as with earlier critiques of 
peaceful coexistence, reiterated how the maxim “don’t touch imperialism, wait until it 
perishes by itself” was “an illusion”. When told the Soviets believed “the Americans 
might launch a strike on the DPRK” Pak responded, “such a strike would mean the 
start of a war, inasmuch as the DPRK would launch a retaliatory strike.”872 One must 
thus look at DPRK narrative to understand this openness to larger conflict with a 
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Great Power and related views on deterrence. Of course, such a strike by the U.S. 
never came, and by 1970 the situation on the Peninsula began to tame down. This 
stemmed from the realization that DPRK efforts to destabilize the South had failed, 
coupled with the fact that diplomatic avenues towards unification began to open, 
culminating in the 1972 Joint Communiqué (examined in Ch. 6). 
 
Conclusions:    
 
Upon review, it becomes possible to conclude that during this period, the DPRK 
consistently championed ideational goals over material or systemic considerations. 
For one, the planning for and conduct of the Korean War contradicted notions of 
balancing and freeriding while postwar nationalist economic policies undermined 
DPRK relationships with its most important allies. Meanwhile Kim’s navigating of 
the Sino-Soviet split can only truly be accounted for when one takes into account 
ideational variables into threat perceptions (resulting in friction with Moscow and 
later Beijing) and for DPRK interests vis-à-vis unification. This culminated in DPRK 
actions during the Second Korean War, the result again of domestic rather than 
international variables. Consequently one must take into account DPRK national 






























DPRK Foreign Policy: 1970-1994 
 
The Second Korean War began to tail off in 1969, though there were still 144 known 
infiltrations conducted that year (decreasing to 86 in 1970 and 52 in 1971). Actions 
along the DMZ had proved costly for the North, resulting in the loss of 715 
servicemen (twice that suffered by the ROK) and further economic stagnation, all 
while failing to incite a Southern uprising.873 Meanwhile, drastic changes to the 
North’s strategic landscape at both the regional and global levels began to unfold, 
making the 1970s a particularly turbulent (and thus interesting) period of study. 
 
For one, following China’s Party Congress in April 1969, the rhetoric of the CR was 
tamed down and Sino-DPRK relations began to mend. In 1970 Pyongyang 
subsequently rejected Soviet advances to join a new collective security alliance due to 
its continued negative view of peaceful coexistence and its desire not to become 
entangled in Soviet posturing against China.874 The Soviets for their part continued to 
provide aid as a means of balancing Chinese influence, sending a high-ranking 
delegation to Pyongyang shortly after Zhou Enlai’s trip in April (the first high-
ranking Chinese official to visit since the CR), and in September signed a new 
agreement on economic cooperation.  
 
The second important change was the introduction of the Nixon Doctrine in July. This 
emphasized local actors as primarily responsible for their own defense (a response to 
the situation in Vietnam), undermining ROK deterrence. 875 Nixon also ordered the 
withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops by June 1971, though he did provide a lucrative 
military aid package in return. This was followed by the onset of Détente between the 
U.S. and China. The ROK in turn felt their position to be further eroded, while the 
North felt momentum to be on their side. Yet what started as a promising decade for 
Pyongyang ended on a low note, as the economic and military discrepancy between 
North and South began to tilt, and then rapidly shift, in Seoul’s favor. Internationally, 
the North faced increasingly insurmountable hurdles, as growing debt and repeated 
defaults began to curtail any hope for future investment, and by the end of the decade 
North Korea was seen as an economic pariah. The 1970s were thus a turning point 
both in the North-South dyad as well as the North’s position internationally. 
 
Despite this, DPRK foreign policy remained markedly similar to the 1950s and 1960s. 
It emphasized reunification and the assertion of DPRK independence while 
fluctuating between diplomatic and military postures depending on which was 
perceived as most promising for unification. As before, this often led to friction with 
key allies. Despite its deteriorating position, Pyongyang not only continued to 
ostracize allies, it also dedicated valuable resources to trumpeting its own nationalist 
and independent image, providing aid and support to third world countries and 
seeking to compete with - and undermine through terrorism - South Korea’s growing 
prestige in the 1980s. By the 1990s North Korea’s nuclear program had become the 
focus of international condemnation. The first nuclear crisis, however, was merely the 
fruition of efforts dating back to the 1950s and 1960s to acquire nuclear weapons for 
both strategic and ideational reasons. Overall, one again finds North Korea seemingly 
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less motivated by traditional security interests and instead more focused on asserting 
its national narrative, regardless of drastic changes to it strategic environment.  
 
1. A “Unified Independent State” Through Diplomacy: 1971-1973   
 
In July 1971, at the same time an unknowing North Korean delegation was in Beijing, 
Henry Kissinger secretly visited China to arrange for a visit by President Nixon. 
Shortly thereafter Zhou travelled to Pyongyang, one day before news would break of 
Nixon’s upcoming trip, to inform Kim of the secret talks. South Korea, by contrast, 
was given no prior warning. When combined with the Nixon doctrine and the 
reduction of U.S. forces both in South Korea and along the DMZ, Seoul feared it 
might very well be abandoned in the same manner as South Vietnam. This was the 
background in which both North and South Korea began to call for bilateral talks. 
 
Lee Dongbok, a member of the North-South Red Cross Talks and instrumental in the 
Joint Communiqué, suggests Pyongyang was acting proactively while Seoul was 
reactive; “Kim Il Sung thought that this dialogue would help North Korea to pursue 
unification, while South Korea was concerned about security.”876 Kim Dasool, head 
of inter-Korean dialogue for the South Korean Red Cross, similarly noted the ROK, 
fearing abandonment, felt it was important to, “on its own, find a way to have an 
assurance of security.”877 Conversely Pyongyang was seeking to tone down its efforts 
and to “pat the U.S. out of South Korea” through dialogue.878  
 
It should be noted that Pyongyang’s diplomatic turn predated Détente, with the North 
viewing dialogue as a viable path towards unification as early as November 1970, 
when DPRK officials in Tokyo began approaching South Koreans. Pyongyang also 
sought to find channels of communication with Washington throughout the 1970s, for 
example by having socialist allies convey messages on their behalf.879 This new 
diplomatic approach took on a more concrete form on April 12, 1971, when an Eight-
Point Declaration on peaceful unification was issued. Stipulations included the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops and a new government formed in the South after which a 
Confederation would be formed. Kim elaborated on his views during a conversation 
with Nicolae Ceausescu in June, during which he referenced domestic unrest in the 
South, his belief Park would soon be overthrown, and his positive views of the head 
of the Progressive Party, Kim Baegyu, whose slogans “resembled our position 
regarding the unification of the country.” However, he also noted if Washington 
“continue[s] to stay in South Korea, victory through elections is not possible… 
unification of the country is linked to this issue.”880 The aim was to therefore use 
diplomacy to create circumstances under which U.S. forces would vacate the 
peninsula while also curtailing the influence of rising Japanese militarism in the ROK.  
 
Consequently, while the North’s diplomatic campaign certainty gained further 
incentive following Détente, it is perhaps better viewed as the next phase of its 
ongoing efforts to achieve unification, similar to its diplomatic thaw prior to the 
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Second Korean War. This stance was further buoyed in July, when Pyongyang was 
informed that China, in talks with Washington, had suggested the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops and that Kissinger had stated “after the Indochina war ends…most, if not all, 
American troops will be withdrawn from Korea,”881 a point reiterated in October. 882  
With Pyongyang’s dreams of U.S. troop withdrawal now on the horizon, there was 
further impetus to enter talks. Subsequently, while many socialist states were plagued 
with unease over Détente, as traditional security studies might expect, North Korea 
was, by contrast, highly optimistic, viewing its goal of unification to finally be within 
reach. To this end, Soviet and GDR officials complained Pyongyang “is pursuing its 
nationalist course and fails to notice the anti-Soviet aspect of rapprochement.”883  
 
Kim’s announcement on August 6, 1971, that he was willing to enter into talks with 
the ROK should therefore be viewed not so much as a response to systemic shifts, but 
as a continuation in unification policy, with the international environment 
compounding this diplomatic turn.884 Further examining the trajectory of the talks 
bolsters this point.   
 
1.1 Unification & The Joint Communiqué:  
 
The first round of North-South talks were conducted secretly under the guise of 
Humanitarian Red Cross meetings, culminating in the head of the ROK’s Intelligence 
Agency, Yi Hurak, secretly traveling to Pyongyang in May 1972. A reciprocal 
meeting in Seoul between Deputy Premier Pak Song-chol and President Park 
followed shortly thereafter. Both Kim and Park expressed their desire for the peaceful 
unification and independence of the Korean nation, though Park was more cautious 
over when this might occur.885 The secret negotiations finally gave way to the Joint 
Communiqué released July 4, 1972, which for the most part encapsulated Kim’s 
Three Principles of National Unification: 
 
1. Unification should be achieved independently, without reliance on or 
interference from outside forces; 
2. Unification should be achieved through peaceful means, without recourse to 
the use of arms against the other side; 
3. Korea being a homogenous nation, great national unity should transcend 
differences of ideas, ideologies and systems.886 
 
Of course, the true purpose of the talks for North Korea surpassed these stated aims. 
In a telegram dated June 9, Comrade Ri Manseok informed GDR officials how 
Pyongyang “wants to start the content negotiation as soon as possible “to…serve as a 
springboard to unification.”” The DPRK thus sought throughout the talks to have 
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“free visits and free reunions", a position seemingly linked to Kim’s statement 
“[w]hite is easily colored over red, yet it is much harder to color red on white.”887 By 
pushing for representatives with unfettered access and the right of free speech, 
Pyongyang hoped to infiltrate South Korean society and establish a more robust pro-
North Korean front, allowing South Koreans “to travel, to listen to DPRK radio, to 
exclaim “Long Live Kim Il Sung,” and other things.”888 
 
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kim Ryong Taek thus noted that by entering 
talks South Korea had adopted “the correct course of the DPRK government…since it 
represents the path to [DPRK] victory.”889 In September he again emphasized bluntly 
how the “peace offensive was started last year to create favorable conditions for the 
realization of South Korean revolution and the unification of the fatherland.”890 There 
was also a high degree of optimism within Pyongyang at this time, optimized by the 
fact DPRK officials suggested revoking its treaties with China and Russia in the 
hopes South Korea would do the same with the U.S. and Japan. 891  While Soviet 
officials balked at the idea, and Pyongyang did not press further, the fact it was 
willing to even suggest sacrificing its two main alliances showcases the importance 
the regime placed on attaining a unified nation. 
 
This all reinforces how Détente was viewed through the prism of national narrative, 
reinforcing and accelerating DPRK diplomatic efforts to bring about unification. 
Accordingly, it was reported how throughout the “negotiations the DPRK was eager 
to solve the entire problem according to the ideas of “juche””892 and how the North 
continued to work independently of Great Powers. For example Georgi Mitov, a 
Bulgarian Foreign Ministry officer at the time, stated how neither Moscow nor 
socialist states, “could exert the necessary influence, or conduct a coordinated policy 
with the DPRK to help direct the “Korean issue” towards one resolution or another. 
Pyongyang’s position remained unchanged in their asserted isolationism towards all 
countries.” 893  This is perhaps best emphasized by the seeming willingness of 
Pyongyang to cut its alliance with allies. While Pyongyang did work in coordination 
with China, helping to devise Beijing’s position on Korea for talks with Kissinger and 
keeping it abreast of DPRK-ROK negotiations, this only lasted as long as their 
interests aligned. As will be shown below, as soon as Pyongyang no longer viewed 
diplomacy as viable, relations with China quickly cooled.   
 
In conjunction with diplomatic overtures to the South, Pyongyang began to engage 
more with the international community. This was conducted through a two-pronged 
approach; one focused on trade relations with capitalist states, in part to offset 
economic difficulties springing from increased military investment in the 1960s, and 
the other on further asserting its position amongst the NAM. When placed against the 
North’s economic position in the 1970s, the costs associated with the latter, and 
restraints placed on the former, make little sense outside the purview of national 
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narrative. Pyongyang therefore seems to have been more focused on championing 
international respect and prestige rather than economic or military goals, often to the 
displeasure of allies. 
 
1.2 “Anti-Imperialists”, “Non-Aligned States” & Pyongyang’s Internationalism: 
 
Despite the new flexibility provided by Détente to procure an influx of sorely needed 
capital, Pyongyang set self-imposed parameters derived from national narrative.  
Accordingly, while turning to capitalist states for investment was the next logical 
option, only those wishing to “request friendly relations with the DPRK” were 
approached while “certain Western countries (e.g. Britain, Greece, Canada, etc.) [that] 
maintained an “aggressive” policy toward the DPRK and supported the south” were 
overlooked. 894 Vice Foreign Minister Shim Tong-hae explained in 1973 that 
Pyongyang would only engage in diplomacy and trade relations based on the North’s 
five principles of peaceful co-existence, and would never sacrifice core principles, 
including its position as the sole governing power of the Korean nation, calling for 
U.S. withdrawal, and denouncing the ROK puppet regime.895  
 
On these lines, Pyongyang forged trade relations throughout Europe, particularly with 
West Germany and France and to a lesser extent Switzerland, Austria and Italy. It 
would be Japan, however, who would become its most important trade partner outside 
the socialist bloc (only surpassed by South Korea in 2000). Armstrong notes this is 
less paradoxical than it may seem; “Japan’s proximity, its wealth and technological 
sophistication, and the presence of a large community of ethnic Korean sympathizers 
to act as intermediaries, made Japan a more desirable economic partner than any other 
capitalist state.”896 Pyongyang also saw potential support in Japan for its position, 
leading DPRK officials to note “Japanese militarism cannot be mistaken for the entire 
Japanese people,” 897  how “influential circles in Japan have come out in favor of 
recognizing the DPRK,”898 and that “public opinion circles in the world, including in 
Japan, are on our side and are supporting us.”899 This gained further credence in 1975 
when Prime Minister Takeo Miki began to push for peaceful coexistence of the two 
Koreas and for direct U.S.-DPRK talks to secure a peace agreement.900  
 
North Korea was also careful not to compromise its ideational position. Following its 
failure to persuade Japan to adopt a more neutral stance between North and South 
Korea in 1973, Pyongyang refused to take positive steps towards Tokyo. When in 
1975 a Japanese delegation told Pyongyang that while recognition would be difficult, 
expanded relations and exchanges were possible, the North Koreans, holding firm, 
responded “the separation of politics and economy in Japan-North Korean relations is 
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unlikely”.901 Armstrong concludes, “as much as North Korea desired economic ties 
and diplomatic normalization with Japan, it would not engage in “beggar 
diplomacy.”” All of this again helps to further highlight the continued prominence of 
DPRK national narrative in framing acceptable policies, impeding on Pyongyang’s 
ability to pursue more traditional security goals (such as economic development); in 
short “economic benefit was secondary to mutual respect.”902  
 
This prioritization of international respect flows into its second diplomatic offensive 
during this period, developing more of a leadership role within the NAM and amongst 
developing countries. As discussed in the previous chapter, by the end of the 1960s 
Pyongyang had managed to acquire a leading position within the NAM. Its aims in 
the 1970s were now twofold. For one, as part of its competition with Seoul for 
legitimacy, it wanted to expand its state-to-state relations and join more international 
organizations while simultaneously forcing allies and other countries to isolate the 
ROK.903 The North thus stunned the ROK in 1973 by joining the WHO, and by the 
mid-1970s was recognized globally by over 90 states, coming close to rivaling Seoul. 
In August 1975, the DPRK officially gained NAM admittance while the ROK 
application was denied. This was a particularly important victory since, in addition to 
competing with Seoul, Pyongyang was also continuing to try and become the de facto 
head of the NAM and leader of the Third World, positioning itself as the 
quintessential archetype for nationalist-minded independent states.  
 
This would not only demonstrate the North’s revolutionary and independent 
credentials, but also validate its national narrative of non-subservience. Indeed, it 
would be seen as leading a new bloc of likeminded nationalists opposed to Great 
Power chauvinism. In nice summation, Kim exclaimed to a Japanese delegation in 
1975 how the “US, China, the Soviets, and Japan should not meddle in our affairs. 
Leave the issue of unification to the Korean race. In the future, North Korea will stand 
ascendant in the international community with the backing of the Third World.904 This 
is particularly interesting as it would seem to indicate the DPRK was seeking to 
challenge – and perhaps change – the international system by introducing a new bloc 
of nationalist states, opening itself to possible retaliation by Great Powers. And 
indeed East European diplomats lamented how Pyongyang did “not act jointly with 
the other Socialist states, but proceeds in parallel to them,” leaving Moscow 
disgruntled over Pyongyang’s overly independent stance.905 The North’s Third World 
diplomacy was therefore crafted primarily within the construct of ideational interests, 
with Japanese delegates concluding Kim was a nationalist, not a communist.906 As 
Kim told Ceausescu in 1971: 
 
We are surrounded by three great powers and their influence can be felt…we have a 
principle-based system, that of our own policies, irrespective of the influence exerted 
by one party or another…You support the principle of autonomy. So do we. Juche is 
exactly the same thing.907  
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Highlighting the detached nature of DPRK diplomacy at this time, Pyongyang soon 
began to promote and spread Juche (going so far as to establish overseas Juche 
research centers), and further championing the DPRK’s fiercely independent stance as 
one that should be emulated. The Soviets thus complained in early 1972 how: 
 
Apparently he [Kim] sees the path to socialism in the DPRK as the “only correct and 
exemplary one for other countries”…the KWP leadership does not focus on the unity 
of the communist world movement but…tries to gain increasing ground through 
ideological infiltration into the international communist and anti-imperialist 
movement.908 
 
Overall the North’s internationalist turn in the early-mid 1970s was shaped by DPRK 
national narrative. Despite economic incentive, the North constrained the extent to 
which it would pursue new trade relations while at the same time spending more 
resources on exporting its Juche ideology. These efforts were linked to the North’s 
desire to become the leading prototype for other nationalist minded states, thereby 
legitimizing its national narrative while also forming a new bloc of likeminded states 
from which to further push back against all forms of Great Power chauvinism. Still, 
with the prospect of unification on the horizon, Pyongyang seems to have felt 
confident in its position, a sentiment that would soon change.  
 
2. “Unified”, “Pride” & “Prestige” - DPRK Brinkmanship: 1973-1979 
 
While North Korea hoped the Communiqué and follow up negotiations under the 
North-South Coordination Committee and Red Cross would incite a southern uprising, 
their efforts proved futile at best. “At the outset North Korea appeared to really 
believe that the North Korean economy was way ahead of us, but in the course of the 
dialogue, they realized that that situation was already upside down.”909 This disparity 
was matched by a far more stable ROK society than had been expected, a problem 
compounded by the political maneuverings of Park. Stipulating that in order to ensure 
a restive ROK populace would follow the government’s lead in talks, Park assumed 
dictatorial powers through the Yushin Reform on October 17, 1972.910 This further 
dampened hope for instigating an uprising, as fears grew that Park would “exploit the 
principles of the Joint Declaration for his own purposes”,911 securing his “hold on 
power for a long time, to repress the political parties”.912  
 
Pyongyang’s outlook was further dampened following Kim’s second meeting with 
Lee Hurak in November 1972, during which Kim proposed tangible policies for 
momentum. These included: sending South Korean workers to the North, joint 
resource development projects, unifying the Korean language by eliminating Japanese 
and American terms that had permeated into the South, mutual troop reduction, and 
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the formation of a Confederation.913 Lee, for his part, remained non-committal and 
follow up negotiations proved to further underscore DPRK views of a disingenuous 
ROK. DPRK officials in turn began to take a far more negative outlook of the ROK, 
again referred to as the “adversary” and “puppets,”914 while referring to the new ROK 
constitution as “a reactionary document to solidify the dictatorship and the power of 
one single person…the entire constitution is an evil deception”915 that showed Seoul 
had “no interest in the country’s unification whatsoever.” 916 By January 1973, reports 
began to increasingly focus on how the ROK was further solidifying its security 
apparatus and defense, “labeling and disseminating “danger” from the Northern 
side”,917 while Pyongyang was again pressing for the isolation of Seoul so that “in the 
end it will be cast aside or it will have to kneel down before us.”918   
 
The main concern for Pyongyang, however, was the continued presence of U.S. 
forces, still seen as the main hindrance to unification. The reluctance of the ROK to 
broaden the scope of engagement had in turn made addressing this problematic. The 
North’s response was to raise tensions along the DMZ in March,919 hoping this would 
motivate Seoul to finally address measures through which to alleviate tensions, such 
as mutual disarmament,920 while also testing “the loyalty of the South Korean puppets 
toward the cause of unification”921 and hopefully motivating “the leftist trends in 
South Korea.”922 It was to little avail.  
 
Pyongyang therefore shifted its focus towards efforts to have China further broach 
withdrawal in its talks with Washington,923 with the Romanians concluding it “is 
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obvious that the DPRK is attempting, with the help of P.R. China or by itself, to gain 
the time necessary for obtaining the disengagement of the U.S. from the peninsula”.924 
The North, however, was growing concerned with China. Soviet officials reported in 
April how Pyongyang was “manifesting certain fears and suspicions towards the 
honesty with which Beijing acted to determine the Americans to pull out of South 
Korea”.925 Further problems then arose following Park’s June 23 Declaration, calling 
for North and South Korea’s simultaneous admittance to the UN, which Pyongyang 
viewed as an effort to “enshrine the division of Korea.”926  
 
Consequently, by mid 1973 Pyongyang was forced to contend with the fact the ROK 
was economically stronger, was domestically becoming unified, and was now seeking 
to solidify the status quo through UN admittance of two separate states, coupled with 
increasing unease over Chinese support for U.S. withdrawal. All the while, the 
North’s economic situation began to further deteriorate. While increased trade 
relations had succeeded in attaining an influx in capitol, it also exposed the North to 
global economic trends. The 1973 OPEC oil crisis sent the world economy into a 
tailspin and by 1974 North Korea was starting to default on its debts; in 1975 it was 
$200-300 million in arrears and was soon viewed as an economic pariah.927 To make 
matters worse, Pyongyang’s economic decline and unifications struggles were 
juxtaposed to the success of Vietnamese unification, compelling Kim to justify the 
North’s delayed unification.928  
 
DPRK national narrative can therefore be seen as under threat in three distinct ways; 
the rather shocking realization regarding just how advanced South Korea had become, 
the failure to bring about unification, and Pyongyang’s rather public economic 
humiliation. This resulted in a desperate need to try and forcefully reverse current 
trends. It is argued Pyongyang thus shifted toward a hybrid military-diplomatic 
campaign aimed at opening up direct negotiations with Washington in an effort to 
bring about troop withdrawal and unification. It congruently sought to further provide 
economic support to recently independent states as a means of bolstering its image, 
maintaining earlier efforts to showcase independence and forge a bloc of likeminded 
nationalist states, again much to the anger of allies. 
 
2.1 The NLL Dispute & Axe Murder Incident: 
 
As noted above, Pyongyang began to lay the groundwork for trying to reach out 
directly to the U.S. in the early 1970s through East European allies. Then in May/June 
1972, Kim conducted his first interview with the New York Times and Washington 
Post, stating his openness to dialogue so long as Washington ceased its hostile 
attitude and obstruction of unification. He also reiterated his support for independent 
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relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973 presented in Jong-Dae Shin, “DPRK Perspectives on Korean 
Reunification after the July 4th Joint Communiqué” NKIDP, e-Dossier, No. 10 (July 2012) 
924 Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061084, 17 March 1973 
925 “Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET,” April 11, 1973, HPPPDA, RMFAA, Matter 220, Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding 
Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973 
926 “Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.253, Urgent, SECRET, 29 June 1973” RMFAA, Matter 220, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations 
between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, 16 January – 30 July 1973, presented in Shin, 
“DPRK Perspectives”  
927 Armstrong, “Juche”, pg. 8 
928 “Information on the Talks between Kim Il Sung and Todor Zhivkov,” June 18, 1975, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 294/78 
 136 
and peaceful unification, including non-interference from allies. Building from these 
same principles, in April 1973, the KWP CC penned a letter to Congress calling for 
troop withdrawal and a cessation of military aid and joint war games.929  
 
Before Pyongyang could further press for direct talks however, it would first need to 
justify ending dialogue with Seoul. The abduction of Kim Dae-Jung by KCIA 
officials in August 1973 provided just such a pretext.930 Shortly thereafter, on October 
23, DPRK naval craft began crossing the Northern Limit Line (NLL), an extension of 
the DMZ into the Yellow Sea (and would do so 43 times that year alone). These 
incursions were accompanied by assaults on UNC personnel in the JSA and along the 
DMZ.931 In December, the North went on to reject the NLL and claim ownership of 
five Northwest Islands, asserting ROK ships traveling to the islands were in violation 
of the armistice.932 The aim, it appears, was to heighten tensions and prod Washington 
into direct talks under the guise of ROK instigations. 933 Tellingly, while Kim rejected 
a January proposition by Park for a North-South non-aggression pact, on March 25, 
1974, DPRK Foreign Minister Heo Dam proposed a U.S.-DPRK peace agreement.  
 
These moves were orchestrated in response to both the failure of North-South talks to 
achieve DPRK objectives, as well as the November 1973 UN General Assembly 
consensus on the Korea Question that while seen a “success”, given it was an 
alternative to the ROK proposal, had still failed to deal with U.S. withdrawal.934 U.S. 
officials therefore noted how “provocative action over the islands…has the quality of 
an effort by Pyongyang to assert its case for further action against the U.N. and U.S. 
presence in Korea.” While China had most likely gained Kim’s support for the UN 
resolution by revealing the U.S. had “privately indicated a willingness to reconsider 
the future of the UNC after this session of the GA,” Kim, “not fully trusting 
Peking…appears to want to force our hand”, with the NLL conflict an attempt to “act 
somewhat independently of Peking in calling attention to the remaining issues where 
it seeks U.N. and U.S. action.”935 This may have also had the dual success of quelling 
anger within the military, which had been opposed to talks in the first place and felt 
justified in their stance following their collapse in 1973.936 
 
The North’s military adventurism in the mid-1970s was therefore categorically 
different from the 1960s. While previously the aim had been to use military 
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operations to directly facilitate a Southern uprising, in the 1970s they were 
coordinated with diplomatic overtures to Washington in the hope negotiations would 
generate troop withdrawal. Analogous to the 1960s however, Pyongyang was acting 
in defiance of Soviet and Chinese interests. China, for one, was focused on Détente 
and did not wish to see hostilities flare on the Peninsula. Moreover, retrospective 
analysis by the GDR in 1977 noted it had been rumored China actually professed 
support for Washington’s ongoing deployment to counter the Soviets,937 a position 
Pyongyang seems to have been aware of since 1973, as seen above. North Korea was 
therefore directly contradicting calls for restraint and what it knew to be Beijing’s 
objectives. The Socialist bloc meanwhile also held a negative view938 given what they 
saw to be the adverse consequences of the North’s actions.939  
 
While the North did have some limited success – in March 1974, UN Command was 
replaced with U.S. and Korean military personal, the aim being to allow for direct 
talks with Pyongyang through the Military Armistice Commission – Washington 
appears to have never seriously considered an agreement outside of the ROK.940  
Increased tensions following another failed assassination on President Park in 1974 
further dampened these talks, despite the fact the would-be assassin, Mun Segwang, 
had acted independently. Seoul’s admonishment of Pyongyang, coupled with the 
discovery of elaborate DPRK infiltration tunnels under the DMZ a few weeks later, 
only heightened tensions.  
 
It is within this backdrop that one must view the August 1976 Axe Murder incident as 
well as Kim’s trip to Beijing in April 1975. 941  Both events, it is argued, were last-
ditch ploys to finally force the U.S. into direct talks while also representing a broader 
split in Sino-DPRK relations. They also showcase how North Korea, while 
responding to material realities, did so through the context of national narrative.  
 
Kim’s trip to Beijing was aimed at “coordinat[ing] future policy towards South Korea 
with the PRC.”942 While the specifics of these meetings are unverified, GDR analysis 
from 1977 stated that during the trip, China denied Kim’s request for a “military 
solution to the problem of Korean unification”, dampening DPRK-PRC relations.943 
While the official communiqué noted a “complete congruence of opinion”, there was, 
in actuality, a large disagreement.944 As relations with Moscow were cool throughout 
the 1970s,945 the GDR concluded Kim had little alternative but to acquiesce. When 
looking at the larger context of DPRK policy at this time, however, the extent to 
which the North desired an actual invasion seems questionable.  
 
Original GDR analysis noted only that Kim “made extremely aggressive 
                                                
937 "On Relations between DPRK and PRC," November 17, 1977, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA C 6857 
938 "Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.076," February 21, 1974, HPPPDA, RMFAA, Matter 
220/Year 1974/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Telegrams from Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; "Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.079," February 25, 1974, HPPPDA, 
RMFAA, Matter 220/Year 1974/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Telegrams from Pyongyang to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January – December 1974  
939 "Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537" 
940 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 171 
941 Ria Chae, “East German Documents on Kim Il Sung’s April 1975 Trip to Beijing” Wilson Center, NKIDP (May, 2012)  
942 "On the Visit of a DPRK Party and Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China from 18 to 26 April 
1975," April 29, 1975, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, 300/78  
943 "On Relations between DPRK and PRC," November 17, 1977, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA C 6857  
944 "Summarized Evaluation of Kim Il Sung's Visit to the PR China (18 to 26 April 1975)," May 06, 1975, HPPPDA, PolA AA, 
MfAA, C 6857 
945 For example no politburo members visited the North during this period. Cha, The Impossible, pg. 28 
 138 
statements”946 during his opening speech: 
 
If revolution breaks out in South Korea we…will energetically support the South 
Korean population. If the enemy recklessly launches a war, we will decisively 
respond with war…In this struggle we will only lose the military demarcation line but 
gain the reunification of the fatherland…Peace or war in today’s Korea ultimately 
depends on the position of the United States…If the U.S. forces withdraw from South 
Korea and a democratic individual with national conscience comes to power…we 
will have a firm guarantee for a permanent peace in Korea.947  
 
Opposed to this stance, Beijing called for diplomatic initiatives aimed at removing the 
UN mandate,948 leading the GDR to conclude Beijing was “not interested in the 
DPRK’s policy of confrontation”. Given Kim’s “posturing during the end of the visit 
was much more moderate”,949 and the final communiqué only contained China’s 
position, they concluded Pyongyang had been tamed by Beijing.950 This would seem 
to indicate, however, that Pyongyang suddenly believed there was a genuine 
possibility Beijing might support an invasion, a questionable position given DPRK 
officials noted throughout the 1970s that China and Russia would not support 
renewed conflict, 951  thereby limiting access to the external support that was 
recognized as being required for the adoption of a Vietnam-inspired campaign.952 The 
North had also told allies it had little intention of invading the South.953 
 
Recognition of these material hindrances in no way detracts from expectations 
derived from national narrative; one does not expect the regime to be suicidal.  
Instead North Korea was interpreting these realities through the prism of national 
narrative. While refraining from a full invasion, Pyongyang was independently 
engaged in high-risk brinksmanship along the NLL, a policy that not only displeased 
Great Power allies (this certainly comes through in GDR reports), but also held the 
potential to quickly escalate into a broader conflict, in the event of which there were 
serious questions regarding the support Pyongyang would receive from the allies it 
was actively working against. 954 It would therefore seem that Pyongyang, unable to 
press for an invasion itself, was working against allied interests to pursue 
brinkmanship despite the very real risk of generating a larger conflict it might be left 
alone to fight (and as will be seen below, this almost occurred following the Axe 
Murder Incident). Rather than changing Pyongyang’s stance, the Beijing meeting 
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seems to have been a continuation of this brinkmanship, with Kim using the platform 
to raise tensions in an effort to compel Washington into talks. It also represented a 
widening of Pyongyang’s post-1973 rift with Beijing.955 
 
Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that throughout this period Kim 
repeatedly emphasized how “he was looking forward to seeing a revolutionary 
upheaval in South Korea, at which time North Korea was not going to be idly 
standing by.”956 Kim reiterated a similar stance after the Beijing meeting, telling 
Zhivkov “if they attack us, we are ready to fight them” but also that the West falsely 
reports the “DPRK will attack South Korea inspired by the Vietnamese victory” so as 
to justify their repression. 957   In May, DPRK Ambassador Gwon Hui-gyeong 
similarly stated, given “the obstacles generated by the presence of American troops” 
focus would be on “carry[ing] out an active fight at the United Nations and in other 
international organizations, as well as in its bilateral relations strategy, to compel the 
United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea.”958 So long as the “peaceful 
path” remained closed due to President Park, the North was thus forced to focus on 
the “military” (war) or revolutionary (southern uprising) paths to unification.959   
 
While traditional security studies struggle to account for the ease with which Kim 
seemed willing to dampen important alliance partners while simultaneously risking a 
potentially larger conflict, especially at a time the North was already weaker vis-à-vis 
Seoul, one would expect such policies in light of DPRK national narrative – especially 
in light of the three ideational threats noted above. The situation was thus reminiscent 
of Kim’s renewed clash with Khrushchev over peaceful coexistence in 1961. In 1973 
the North was again diverging from a strategic ally (China) to pursue policies it 
believed to be best positioned for achieving its own goals (unification), and 
countering ideational threats (ROK prosperity), through more aggressive means. This 
defiance culminated with the Axe Murder incident, when an argument in the JSA over 
a tree trimming by U.S. and ROK forces ended with DPRK troops killing two U.S. 
officers with axes;960 generating the exact type of confrontation Beijing and Moscow 
were opposed to.   
 
Tensions soared as both sides accused one another of premeditating the incident.961 In 
addition to infuriating Washington - Kissinger considered aerial bombardment, 
highlighting the risk of brinkmanship962 - and DPRK relations with Beijing and 
Moscow further soured.963 Beijing, while standing behind Pyongyang’s official line, 
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noted, “the North Korean comrades let themselves be caught in this provocation” 
which “did not bring any political benefits.”964 Others concluded the incident was 
most likely “an “over-reaction” by DPRK personnel involved…whose background 
probably lies in fanatical feelings of hate.”965 Despite the DPRK’s initial response, 
“declar[ing] a state of emergency…and practically defy[ing] the United States to 
attack, vowing to “crush the aggressor””966 the North’s subsequent actions were more 
docile. Following the incident, U.S. forces massed a military operation into the JSA 
and cut down the tree. “The lack of military reaction by the DPRK…was surprising” 
indicating the North “did not desire any further aggravation.”967 In talks with the U.S., 
Kim also called the incident “regrettable,”968 representing a “certain concession they 
want to keep secret from their people for matters of prestige.”969 This may have been 
the result of Chinese intervention, as Beijing sought to moderate responses to 
safeguard Détente.970  
 
While at first this sequence of events seems contradictory to national narrative, upon 
closer examination it appears to have been a final calculated gambit. With inter-
Korean dialogue frozen, China viewed as an oppositional party, and the NLL policy 
failing to incite enough impetus in Washington, fostering an incident directly 
involving U.S. soldiers, albeit in a poorly devised manner (leading some to believe it 
was the recently promoted Kim Jong Il971 who orchestrated the attack),972 was a 
means of forcing Washington into talks. Linked to this is the fact Presidential 
candidate Jimmy Carter had espoused a favorable position on withdrawal, leading the 
GDR to conclude Pyongyang “is obviously interested in fomenting the slogan “not 
our boys” in the United States…The DPRK wants to prove that the threat to peace in 
Korea…emanates from the presence of U.S. troops…and support the demand to 
negotiate and solve current problems in direct talks with the United States.”973 The 
Romanians also reported many diplomats “are not ruling out the hypothesis that the 
North Korean action was partly aimed at checking the reactions of China, the USSR 
and other friendly countries…[and] to prepare a condemnation of the United States at 
the forthcoming session of the United Nations.”974  
 
Pyongyang therefore never had an interest in further provoking a larger conflict 
against the U.S. and ROK, especially since, as the Soviets reported, Pyongyang would 
“not benefit from the agreement and support of the USSR, of China or of other 
socialist countries if it is the initiator of a regional conflagration.”975 The aim was 
always to reduce tensions through negotiations aimed at securing broader armistice 
talks. Regarding the apology, while even the somewhat lackluster reference to the 
incident as “regrettable” represented a concession within the context of DPRK 
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‘dignity’, Kim also publicly called the DPRK soldiers involved, “national heroes.”976 
In short, there was a balancing act between seeking to manipulate the incident as the 
first step towards U.S. negotiations and unification (an important component of 
national narrative) while at the same time maintaining North Korean pride.  
 
Pyongyang’s gambit failed to pay off, and perhaps further undermined its position by 
emboldening hawks in the U.S. and justifying ROK modernization and crackdowns 
on dissent. 977 Fortunately for the North, Carter would be elected in 1977 and 
announced the gradual but total withdrawal of U.S. troops. The North, for its part, 
quickly toned down anti-U.S. rhetoric and Kim went so far as to express to President 
Honecker that the North would soon triumph on the peninsula.978 This would be short 
lived however, as increased global tensions following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and revolution in Iran resulted in mounting pressure on Carter to 
backtrack on withdrawal. The 1970s was thus to end on a bleak note for Pyongyang.  
 
Before turning to the 1980s however, one last element DPRK foreign policy in the 
late 1970s is worth exploring; the fact that, in conjunction with its campaign of 
brinkmanship, Pyongyang maintained, and indeed increased, provisions of aid to 
developing countries in an effort to showcase independence from great powers despite 
its own domestic woes and high stakes diplomacy.   
 
2.2 International Aid & Combatting Great Power Chauvinism:    
 
The Axe Murder incident not only damaged Pyongyang’s relations with Moscow and 
Beijing, it also undercut the success it had enjoyed with the NAM and Third World. 
The incident, combined with Pyongyang’s use of “high pressure tactics” within the 
NAM, led to a new disenchantment with the North and the “loss [of] many 
friends.”979 Despite this setback, the North saw the rapid introduction of newly 
independent states in the 1970s as a new opportunity to assert itself as the 
representative of nationalist movements, seeking in 1977 “to establish special 
relations with those fraternal parties and socialist states that also emphasize in 
particular “independence” and “self-reliance.”980 The GDR thus remarked on “DPRK 
tendencies to become evasive in openly supporting the PRC foreign policy course” 
noting it “follows its own interests in the Non-Aligned Movement”,981 propping up 
régimes, regardless of their ideology, to maintain its image as a leader of Third World 
nationalism. Armstrong concludes, “North Korea had become, relative to the size of 
its own economy, a rather substantial contributor to African development,” seen for 
example in the wide-ranging assistance provided to Guyana and Mozambique.982   
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This of course makes even less sense for traditional security studies than DPRK aid at 
the start of the decade; the North was struggling economically, losing parity with the 
South, and was faced with an increased ROK-U.S. military presence, all while having 
undermined relations with Beijing and Moscow. To spend critical resources on states 
of little strategic importance seems strange. However the moves make sense within 
the context of DPRK national narrative, forming relations with similarly nationalist 
independent states to reassert identity at a time its image was suffering. It was also a 
way to further rebuke Great Powers (Moscow and Beijing) seeking influence amongst 
these states; the GDR noted that while both China and North Korea “tout the “great-
powers-theory” and stress the need for struggle against “hegemonism” (PRC) and 
“dominationism” (DPRK)” Pyongyang considered China to be just such a “great 
power”.983 The DPRK therefore seems to have been interested in continuing its efforts 
to forge a new bloc of nationalist independent states from which to further challenge 
superpowers, seemingly in an attempt to challenge the international system.  
 
Taken as a whole, ROK-DPRK rapprochement, operations along the NLL, the Axe 
Murder Incident and DPRK Third World aid, are best explained as efforts to achieve 
and assert DPRK national narrative, signaling a continuation in foreign policy from 
the 1950s and 1960s. This consistency was maintained despite the multitude of 
changes Pyongyang was forced to contend with by mid-1975, including Détente, 
rising animosity with China, continuously cool relations with Moscow, growing 
economic difficulties, and an increasingly developed and unified ROK. Despite these 
global and regional shifts, North Korea’s ultimate objectives and stance remained the 
same: unification under Pyongyang’s terms and an independent foreign policy 
championing non-subservience to Great Powers. Much as in the early 1960s (peaceful 
coexistence), Pyongyang’s response to systemic shifts in the 1970s (Détente) was not 
to fundamentally alter its position, but to continue with polices aimed at achieving the 
same set of objectives - often at the expense of relations with key allies.  
 
3. Challenge to “Prestige”: Terrorism & The 1980s  
 
North Korea, despite its deteriorating position, entered the 1980s with the same 
unwavering determination it had decades of the past. Rather than engage in market 
reforms like other socialist states, Pyongyang continued to rely on nationalist zeal to 
try and economically rebound, introducing a new slogan, “The Speed of the ‘80s.”984 
At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had introduced a new phase of 
the Cold War, one with renewed tensions between Moscow and Washington, the 
latter who was increasingly aligned with a reforming Beijing under the new 
leadership of Deng. The unity of the Third World and NAM was increasingly starting 
to fragment and by the mid 1980s many members were seeking to replicate rapidly 
growing Asian market economies.985  
 
Regionally, following the KCIA-backed assassination of President Park in 1979, 
Chun Doo-hwan had launched a military coup and established himself firmly in 
charge of the ROK. Chun’s grip on power was bolstered not only by Carter’s 
backtracking on withdrawal, but also increased military investment under Reagan. For 
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its part, Pyongyang, unnerved986 by China’s overly friendly attitude towards the U.S., 
began to lean more towards Moscow, who was seen as finally taking a more 
acceptable U.S. posture. While this resulted in increased military and economic 
assistance, Kim was again sure to refrain from diverging too far from a middle line. 
Pyongyang was aided by the fact China sought to compete with Russia by providing 
increased military and economic assistance as well. Still, even with these influxes of 
assistance the ROK was continuing to quickly pull ahead economically and militarily. 
 
The North appears to have viewed these changes as merely altering their calculus on 
the best methods through which to pursue the same policy objectives of independence 
and unification.  Regarding the latter, the ROK’s growing success and stability made 
the potential for unification under Pyongyang a distant hope. The North therefore 
began to emphasize an interim plan aimed at helping lay the groundwork for 
unification in the future, pushing for the formation of the “Democratic Confederal 
Republic of Koryo” (DCRK), which would not “participate in any political-military 
alliance or bloc”. In contradiction to traditional security studies, Kim also proposed, 
as he had during talks around the Joint Communiqué, that North and South Korea 
“repeal all treaties and agreements with other countries detrimental to national amity, 
including military treaties concluded separately by the north and south prior to 
reunification.”987 While this did not come about, Pyongyang did push for trilateral 
talks with the U.S. and ROK, holding ten ‘preliminary’ talks with the ROK in 1980 
and high-level talks in 1981. In 1984 the North provided Seoul aid following floods 
and in 1985 members of the respective national assemblies met for the first time.  
 
Unfortunately for Pyongyang, the 1980s held further challenges. Two events in 
particular would force them to adopt more extreme measures as they desperately 
sought to safeguard national narrative; the September 1981 announcement that Seoul 
would host the 1988 Summer Olympics and the announcement just two months later 
that it would host the 1986 Asian Games. The ideational threats of these events go 
some way in accounting for the DPRK’s turn to acts of terrorism. 
 
The first was the October 1983 bombing in Rangoon in a failed assassination attempt 
on Chun. The move was very much in line with previous DPRK assassination 
programs and appears to have been a response to the increasingly threatening military 
posture of the U.S. and ROK; Washington had recently introduced an Airline Battle 
doctrine on the Korean Peninsula in conjunction with an influx in military (and 
nuclear) armaments. The incident significantly damaged Pyongyang’s already 
tarnished image (Burma severed relations) and undermined U.S.-ROK talks, which 
were not to be renewed until 1985.988 It was DPRK attempts to counteract the Asian 
Games and Summer Olympics, however, that led Pyongyang to be listed as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism. Exploring these events proves to be a particularly insightful 
exercise in revealing DPRK motivations at this time.  
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Of prime importance is the level of prestige attached to holding international events 
like the Olympics.989 When placed within the context of DPRK national narrative, this 
would have been interpreted as a fundamental challenge. The North’s reaction was 
first and foremost to protest, in coordination with Cuba,990 the IOC decision. When 
this failed, Pyongyang changed tact and tried to negotiate for joint custody with 
Seoul.991 The IOC’s representative determined this to be a method through which 
Pyongyang could showcase its “peaceful intentions and at the same time give a face-
saving opportunity…it would then be able to tell the world that they were really for 
participation but their just cause had been rejected…purely on legalistic grounds.”992 
While the IOC and ROK rejected the DPRK offer, they did agree for some sports to 
be held north of the border.993 The North iterated tentative support for this in June 
1986, but retreated to its earlier position by July 1987.994  
 
During the talks, North Korea had somewhat forebodingly indicated, “the course of 
events would definitely take a violent turn in case the situation was not diffused…by 
holding common unified Games”.995 Realizing its hopes of capturing the prestige 
associated with co-hosting had most likely been dashed, combined with the fact 
Pyongyang’s socialist allies were not only going to attend the Olympics but were also 
starting to grow relations with the South, 996 the North became resolute in its 
determination to undermine both the Asian Games and the Olympics. North Korea, 
now under the de facto run of Kim Jong Il, thus staged two bombings targeting 
civilians for the first time. The first was at Gimpo International Airport days before 
the Asian Games were due to start. The second was the bombing of Korean Airlines 
Flight 858 on November 29, 1987.  
 
In addition to terrorism, North Korea also decided to throw what limited resources it 
had left at the problem, investing heavily in domestic status projects. These projects, 
several of them left unfinished, had the effect of hollowing out the economy and, in 
conjunction with the cut off of Soviet and Chinese aid at the end of the decade, laid 
the groundwork for economic collapse in the 1990s.997 The North also sought to 
directly compete with the Olympics by hosting the World Festival of Youth and 
Students (WFYS), investing $4-9 billion dollars into the event.  
 
The notion North Korea would invest such tremendous resources in this strategic 
setting for domestic propaganda alone seems suspect, especially when cheaper 
alternatives were available; agreeing to have the 3-4 Olympic games offered by the 
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IOC in North Korea or merely citing the IOC and ROK rejection of its ground 
breaking proposal to jointly host the Olympics as being indicative of Seoul’s hostile 
stance towards peace and unification would both have sufficed for the North’s 
isolated community. While hosting the WFYS was played up for the domestic 
audience, it was also certainly aimed at the international community; an attempt to 
demonstrate it too was a great country capable of hosting prestigious events. This 
attempt to assert DPRK strength and prestige would also begin to culminate in 
another form at this time; a nuclear weapons program.  
 
4. “Modern”, “Independent” & “Self-Reliant”: The DPRK Nuclear Program 
 
Questions over the North’s nuclear weapons program have largely dominated its 
foreign policy since the 1990s. However the program itself has much deeper routes. 
While it remains inconclusive when specifically Pyongyang decided to pursue nuclear 
weapons, a few points can be drawn. For one, North Korea’s interest in at least a civil 
nuclear program dates back to the mid-1950s. Secondly, the North often cited prestige 
as embedded in its desire to acquire and develop nuclear technology; indeed 
somewhat ironically Krige shows how during this time “the Americans pitched a 
nuclear future as a ready alternative to the Marxist utopia.”998 Third, North Korea 
expressed at least an interest in a nuclear weapons program as early as the 1960s, a 
period of time its strategic position was relatively more secure. Subsequent actions 
inline with these professed interests did little to assuage outside concerns, 
undermining efforts to receive nuclear assistance despite economic incentives.  
Undeterred, North Korea maintained a ‘do it alone’ mentality early on in its nuclear 
program, seemingly due to the fact that it wanted to secure nuclear self-reliance, 
resulting in a further economic drain. All of this in turn holds key insights into 
possible rationales behind its decision to go nuclear.  
 
4.1 Origins:  
 
Pyongyang’s relationship with nuclear technology dates back to the early discovery of 
uranium deposits in North Korea, the result of Soviets efforts to try and locate fuel for 
its own nuclear weapons program in the 1940s.999 For its part, Pyongyang knew it 
would require technical assistance should it ever wish to utilize these resources.1000 
Luckily, in the early 1950s, Moscow and Washington each sought to assert their 
prowess relative to one another through the provision of nuclear technology 
assistance. Washington’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ program, which led to nuclear 
technology transfers to Taiwan in 1955 and South Korea in 1956, was therefore 
matched by Soviet aid to allies through the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. This 
included North Korea, with whom it signed an additional agreement on nuclear 
cooperation in 1956 and a 1959 agreement to establish a nuclear research facility. 
Despite this, the North’s program lagged behind both South Korea, which completed 
an experimental reactor in 1960 (Pyongyang only began construction in 1962), and 
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other socialist states that were given preferential treatment from Moscow.1001  
 
There appear to have been two motivations behind Moscow’s apprehension to fully 
support the DPRK civilian nuclear program. The first related to fears of Sino-DPRK 
collusion and the belief that aiding Pyongyang would indirectly facilitate China.1002 
Consequently, expanded DPRK operations to “develop the mining of uranium ore on 
a broad scale” as reported in 1963, outside the purview of what was required for its 
own program, was interpreted as indicative of its intentions to send fuel to China.1003 
However, there is no evidence such shipments took place and the fact that “mining 
and processing of such ore [was] extremely expensive” and they “insistently trie[d] to 
obtain information about the deposits and quality of the uranium ore mined in the 
Soviet Union”,1004 could indicate these efforts were geared toward facilitating a 
domestic nuclear program aimed at nuclear self-reliance. To this end, the second 
hindrance to cooperation was Soviet unease over DPRK nuclear intentions. 
Consequently, while the Soviets were worried about facilitating Chinese nuclear 
weapons endeavors, there is evidence that, despite a lack of technical knowhow, 
Pyongyang also had a genuine interest in nuclear weapons at this time.  
 
In the late 1950s, DPRK requests for Soviet nuclear assistance employed Soviet 
rhetoric, emphasizing its “peaceful purpose.”1005 However Soviet apprehension grew 
when Pyongyang refused to adopt Khrushchev’s support for nuclear arms treaties in 
1962 and the eventual Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As Pak Song Ch’ol told the 
Soviets:  
 
who can impose such a treaty on countries that do not have nuclear weapons, but are 
perhaps successfully working in that direction?...[the US] possession of nuclear 
weapons, and the lack thereof in our hands, objectively helps them, therefore, to 
eternalize their rule. They have a large stockpile, and we are to be forbidden even to 
think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons? I think that in such case the 
advantage will be on the Americans’ side.1006  
 
The DPRK also “approached other socialist ambassadors with inquiries as to where 
they could “obtain any kind of information about nuclear weapons and atomic 
industry”” 1007  and forced Soviet experts working on Pyongyang’s experimental 
reactor to give fingerprint scans and information on “their circle of relatives and 
friends…A Korean “colleague” told one of the technical experts, “if we cannot get 
you for some reason, we will get your relatives; this is why it [the questionnaire] is 
needed!””1008 In April 1963, DPRK officials stated to their Czechoslovak counterparts 
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that it would be better if the Soviets just gave Pyongyang nuclear missiles,1009 and in 
August “apparently on Chinese instructions [asked the GDR] whether they could 
obtain any kind of information about nuclear weapons and the atomic industry.”1010 It 
was also recounted in October how a DPRK engineer had approached a Soviet 
uranium specialist to inquire about the feasibility of Pyongyang constructing a nuclear 
bomb: 
 
Upon hearing the reply to the effect that the economy of the DPRK cannot cope with 
the creation of nuclear weapons, the Korean said that it would cost much less in the 
DPRK than in other countries. If we tell our workers, he declared, that we are taking 
up such a task, they will agree to work free of charge for several years.1011  
 
In 1966 Colonel Latyshev, a subordinate to the Soviet military attaché in North Korea, 
therefore concluded that while initially the DPRK military was “influenced by the 
strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare” in 1966 they “introduced the study of 
military experiences involving missiles and nuclear weapons, under the circumstances 
of both offensive and defensive struggles.”1012 In March 1967 it was also reported 
Pyongyang “did not agree with [the Soviet standpoint concerning the agreement on 
nuclear non-proliferation], but would not attack and criticize it openly,1013 and in 
December that the DPRK held negative attitude towards “disarmament and the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons” the result of “their general negative attitude toward 
the problem of the relaxation of international tensions” and policy “they adopted back 
in 1962…of "arming the entire people and turning the entire country into a 
fortress".”1014 On top of this, the Hungarian’s noted the same year that request from 
Pyongyang for nuclear power plants was declined by Moscow because of the formers 
refusal to provide operational data on the “experimental nuclear reactor that had been 
established with Soviet assistance” in 1965, raising questions over its use.  
 
DPRK efforts remained undeterred following unsuccessful efforts to acquire an 
“agreement on nuclear assistance” and acquisition of nuclear equipment from the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia.1015 Pyongyang thus began to associate itself more with 
Bucharest,1016 whose nuclear ambitions were also being curtailed by Moscow and 
who was subsequently seeking nuclear assistance from the West.1017 In 1968, the two 
signed a joint communiqué seemingly condemning Moscow for its failure to support 
their nuclear endeavors. 1018  While Romania would eventually sign onto the NPT 
later that year, North Korea would not do so until 1985, disregarding direct Soviet 
efforts to have Pyongyang change course. For example, the Soviets: 
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asked the Korean comrades whether they thought that it would be a good thing if, for 
instance, Japan – which possesses the required industrial and technical capacity – 
obtained nuclear weapons. In this concrete case the Korean comrades naturally 
acknowledged that nuclear nonproliferation was justified, but in general they did not 
(by which they actually give veiled support to the Chinese position)...1019 
 
The divergence from Great Power allies is interesting in it own right, but the context 
and implications of this move are perhaps more telling. For one Pyongyang, by not 
only expressing an interest in nuclear weapons technology but also acting in a manner 
that was a cause for concern to allies - only to then take a more belligerent stance 
following Soviets efforts to discourage such behavior, effectively undermined its 
ability to extract nuclear support despite a growing need for energy assistance by 
1968.1020  Indeed, North Korea had failed to invest in (and did not posses even in the 
1990s) a power grid capable of handling nuclear energy,1021 further suggesting the 
entire program was intended to boast of nuclear energy and/or to use in military 
programs.  
 
Secondly, while Pyongyang’s stance towards the NPT aligned with China, Sino-
DPRK relations were at this time on the brink of armed conflict (Ch. 5), suggesting 
the North should have remained closer to the Soviets. Refusing to adopt a more docile 
nuclear stance, Pyongyang instead focused on investing in domestic nuclear initiatives, 
despite costs associated with such a program1022 and questionable strategic needs for 
such a weapons system (the North still enjoyed parity with South Korea and indeed 
may have felt superior as the above overview on the Joint Communiqué 
demonstrates). While the argument could be made there was an interest in nuclear 
deterrence given turbulent relationships with Moscow (early 1960s) and Beijing (late 
1960s), the deterioration of these relationships is best understood as the result of 
DPRK narrative maintenance. Subsequent nuclear policies were therefore either an 
offshoot (responding to their security implications) and/or also linked to narrative 
assertion of a modern, advanced, self-reliant state.1023 Given the deterrence credibility 
of a few nuclear weapons with no delivery mechanism is highly suspect (as explored 
below), the ideational factors become even more persuasive.  
 
To this end, Szalontai suggests Pyongyang seems to have been inspired by Beijing’s 
domestic nuclear weapons program initiated in the early 1960s and the construction of 
nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe, all of which demonstrated the potential for 
“nuclear self-reliance”.1024 It was reported in 1967 how “[a]fter each experimental 
nuclear test in China the Korean leadership sent Peking a congratulatory 
telegram.” 1025  Nuclear energy and, perhaps more importantly, weapons, were 
therefore viewed as showcasing the North as an advanced, modern, independent 
nation; in a conversation in December 1969 between the GDR and DPRK ambassador 
the latter, “stressing the need to “hack off the US imperialists’ dick,” had muttered 
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“We must prove that our atomic bombs are the better ones.”1026  
 
It would therefore appear as though Pyongyang had a genuine interest in, and was 
attempting to make inroads towards, a nuclear weapons program throughout the 
1960s. This was linked to its desire to both boost its international image and prestige 
while also acquiring nuclear self-reliance. Events in the 1970s should therefore be 
viewed as compounding Pyongyang’s preexisting interests in (if not efforts at) nuclear 




The 1970s witnessed growing fears over possible Japanese and ROK nuclear weapons 
program, both of which would have spurred on DPRK interest in nuclear weapons.1027 
Szalontai suggests this might have led Kim to express to his ROK counterparts during 
talks in 1972 that “the two Koreas ought to work together to develop nuclear 
weapons”; a ploy to feel out ROK nuclear progress following construction of its first 
nuclear plant in 1971.1028 The DPRK subsequently began to repeatedly raise concerns 
over Seoul from 1975 onwards. 1029  However ROK nuclear weapons ambitions 
seemingly ended that year when the U.S. pressured France to halt delivery of a 
reprocessing plant and forced ROK ratification of the NPT, potentially dampening the 
impact this may have had on DPRK nuclear aspirations. While Pyongyang did call on 
states to cease providing Seoul with assistance that could allow it to “increase its 
armament capacity and create a military nuclear potential” during the 1977 World 
Conference for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, it is unclear if this was done out 
of genuine concern or for posturing.1030 
 
In addition to regional concerns, some have argued DPRK nuclear rhetoric throughout 
the 1970s was partially aimed at brinkmanship, an attempt to push the U.S., China, 
and Russia to finally deal with the Korea problem. Szalontai thus notes how 6 months 
before the Axe Murder Incident the DPRK claimed, indirectly to Moscow through the 
Hungarians, that they had already “manufactured by themselves” nuclear weapons 
and carrier missiles “targeted at the big cities of South Korea and Japan”.1031 Then, in 
January 1977, another declaration was made describing the Peninsula as on the brink 
of nuclear war and that the “DPRK is equipping itself with nuclear weapons”, a 
statement the Hungarians linked to “sound[ing] out the Carter administration’s plans 
for Korea.”1032 Szalontai further links these statements as an effort to ensure U.S. 
troop withdrawal would be discussed during the Carter-Gromyko talks in September; 
the Korean’s also temporally halted pestering the Soviets for nuclear assistance in the 
immediate run up to the talks1033 “because they knew all too well how much it 
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irritated Moscow.” 1034 
 
While potentially using the prospect of nuclear war to force talks on the Korean 
question, a sentiment that aligns with much of the above analysis, this in no way 
suggests DPRK nuclear interests/efforts were only a diplomatic guise or pawn. They 
were a continuation of its 1960s nuclear policy, with the North demanding access to 
nuclear technology and support while remaining indignant towards any forms of 
oversight and firmly opposed to nonproliferation treaties, a position Clemens suggests 
was buoyed by India’s nuclear weapons success (and recognition as a de facto nuclear 
power) in the early 1970s.1035 Seoul thus reported in 1976 how Pyongyang was 
“having talks about this issue [acquiring nuclear reactors] in order to become capable 
of producing atomic weapons in the future,”1036 while Soviet intelligence reported in 
the late 1970s that Kim “instructed the Ministry of Public Security to initiate a nuclear 
weapons program at expanded Yongbyon facilities (Oberdorfer 1997, 253).”1037 
Tellingly, in January 1976, a DPRK trade delegation was again refused nuclear 
assistance for “various reasons – primarily military considerations and the amount of 
the investment” [emphasis added].1038  Further requests for nuclear power plants in 
June were also rebuffed1039 while Pyongyang maintained “less than harmonious” 
relations with Moscow in the IAEA following its admittance in 1974.1040  
 
DPRK nuclear policy at this time is again especially interesting given the larger 
framework it took place in. In particular, there was an increasingly dire need for 
electricity, with the 1973 oil crisis and “scantiness of rainfall [in 1975 and 1976] 
produc[ing] a substantial effect on the production of electrical energy”.1041  This 
further compounded energy concerns and stunted Pyongyang’s ability to uphold its 
trade balance with Moscow. North Korea was also concerned with Seoul, whose 
nuclear progress it continued to try and obstruct,1042 and asked Moscow, for “reasons 
of prestige” to provide a nuclear power plant; somewhat ironically Pyongyang was 
congruently blaming Moscow’s pricing policies for it economic woes.1043   
 
Consequently, while North Korea could have benefitted immensely from an influx in 
nuclear assistance and investment into a nuclear-compatible electric grid, its refusal to 
adjust its stances/rhetoric ensured repeated calls for nuclear aid were rebuffed by both 
Moscow1044 and socialist states.1045  As its economic woes deteriorated throughout the 
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1970s, the consequences of self-reliance also became further apparent, with the 
Soviets taking “every possible opportunity to make the Korean side understand that it 
is the COMECON countries that have priority when [the Soviets] decide on 
unexpected demands.”1046 On one hand you thus had the North’s dire economic 
problem and need for energy assistance, on the other, its commitment to leaving room 
for the pursuit of nuclear weapons and nuclear self-reliance, as well as its ongoing 
fixation with prestige and image vis-à-vis South Korea. A 1979 Hungarian report best 
sums up the DPRK position: 
 
If we compare the output of electric power generation that South Korea plans to reach 
by the end of 1986 with that of the DPRK…[it] is about three times that of the DPRK. 
This may explain why, from this year on, but also earlier, the DPRK strongly urged 
the socialist countries…to provide it with equipment for nuclear power plants or even 
to build a nuclear power plant. It tries to make up for its lag behind South Korea in 
this way, with the hidden intention that later it may become capable of producing an 
atomic bomb.1047 
 
In short, DPRK interests in nuclear weapons technology, first pursued in the 1960s, 
were compounded by its growing disparity with South Korea, and most likely by 
concerns over the possible military applications of Seoul’s nuclear achievements1048 
(though this was most likely tempered in 1975). The DPRK was thus pushing, at 
times belligerently, for assistance in its civilian nuclear program so as to maintain 
face vis-à-vis South Korea, while at the same time actively working towards a nuclear 
weapons program. Efforts towards the latter ultimately undermined the former, 
forcing the North to further divert domestic resources towards its nuclear goals while 
further sacrificing economic benefits that would have accompanied a more docile 
nuclear stance;1049 for example while planning for the 22nd IAEA conference, socialist 
state delegates “generally agreed that…the countries committed to the exclusively 
peaceful use [of nuclear energy], should be given preference in technical assistance 
[emphasis in the original].”1050  
 
Having failed to acquire assistance, but aided by years of domestic research, 
Pyongyang finally managed to begin construction on its own twenty-to thirty-
megawatt research reactor.1051  The weapons component of this program was made 
clear by the use of an RBMK reactor. As Szalontai notes, the Soviet’s had provided 
allies only with Light Water Reactors, from which it was difficult to procure weapons 
grade plutonium. By contrast, most states that had pursued nuclear weapons did so by 
using high-grade plutonium acquired from RBMK reactors.1052 Additionally, by using 
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RBMK reactors, Pyongyang avoided becoming dependent on external fuel sources; 
light water rectors require enriched uranium to function (RBMK reactors do not) 
meaning the DPRK would have been forced to rely on imported uranium from 
Moscow.  
 
With the new reactor, Pyongyang could, with “each core load…produce thirty 
kilograms of plutonium—sufficient to make five nuclear warheads. When U.S. 
intelligence spotted this operation in the mid-1980s, North Korea was already 
working on a much larger reactor”1053 Following this success, the Soviets finally came 
around to providing broader nuclear assistance and agreed to help construct a nuclear 
power plant, which Pyongyang believed would help “to offset the fact that a nuclear 
power plant is already in operation in South Korea...[and to] enhance the DPRK’s 
economic prestige in foreign eyes.”1054  
 
Soviet support had little to do with reformed DPRK behavior; Pyongyang still 
“evaded giving an unequivocal and final answer” regarding ratification of the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty in 1983.1055 Moreover, this support came prior to North Korea 
joining the NPT, suggesting this was not a precondition to Soviet assistance.1056  
Instead, the Soviets, feeling increasingly isolated and pressured by the U.S., saw the 
strategic value of placating DPRK interests. Additionally, Szalontai suggests Moscow 
“may have concluded that Pyongyang was determined to go ahead with its nuclear 
project anyway, and if they got involved in it, they would have more leverage over 
North Korea” (Moscow had adopted similar policies towards Romania following its 
nuclear advances in the 1980s).1057 Either way, the North now had further access to 
nuclear technology, propelling it towards the first nuclear crisis.  
 
4.3 1990s & First Nuclear Crisis:  
 
The North’s nuclear program is often viewed as a post Cold War phenomenon and a 
response to the North’s drastically altered strategic landscape at the start of the 1990s. 
If its attendance of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul had not been bad enough, Pyongyang 
was informed in September 1990 that Moscow would be establishing relations with 
South Korea. This was followed by Moscow’s cessation of military assistance in 1991, 
the official collapse of the USSR that December, and Yeltsin’s decision in 1992 to 
rescind Russia’s “automatic intervention” stance vis-à-vis North Korea. Beijing for its 
part also normalized relations with Seoul in 1991 and ceased providing “friendship 
prices” to the North, resulting in a dramatic drop in bilateral trade. As Cha notes, even 
though Pyongyang was more dependent than ever on Beijing following the collapse 
of the USSR, it was also “deeply offended by China’s decision to normalize relations” 
with Seoul, resulting in a period of “non-dialogue for almost 10 years.”1058 Then, in 
1994, Kim Il Sung passed away.  
 
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that North Korea’s strategic landscape was drastically 
altered in the 1990s. However it would be a mistake to view these changes as the 
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ultimate motivation behind a nuclear program decades in the making, as many 
scholars and policymakers have.1059 The argument that DPRK insecurity forced it to 
seek out deterrence is also a problematized view. According to classic deterrence 
theory, North Korea would only be able to feel secure once it had acquired a second 
strike capability; a few nuclear weapons with questionable delivery methods does not 
cut the bill, leading to questions over the ““deterrent” or “provocative” effect of small 
nuclear arsenals”.1060 It is also particularly insightful that Pyongyang pursued nuclear 
weapons while under the nuclear umbrella of Beijing and Moscow. If, in the 1970s:  
 
There was probably little reason to fear that the USSR would not honor its defensive 
commitments. Rather, Pyongyang seemed to be dissatisfied by the unwillingness of 
Moscow to support its offensive ambitions [emphasis added].1061 
 
As noted above, Pyongyang has repeatedly pursued policies contradictory to strategic 
allies (the Second Korean War, the NLL and Axe Murder, and 1980s bombings) with 
questionable reassurance of allied support in the event of larger conflicts breaking out. 
While the early interest in nuclear weapons may have been viewed in conjunction 
with this offensive mindset – an attempt to secure nuclear self-reliance to counter 
allied reluctance to support an adventurist foreign policy – questions over the ability 
to acquire genuine deterrence would have still remained. Therefore, it seems as 
though the North was equally, if not more, motivated by prestige and a desire to 
showcase itself as a modern and advanced nation equal to other states.  
 
This of course raises questions as to why the North only seems to have enjoyed 
significant progress on the nuclear front from the mid-1980s onwards. For one, 
Hyman’s argues that the form of patronage system prevalent in authoritarian states 
like North Korea makes it difficult to effectively manage and organize intricate work 
projects,1062 not to mention the vast discrepancies regarding available resources when 
compared to larger states’ nuclear programs. Hymans also notes how the emergence 
of the non-proliferation regime, coupled with concerted efforts by the U.S., Japan and 
ROK to curtail DPRK efforts going back to 1985, have similarly hindered its progress.  
Secondly, it was only after the success of Pyongyang’s domestic nuclear initiatives in 
1984 that Moscow finally came around to providing significant nuclear aid.  The 
influx in technology, coupled with its own initiatives, allowed the North to separate 
plutonium from spent fuel rods in 1989, 1990 and 1991, providing enough fissile 
material for a few nuclear bombs. This was discovered following Pyongyang’s 
ratification of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and subsequent IAEA inspections in 
1992,1063 laying the groundwork for the first nuclear crisis.  
 
Prior to this, President Bush announced the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from 
the Peninsula in September 1991 while that November ROK President Roh Tae Woo 
announced the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, pledging 
South Korea would not pursue or store nuclear weapons and unilaterally forbade 
reprocessing and enrichment facilities. This was largely seen as satisfying “all of 
                                                
1059 For an overview of the literature on the DPRK nuclear program see Andrew Scobell, “North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions,” in 
James M. Lister, ed., Challenges Posed by the DPRK for the Alliance and the Region (Korea Economic Institute, 2005) 
1060 Hymans, “Assessing”, pg. 263  
1061 Clemens, “North Korea’s”, pg. 149 
1062 Hymans, “Assessing” 
1063 Ibid, pg. 272 
 154 
North Korea’s conditions for allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.”1064 
On December 31, both Koreas signed onto the South-North Joint Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, under which they pledged not to produce 
or possess nuclear weapons or reprocessing facilities. However, following IAEA 
revelations regarding discrepancies in reported DPRK nuclear material, and 
Pyongyang’s rejection for additional inspections of facilities believed to be housing 
separated plutonium, the situation on the Peninsula grew tense, with Pyongyang 
threatening to leave the NPT and Washington drawing up plans for potential military 
strikes. Finally, in 1994, after a series of talks, both Pyongyang and Washington 
agreed to the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Frameworks. This froze North Korea’s reactors and 
reprocessing facilitates while Washington pledged to provide light water reactors, oil 
shipments and a move towards normalized relations. 
 
The Agreement, as we now know, was not to last. A Republican dominated Congress 
held up Washington’s ability to implement its side of the deal, leading to delays in oil 
shipments and construction of the light water reactors. However, there are also 
questions behind North Korean sincerity. In 1992 Pyongyang began to cooperate with 
Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, with Pakistani officials (in search of missile technology) 
travelling to North Korea to view prototypes of the No-dong missile. By 1995 the two 
sides had agreed for North Korea to transfer 12-15 missiles to Pakistan throughout 
1996-1997. Fitzpatrick notes that it is assumed centrifuge technology was most likely 
provided by Pakistan in turn.1065 Consequently, while the North did dismantle large 
portions of its plutonium nuclear infrastructure, by 1998, it had begun a secret Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) Project, the discovery of which in 2002 led to the second 
nuclear crisis. Given the program seems to be linked to the agreement with Pakistan, a 
process started in 1992, DPRK intentions towards the Agreed Framework are 
questionable, though Washington’s default certainly played a role.    
 
Conclusions:   
 
Much as in the 1950s and 1960s, DPRK policies throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
consistently placed ideational goals over material or traditional security 
considerations. To this end there was continuity in DPRK policy despite drastic 
changes in its strategic environment and the international system. The North remained 
committed towards forcing unification, and later the creation of an independent 
Korean Confederation. Its subsequent policies of brinkmanship undermined alliances 
and posed the potential for a conflict with the U.S. at a time the North was 
economically collapsing, had lost parity with Seoul, and had little commitment of 
allied intervention. At the same time, Pyongyang continued to invest both 
internationally and domestically into endeavors to propagate itself as a leader of 
independent states and as equally prestigious as Seoul, while at the same time turning 
to terrorism in an effort to dampen the latters success. Endeavors to acquire nuclear 
technology, dating back to the 1950s/1960s, were also further accelerated and, much 
like its other investments, seem to have been focused on advancing the DPRK’s 
image. Overall, while the North was not ambivalent to geostrategic changes, its 
responses are best accounted for through the prism of national narrative.  
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From North Korea’s formative years in the 1940s, through to the nuclear crisis of the 
1990s, the empirical record – both tangible policies and diplomatic correspondence – 
reveals how Pyongyang has consistently championed ideationally motivated policies 
often at the expense of more traditional security goals. Consequently, DPRK behavior 
is found to be best accounted for within the context of national narrative; that is as an 
effort to protect and promote narrative. This is not to say Pyongyang discounted the 
international system or balance of power, but that it perceived its strategic terrain 
through the prism of national narrative, often leading to behavior contradictory to 
traditional security study expectations. By contrast, the alignment between the 
behavioral expectations derived from Chapters 2 and 3 and discourse analysis in 
Chapter 4 with the analytical findings in Chapter 5 and 6 validates the thesis’ 
argument regarding the need for an OS framework in security studies. In short, the 
framework provided a more holistic account of DPRK foreign policy, one that could 
hold fruitful analytical insights into a range of other case studies. From this, a number 
of other key points can also be drawn out.  
 
The first deals with possible limitations in the analysis, including North Korea’s 
seemingly unusual behavioral patterns and distinct domestic power structure. It is 
argued, however, that this is linked to North Korea’s unique national narrative. 
Consequently, states with seemingly more ‘conventional’ foreign policies, or 
ascribing to more democratic power structures, are still subject to the scope of the 
framework, with behavioral differences linked to variances in national narratives. 
Interesting questions do arise, however, regarding the extent to which debates on sub 
narratives in more democratic societies might allow for greater policy shifts than in 
the DPRK, as well as the prospect for DPRK narrative maintenance in the wake of its 
famine in the 1990s. This in turn raises questions over the important role of past 
humiliations in narrative and the possibility to export some of the findings to states 
with similar histories as North Korea, especially in light of recent work in 
postcolonial studies. Last but not least, the framework’s reconceptualization of state 
interest and perceptions holds important implications for literature on conflict 
resolution generally, and for policy debates on North Korea specifically.   
 
1. Empirical Results & Ontological Security 
 
Analysis on the DPRK’s historical record indicates a preference for ideational goals 
and objectives over those rooted in more traditional security studies. Tracing through 
the five principle expectations for North Korean behavior drawn out from traditional 
security studies (Ch. 4) helps to underscore this point.  
 
1. Unable to balance against the ROK/U.S. internally, North Korea should 
predominately focus on external balancing, with fighting alone seen as a last option. 
 
In contrast to this expectation, North Korea preferred to fight alone during the Korean 
War, delaying the intervention of Chinese forces and then undermining their ability to 
join the war effort due to concerns of sovereignty. Despite the war greatly weakening 
DPRK capabilities, Pyongyang quickly engaged in nationalist economic polices bent 
on ascertaining economic self-reliance, undermining support from the Soviet Union to 
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again ‘go it alone’. Efforts to safeguard these policies further strained DPRK relations 
with Moscow and Beijing whom had sought to curtail domestic crackdowns, leading 
to decreased aid and discussions of possible régime change. After solidifying their 
nationalist position, Kim’s faction subsequently turned their attention to unification, 
engaging in unilateral offensive policies throughout the 1960s and 1970s that 
repeatedly contradicted the strategic interests of Moscow and Beijing. This often 
threatened to leave North Korea either isolated (in a similar fashion to Albania), in a 
possible conflict with allies (China in the late 1960s), or fighting a Great Power 
adversary on its own (DPRK brinkmanship in the 1970s). The North’s nuclear 
program similarly had a ‘go it alone mindset’. To this end, undeterred by Soviet 
opposition to its rather bellicose nuclear postures, and willing to divert tremendous 
resources into a nuclear program that resulted in reduced (and sorely needed) 
economic and energy support, Pyongyang continued with a domestic program that 
finally made breakthroughs in the 1980s, only after which did Moscow come around 
to providing support.  
 
2. Given the balance of power on the Peninsula and the international system, North 
Korea should have retained a defensive posture, fearing the Soviets would not be 
chain-ganged into a larger conflict initiated by Pyongyang, and sought to solidify its 
alliance with major powers as much as possible.  
 
This was certainly not the case in the Korean War, when Kim pushed for invasion 
long before it was strategically feasible, and when the more sensible action was to 
defensively balance against U.S.-ROK forces. The subsequent Soviet refusal to join 
the war effort, coupled with the 24hr period Kim believed he had be completely 
abandoned by allies, would surely have stayed in the minds of the DPRK leadership, 
undermining the extent to which they could count on allied support for future 
adventurism. Despite this, Pyongyang sought to lay the groundwork in the early 
1960s for a renewed offensive unification strategy despite the continued presence of 
U.S. forces, relative parity with ROK forces, and the fact these polices undermined 
relations with Moscow. This eventually culminated into the Second Korean War. 
While relations with Moscow had somewhat improved by this time, the Soviets 
remained opposed to open hostilities. Moreover, relations with China had at this time 
drastically deteriorated over perceived attempts by Beijing to establish ‘feudalistic’ 
relations.  Consequently, at the same time North Korea was in the thralls of the 
Second Korean War, much to the displeasure of Moscow, it was also contending with 
a possible armed conflict with China. To this end, not only did Pyongyang allow 
ideational interest to trump relations with key alliance partners, it also pursued 
offensive policies while engaged in these disputes despite the inhospitable 
geopolitical landscape for such endeavors and the risk of escalation with the U.S. via 
the USS Pueblo and EC-121. The 1970s policy of brinkmanship was similarly 
undertaken despite questions over allied commitment to intervene should a wider 
conflict erupt, as it almost did in 1976. While by the 1980s ROK-DPRK disparity 
eliminated the potential for unification under Pyongyang’s terms, it was at this time 
the North’s nuclear weapons program finally made significant progress, culminating 
into the first nuclear crisis. The fact Pyongyang was far from capable of claiming a 
genuine nuclear deterrence raises significant questions over purely ‘defensive’ 
motivations, with the nuclear program instead partially linked to ideational incentives.  
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All of this would seem to indicate that North Korea did recognize, and to some extent 
respect, the balance of power; it did not undertake a full invasion during the Second 
Korean War in the 1960s or during its campaign of brinkmanship in the 1970s, and 
shifted to advocating for a Confederation by the 1980s. However, it is difficult to 
account for those actions the DPRK did undertake from a traditional security study 
perspective, suggesting a more nuanced view, as provided by the OS framework, is 
required. Pyongyang thus responded to material facts, but did so through the prism of 
national narrative, resulting in an aggressively independent stance. 
 
3. Given this security dependency one would also expect the DPRK to, for its own 
survival, not chastise or jeopardize its relationship with the Soviet bloc. At the same 
time, North Korea could free-ride given its inability to independently alter strategic 
calculations in a meaningful way.  
 
North Korea has repeatedly undermined relations with key allies and refrained from 
free-riding. In the 1950s it undermined economic assistance by pushing a nationalist 
economic line. In the early 1960s it increased defense expenditure despite 
questionable strategic rationale, while distancing itself from its largest benefactor, the 
USSR, and was reportedly prepared for excommunication much like Albania. The 
result was a stunted defensive infrastructure and reduced Soviet aid, both of which 
increased economic strain. This military investment continued after the reintroduction 
of Soviet military assistance (following the ouster of Khrushchev) something allies 
viewed as unnecessary and a major cause of its economic difficulties. Kim’s renewed 
neutrality was then short-lived, shifting towards Moscow given Beijing’s attempts to 
forge a ‘feudalistic’ relationship, a decision that almost resulted in armed conflict. In 
spite of this, Pyongyang not only continued to ratchet up tensions along the DMZ, 
much to the displeasure of the Soviets, it went so far as to directly contradict Soviet 
interests by capturing the USS Pueblo. Renewed DPRK aggression along the NLL 
and in the DMZ following the failure of diplomatic talks in the 1970s were similarly 
conducted against the interest of Beijing (in the midst of détente) and Moscow, with 
whom Pyongyang had cool relations with throughout the decade. 
 
North Korea has not only undermined key alliances, it has propositioned dissolving 
them entirely, as seen during talks over the Joint Communiqué in the 1970s and in 
efforts to form a Confederation in the 1980s. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s it also 
took the unusual step of becoming a source of support for seemingly non-strategic 
states, particularly in Africa, while simultaneously placing ideological-based limits on 
the acquisition of sorely need capitol via international trade. This was linked to its 
efforts to cultivate more of a leadership role amongst the NAM and Third World, 
from which it seems to have hoped to challenge the influence of Great Powers. This 
not only angered allies, it would seem to indicate North Korea’s interest in altering 
the international system. In the backdrop to all of this was the DPRK nuclear program, 
which was a persistent concern for the Soviets. As early as the 1960s, the DPRK 
refusal to commit to non-proliferation, or allow for oversight of what nuclear aid it 
did receive, led to serious concerns over its intentions. Incessant requests for nuclear 
assistance, despite its refusal to adopt more amenable postures, perturbed and angered 
Moscow to no end, and it was only after North Korean domestic success that Moscow 
came around to providing substantial aid in the hopes of maintaining some influence.  
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4. Focused on maintaining the bipolar system and ensuing “that no crisis gets so out 
of hand that it leads to war. 
 
The extent to which North Korea maintained this position as a main objective of its 
foreign policy is questionable. It certainty did oppose Soviet peaceful coexistence as 
might be expected. However, it also supported direct confrontations with the U.S. on 
all fronts, in particular in regards to Vietnam. Pyongyang contributed what little 
resources it could (Kim would later claim this had a negative impact on the economy) 
and chastised the Soviets, and later Chinese, for not doing more. The Koreans also 
originally supported Sino-U.S. Détente (as opposed to most other states), believing 
this provided a chance to push for U.S. withdrawal from the Peninsula. Last but not 
least, North Korea seems to have been intent on trying to formulate a bloc of like-
minded nationalist states from which to further challenge great power chauvinism. 
 
5. Regarding the Sino-Soviet split North Korea should seek to be nonaligned or 
balance against/bandwagon with China. 
 
As seen above, North Korea was far from ‘neutral’ during the split. At the same time 
it never fully balanced or bandwagoned, despite the serious implications stemming 
from its responses to perceived ideational threats. North Korean shifts thus had little 
to do with efforts to extract aid or ‘play’ one side off the other. Instead, in the early 
1960s Kim “shifted from a neutral position to one markedly closer to China” due to 
ideological disagreements with peaceful coexistence, knowing all too well Beijing 
would be unable to provide similar levels of support. This was also done in the 
purview of Albania’s excommunication from the socialist bloc, with Kim reportedly 
prepared for a similar outcome. While this did not happen, allies reported the North’s 
decision to shift from Moscow had retarded both its economic growth and its military 
forces. Positive relations only resumed following the ouster of Khrushchev and a 
return to what Kim deemed to be a more ‘acceptable’ posture by Moscow. Meanwhile 
following the CR, and the perception Beijing was trying to engage in ‘feudalistic’ 
relations, Kim again pushed back. However he also refused to fully balance against 
China so as to maintain independence, despite armed conflict almost breaking out; 
indeed Kim simultaneously continued to work against Soviet interests, as seen above.  
 
1.1 Ontological Security & Return to Foreign Policy:  
 
Following the above overview, one finds that traditional security studies failed to 
account for a number of key DPRK decisions and policies. Instead, DPRK behavior is 
best accounted for within the context of national narrative, indicating the importance 
of non-systemic factors and a need to return to a foreign-policy approach to security 
studies, though one rooted in more than blanket statements of human nature. Instead, 
by taking seriously unit level factors and individual agency, what would otherwise 
seem to be inexplicable behavior suddenly appears as a rational and concerted effort 
to assert and maintain DPRK national narrative. These findings substantiate the OS 
framework devised over Chapters 2 and 3, providing a more robust account than 
previous historical or historical-intuitionalist based works, and align with the 
behavioral expectations derived from discourse analysis outlined in Chapter 4. 
 
As expected, North Korea maintained a hypersensitivity to foreign influence, 
exploitation and Great Power chauvinism, seeking to assert its independence and 
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pride. This was often done at great expense to traditional security goals, jeopardizing 
North Korean strategic alliances, undermining access to economic and military 
support, augmenting economic woes, and risking larger conflict with Great Powers.  It 
sought to affirm economic independence, not letting international economic 
incentives hold undue sway over Pyongyang, and repeatedly sought to ‘go it alone’, in 
economics, military and nuclear power, despite an inability to internally balance 
against the U.S.-ROK alliance. This is not to say it never requested assistance in all 
these fields, but that it would not be cajoled into altering its behavior to reap rewards. 
To this end, perceived actions seen as reminiscent of, or possibly moving towards, 
feudal or colonial-esc relations, or that could be interpreted as resembling a return to 
its temporal Self or its South Korean Other, were determinedly rebuffed. Similarly, 
efforts to curtail DPRK labors to achieve unification were regarded as Great Power 
chauvinism and thus spurned, often resulting in negative consequences. North Korea 
also diverted tremendous resources into strategically questionable polices: 
militarization in 1962, a domestic nuclear program from the 1960s onwards, 
becoming a purveyor of international aid throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and 
launching world conferences and prestige projects in the 1980s.  
 
Regarding the OS framework, it can be surmised that North Korea responded to 
perceived personal crises by seeking to reassert narrative. This included the U.S. 
occupation of South Korea (Korean War); the Inchon Landing (debates on 
sovereignty undermining the war effort); de-Stalinization (nationalist economics and 
purges); peaceful coexistence (split with Moscow); Cultural Revolution (split with 
Beijing; int. aid); ROK solidification (brinkmanship; int. aid); and the Asian 
Games/Olympics (terrorism; prestige projects). The DPRK also took proactive steps 
to forge unification, develop positive relations with the NAM, and construct a nuclear 
program in line with its self-image as an advanced, modern, and independent nation.  
 
Again, these findings do not suggest North Korea was ambivalent to its geo-strategic 
position or to systemic shifts. Importantly, however, the lens through which North 
Korea perceived its strategic landscape and responded to events requires far more 
nuance than is found in traditional security studies. Consequently, while in no way 
suicidal, Pyongyang was willing to undertake policies otherwise inexplicable to 
purely systemic-based, or more classical realist, analysis. DPRK objectives also 
remained fairly consistent from the outset of the Korean War through to the early 
1990s despite the drastic changes within the North-South dyad, regional geopolitical 
shifts, and drastic alterations to the international system; while North Korean foreign 
policies changed in terms of adjustment (level of effort) and program (methods or 
means) the problem (goals) and international orientation (international role and 
activities) stayed the same. 1066  Pyongyang remained focused on asserting 
independence and sovereignty, pushing back against Great Power chauvinism – ‘self-
reliance’ – and forging a unified and independent Korea.  While systemic shifts 
altered the means through which North Korea sought to obtain these objectives, at no 
point does the North seem to have drastically deviated from these goals (even the 
1980s shift towards a Confederation adhered to these basic principles).  
 
                                                
1066 Hermann, “Changing Course” pg. 5-6 
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While all of this greatly supports the OS framework, it also helps to address the five 
components that a work on North Korea foreign policy ought to be able to 
address/account for, as first outlined in Chapter 1.   
 
1. Account for early DPRK agency and its friction with patron powers 
 
As noted on numerous occasions, DPRK decisions during the run up to and course of 
the Korean War, as well as its post-war reconstruction plan, left puzzling questions 
for both traditional security studies and for some of the literature on North Korea. 
However this early agency, and readiness to both fight alone and challenge key allies 
from an early stage, aligns with DPRK national narrative propagated by Kim Il Sung 
and his guerillas from an early stage; both during the liberation movement against 
Japan and during North Korea’s formative years.  
 
2. Account for the DPRK’s wider social and cultural attributes  
 
This same narrative in turn encapsulated the wide set of social and cultural attributes 
that have been the focus of numerous works on North Korea. The narrative derived 
from discourse analysis corresponds with the nationalistic and militaristic children 
games, daily sayings, dress, songs, and literature of North Korea vividly depicted in 
the works of, for example, Barbara Demick or Jang Jin-sung. While a conglomeration 
of Marxist-Leninism, Maoism, and Confucianism, DPRK national narrative – 
eventually codified in Juche – was an entirely distinct entity, one emphasizing not 
only non-subservience, but also Korean uniqueness, homogeneity, and pure 
bloodedness. Importantly, not all of this was forced upon the North Korean populace 
by a small contingent of elites; many had already developed anti imperialist and 
American sentiment as a result of colonization and the Korean War. There was, as 
Kang remarked, a fusion between the macro (government) and micro (daily lives of 
North Koreans), with national narrative establishing (and mirroring) a set of routines 
and rituals – in other words, a range of lifestyles – for the populace. As the DPRK’s 
ability to control society grew, it sought to further emphasize this collective memory 
and militant nationalism within all facets of life. 
 
3. Account for the formation of domestic power structures  
 
It was internal challenges to this national narrative, first in 1956 and later in 1967, that 
led Kim Il Sung to further consolidate his position, leading to the North’s unique 
domestic structure. These shifts were not merely a jockeying for sheer power; they 
were the result of substantial policy debates that represented wider fissures regarding 
national narrative. Throughout North Korea’s early years, Kim’s guerilla faction was 
but one group, albeit the dominate one, in the post-independent period. As shown in 
Chapter 4, their experiences during the campaign for liberation helped them form a 
distinctly appealing and coherent narrative that was elevated as the ideal for all 
groups, underscoring the genuine national sentiment of the populace at that time.  
 
In 1956 this dominant narrative was challenged by the CGG, a loose political 
affiliation of ethnic Koreans from Russia and Koreans who had fled to China during 
colonization. This group subsequently held a less strident form of nationalism and, 
given their background, viewed Great Powers in a far more favorable light. As North 
Koreans sought to forge who exactly they ‘were’, the CGG wanted to drastically alter 
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the North’s position to one markedly closer to Great Powers; strategically, 
economically, socially, and politically. Kim’s faction successfully fended off the 
CGG’s attempts to redirect North Korea’s course and refashion its identity, purging 
its members and further solidifying their power and narrative. To this end, during its 
formative years, there was still some sense of debate regarding what the North Korean 
narrative ought to entail. This debate, for the most part, became closed off following 
1956. While there was a renewed challenge to Kim’s policies following the KWP 
Second Congress in 1967, with some officials questioning ‘equal emphasis’, these 
officials were duly purged and the Monolithic Ideological System established, closing 
off once and for all any acceptable future debate.  
 
The challenge in 1956 was thus not only substantively more acute than in 1967, it was 
also conducted at a time DPRK narrative was still being crafted following liberation 
and the Korean War. By 1967, not only was a coherent narrative institutionalized, the 
scope of questioning was less of a threat. Still, in both instances, Kim’s faction 
responded to these internal ideational threats by removing from power those behind 
the counter narratives, and by seeking to further instill their position so as to 
safeguard against potential threats in the future.  It should also be noted it is unknown 
the level of support these counter narratives might have received in broader public 
debate; in 1956 they were propagated by entities whose pasts – having lived in either 
Russia or China – were different than those of the wider North Korean populace that 
had rallied around Kim in the post liberation years given his ability to put forward a 
widely resonating narrative.  
 
4. Account for the continued emphasis on Juche and continuities in DPRK behavior 
over time and across different circumstances 
 
A combination of the fusion between the macro and micro, combined with the ability 
of Kim Il Sung’s faction to combat internal policy/narrative debates, allowed for the 
solidification of North Korean national narrative, eventually codified in Juche. While 
the term itself was not employed until 1955, and did not come into common usage 
until later – culminating into the 1972 Juche constitution – its foundational tenants 
corresponded with the narrative propagated by Kim from much earlier. Juche 
therefore became in many ways a catchall phrase for DPRK national narrative and, 
given the persistence of this narrative, it maintained an important function in DPRK 
policy deliberations. It therefore became the prism through which the North 
responded to events and planned for the future, resulting in consistent behavior. 
 
5. Explain How and Why Juche influences foreign policy decision-making 
 
While historical works on North Korea have started to reveal the importance of 
DPRK history and the ideology of Juche in explaining past events, their works did not 
grapple with questions of how and why. By contrast, the OS framework explicitly 
broke down why national narrative (and Juche) is so important and how specifically it 
comes to impact foreign policy decision-making. To this end, as policymakers’ re-
present new information they seek to determine if it is threatening or non-threatening 
to the norm – i.e. national narrative. Those events re-presented and then interpreted as 
negative take on negative qualities - a negative image - leading to appropriate 
schemas and postures. An OS threat will in turn be perceived when: 1) there is 
competing historical representations of the past central to national narrative, 2) there 
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is alternative narratives pertaining to a certain place and what that place should/should 
not be, and 3) the failure of one narrative to adequately recognize another. At the 
same time, North Korea would proactively try and gain recognition of its narrative.  
 
The framework therefore provides a more holistic account of DPRK behavior than 
traditional security studies while also accounting for the five components necessitated 
by a work on DPRK foreign policy.  North Korea’s position as the seeming antithesis 
of modernity also bolsters the claim that works on OS need not be focused solely on 
modernity. In doing so, however, it also highlights to some extent the peculiarity of 
North Korea as a case study. Consequently, a few limitations/implications stemming 
from the empirical findings should be elaborated on. 
 
2 Limitations of Findings & Further Implications  
 
There are roughly three sets of limitations/implications that stem out of the empirical 
analysis. The first relates to North Korea’s power structures and the impact this had 
on narrative stability. The second relates to more specific questions on the future of 
North Korea, in particular what impact the famine from 1994-1998  might have on 
narrative and the population of North Korea. The third relates to the relationship 
between DPRK behavior and the unique content of its national narrative and the 
potential to extrapolate the findings to other postcolonial or ‘humiliated’ states.  
 
2.1 Power Structures:  
 
North Korea is often characterized by its extreme centralization and firm grasp over 
the socialization of its populace. This power structure seems to have had two 
important implications for the case study. For one, it allowed for a rather continuous 
national narrative, possibly resulting in less policy flux than may have occurred had 
sub narratives been allowed to openly compete. In more democratic societies, one 
might then find some deviations in state policy depending on if one sub narrative is in 
power as opposed to another, for example the Neoconservative ideology of the 
George W. Bush administration. 1067  Secondly, the DPRK narrative became 
increasingly entangled – to a greater degree than other states – with the legitimacy of 
the regime. As Juche became a ‘philosophy’ in the 1970s, and took on religious 
qualities in the 1980s, it therefore became increasingly hard for the regime to deviate 
from the narrative, given its function in legitimatizing the leadership and its portrayal 
of the infallibility of the Kim regime, a sentiment linked to its ongoing “epic struggle 
against the impermanent nature of charismatic authority”.1068 This all leads to the first 
set of limitations and questions. 
 
1. Given the structure of the DPRK, questions remain over to what extent derivative 
narratives championed by political parties in more democratic states result in 
behavioral deviations – i.e. to what extent do they expand or retract the scope of what 
might be perceived as an OS threat and/or goals the state should be working 
towards.1069 For example, Holsti writes in regards to role conceptions how “[i]t is easy 
                                                
1067 At the same time, “few Democrats today dispute his fundamental point that America has a responsibility to order the world, 
presumably for the benefit of all.” Boyle, “Utopianism”, pg.83; see also Krebs, Narrative, pg. 13-14 
1068 Kown and Chung, North Korea, pg. 4 
1069 To this end Steele has begun to investigate the overlap between ontological security and organizational processes within sates, 
looking at discursive debates over the CIA’s use of torture in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Brent J. Steele, “Organizational 
processes and ontological (in)security: Torture, the CIA and the United States” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.52, No. 1 (2017) 
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to speculate that had Hubert Humphrey been elected president in 1968, some of his 
foreign policy decisions might have differed substantially from those taken by 
Richard Nixon. It is unlikely, however, that he would have changed the United States' 
established national role conceptions, such as developer, defender of the faith, or 
regional protector.”1070 Thus as governments come and go, to what extent do they 
change the national narrative, and thus foreign policy.  
 
Linked to this is are remaining questions over to what extent domestic 
questions/challenges to national narrative are more or less threatening than external 
challenges. In North Korea, Kim’s faction seems to have viewed both as equally 
threatening but it is not clear if this would be found in other case studies. In 1956 the 
CGG certainly did pose a threat to the very foundation of DPRK narrative, a threat 
that might have led to similar responses in other states still in their formative years 
and/or dealing with larger ideational debates; for example Huysmans has written how 
internal others that challenge norms and become threats to self-identity are ascribed to 
be the enemy.1071 In 1967, however, the challenge was less narratively substantive, 
raising questions if it should be viewed as a policy debate comparable to what one 
finds in more democratic societies (for example surrounding neoconservative 
ideology) or if it was indeed a more substantial ideational threat. Questions also 
remain over the degree of narrative difference that might be found between political 
parties in democratic states and the potential for conflict should these become too 
divergent. Such questions are therefore best examined across a variety of case studies 
and varying power structures. 
  
Building from this overview, one additional point must be examined specifically 
within the context of North Korea: the increasingly problematic relationships between 
legitimacy and narrative maintenance and how it might continue following North 
Korea’s famine from 1994-1998. 
 
2.2 North Korea’s Famine:  
 
One of the largest implications of the famine, outside of the countless lives lost, was 
the breakdown in North Korea’s social order.1072 This could in some respects be 
interpreted as a fateful moment. Demick writes, before the famine “people knew what 
the rules were and which ones not to cross. Now the rules were in play-and life 
became disorderly and frightening.”1073 Conversely, the fact that many elements of 
the state continued to function and many routines and rituals were still followed, 
albeit unenthusiastically, and then largely restored following the famine, raises 
questions over if indeed this should be classified a fateful moment or not. This all 
raises fruitful avenues for further investigation regarding the relationships between 
famine and OS. For the topic at hand, however, it also raises an important question 
regarding to what extent the preexisting DPRK narrative was able to remain intact and 
to what extent it remains a source of comfort for North Koreans post-1998, especially 
since fateful moments often result in re-articulation of narrative. Yook’s comparative 
analysis on North Korea’s two editions of Ryeoksa Sajeon, Dictionary of History, 
from 1971 and 1999-2004, helps shed light on changes that might have occurred. 
                                                
1070 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”, pg. 298 
1071 Huysmans, “Security” 
1072 See for example Demick, Nothing, pg. 57, 67 
1073 Demick, Nothing, pg. 184  
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In the latest edition, Western Europe is no longer vilified, Gorbachev is viewed as 
betraying Pyongyang’s former socialist allies, and Marxism-Leninism is seen as a 
flawed system. However, the U.S., while now talked about in “a sour but somewhat 
restrained tone”, is still seen as the “archetype of imperialism.”1074 It is also seen as 
affiliated with the continuing threat of ilchehwa  (homogeneification), a “new 
reactionary vocabulary which was falsely invented by the United States in order to 
restrict the subjectivity of other nations, eliminate their own nationalities, and thus 
monopolize its world domination.” Thus, while North Korea seems to have responded 
to the new globalized world (focus on world history doubled while Korean history 
decreased), it also sees homogeneification as something that must be overcome. 
Meanwhile both versions “have chronicled how bravely and desperately North 
Korea…has struggled for its own survival throughout the age of bloody civil/cold war 
and the horrible age of Pax Americana (or rather that of homogeneification).” 1075 It 
would appear, therefore, that while some sub narratives have been changed, the 
metanarrative, as a whole, has remained intact.  
 
Sticking to its narrative, the regime has certainty done its best to portray the famine as 
the result of imperialism and efforts – via sanctions – to finally crush the DPRK.1076 
However problems abound.  In surveys conducted by Haggard and Noland (see Table 
4 in Ch. 4), 1.8% of refugee respondents claimed to be leaving for political reasons in 
their 2004-2005 survey; this number rose to 27% in the 2008 survey. The authors also 
note how the collapse of existing social structures allowed for a new ‘social space’ to 
develop in the form of unsanctioned private markets, which provided “a greater space 
for at least a limited forms of political communication.”1077 While the regime appears 
to have “cultivated a core base of supporters in the army, party, and state apparatus”, 
the authors could also “not rule out that mass support for the regime may be much 
weaker” than is frequently believed, though public dissent remains minimal.1078 They 
also note that while earlier refuges were “more willing to entertain the view that the 
country’s problems were due to foreigners”, later waves have increasingly come to 
blame the regime. All of this suggests a decline in the “hold of ideology and the 
regime’s particularly virulent nationalism.”1079  
 
These results, however, need to be qualified. Kyung-Ae Park’s work on refuges has 
found “the primary motivation for leaving their homeland is a desire to survive and 
generally improve their living conditions.” In the 1990s it was survival, more recently 
it has been “economic betterment”, leading some to classify these refugees as more 
“migrating laborers.” The fact that a majority of refuges come from the poorest 
province in North Korea, and the fact that as “of January 2009, about 87 percent of 
the 15,271 refugees had been either unemployed back home or manual laborers” and 
contain only small numbers of the elite or middle class, indicates economic rather 
than political motivation. 1080  This point is further substituted by the apparent 
                                                
1074 Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149 
1075 Ibid, pg. 154, 156 
1076 ““The people of Korea how long suffered from the blockade and sanctions of the US imperialists” opined Rodong Sinmun.” 
Demick, Nothing, pg. 69  
1077 Haggard and Noland, Witness, pg. 111 
1078 Ibid, pg. 110, 106  
1079 Ibid, pg. 103 
1080 Kyung-Ae Park, “People's Exit in North Korea: New Threat to Regime Stability?” APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper 
(2010), pg. 6-7 Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642807 
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correlation between the large portion of refugees that are women and their increasing 
role as the primary bread earners in North Korea.  
 
Levels of political disenchantment are also questionable; a 2008 survey of refugees 
living in Seoul “revealed that about 75 percent of them did not show any negative 
sentiment toward Kim Jong Il’s leadership” while a separate survey showed an 
overwhelming majority of refuges in South Korea did not hope “to become like South 
Koreans when they grow up…many refugees were found to suffer from post 
traumatic stress disorder1081 and some even wanted to return to North Korea or 
resettle elsewhere.”1082 Of the 45 organizations established by North Koreans in the 
South, only 4 were established with the explicit aim of undertaking anti-North Korean 
activity, the rest were social organizations aimed at “promoting a bond amongst North 
Koreans.”1083 Even for those scholars who have found a more negative view of Kim 
Jong Il amongst refuges, there might be some hope for the regime as a whole: 
 
It didn’t take much prodding for people to admit their ambivalence toward Kim Jong-
Il, whom they blamed for the famine. “When Kim Il-sung died, I cried desperately. I 
didn’t know how we could go on living. When Kim Jong-Il died, I cried too, but not 
so much. Our lives are so hard. We are less loyal, honestly”…“He [Kim Jong-un] is 
so young. We think he will open up North Korea. He won’t do politics like the 
others.”1084 
 
As Demick writes, Kim Il Sung, “picked a convenient time to die, one that would 
prevent his legacy from being tarnished…Had he lived a moment longer, North 
Koreans today would not be able to look back with nostalgia at the relative plenty 
they had enjoyed during his lifetime.”1085 To this end, the régime seems to have gone 
through great lengths to mirror Kim Jong Un off his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, rather 
than his father, Kim Jong Il.  Relatedly, Park found a “sentimentality expressed for 
the leadership [amongst refuges] even as they expressed anger with the political 
system.”1086 The regime, it seems, is therefore walking a thin line. On the one side 
there is a great deal of political discontentment and seemingly “zero” true believers 
left in terms of the political system; money, rather than political loyalty, has come to 
play an increasingly important role in North Korean life.1087 At the same time, there 
seems to be a persistent level of embedded nationalist sentiment within the North 
Korean populace.1088 This all brings up the second set of questions.  
 
2. Given the increased focus on narrative maintenance for legitimation, one must ask 
whether North Korea can somehow produce a settlement with the international 
community that simultaneously conforms to DPRK narrative while allowing for an 
easement in domestic woes or if a revised narrative is ultimately required that allows 
for broader change while still embodying this nationalist sentiment and continuing to 
prop up the regime. For example, Barnnet argues that it was Prime Minister “Rabin’s 
                                                
1081 Demick similarly depicts the insecurity and anxiety experienced by many North Korean refuges who have to, for the first 
time, make all sorts of decisions themselves, opening yet another potentially fruitful avenue for examination of OS.  
1082 Park, “People's Exit “, pg. 13, 7 
1083 Ibid, pg. 14 
1084 Demick, Nothing, pg. 287 
1085 Ibid, pg. 115  
1086 Cha, The Impossible, pg. 74 
1087 Demick, Nothing, pg. 296 
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practices and policies – to create, however temporarily, a cultural space in Israeli 
politics…a construction of an Israeli identity [as Zionist and Liberal] and interests 
that were tied to a peace process”, that ultimately allowed for momentum on the Oslo 
Accords.1089 All of this relates to the general question, noted above, regarding whether 
or not domestic challenges to narrative are more or less threatening than external 
ones. Moreover, within North Korea, the lack of free and open discourse and the level 
of focus the regime places on the infallible nature of the Kim dynasty to prop itself 
up, it is questionable if larger deviations from the narrative are conceivable; as 
Yook’s analysis above shows the changes we have seen appear minimal. This could 
in turn mean the real question is if the physical (i.e. hunger, medicine, economic.) 
concerns of the North Korean populace and the security concerns of the international 
community can somehow be solved within the context of existing DPRK narrative. 
To this end, it is important to look at some of the broader implications of North 




North Korean behavior is often typified as being outside the norm. This, however, is a 
fairly shallow interpretation, and it is perhaps more accurate to view DPRK behavior 
as indicative of its distinct narrative, one built out of experiences of humiliation and 
colonization and, perhaps more importantly, the process through which it went on to 
gain independence. This in turn resonates with some of the work being done in 
postcolonial studies, helping to bridge the gulf between the “mountain of intellectual 
work done on the colonial relationship” and IR.1090 
 
While there has been contestation over the term postcolonial, many accept it denotes 
not necessarily the end of colonialism but the implications colonialism had, and still 
has, in the “construction of contemporary relations of power, hierarchy, and 
domination.”1091 Given its strong routes in postmodern and poststructuralist thought, a 
great deal of postcolonial studies has focused on deconstructing knowledge claims. 
Much of this takes from Said’s investigation into how the West (the Occident) created, 
through “academic, philosophical and other cultural expression” a set of accepted 
knowledge wherein the Occident was seen as culturally superior to the backward East 
(the Orient), thereby protecting European imperialism.1092 Consequently, a large 
portion of Chowdhry and Nair’s work integrating postcolonial thought into IR, 
focuses on how “pseudoscientific racist and gendered constructions of the 
other…inscribe the cultural authority and dominance of the West under colonial rule 
and in the postcolonial present”, on how the non-European other was often seen as 
both primitive and “feminized in contrast to a masculinized European identity” and on 
the “relationship between culturalism and materialism.”1093 Importantly, however, the 
fourth section of their work seeks to move beyond this focus on deconstruction to 
examine “material histories…[relating] these histories to questions of resistance and 
agency” and the “significance of colonizing practices, counter-narratives, and 
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struggles, and the marginalized’s “recovery of self”.1094   
 
Such a view stems from what Derby and Paolini label the ‘second movement’ of 
postcolonial studies; “Third World scholars such as Albert Memmi, Octavio 
Mannoni, and especially Frantz Fanon, who utilized Freudian and other 
psychoanalytic perspectives to focus on the colonizer-colonized relationship and 
posited the necessity of resistance and rejection” and the need “to recover precolonial 
culture, language, and identity in a process of resistance to colonization”.1095 These 
works focus on the “recovery of self…[which] often entails political struggle and 
liberation from colonial rule, and the search for, and realization of…an identity that 
has been systematically degraded and denied by the colonizers.” At the same time 
these works have been cautious about nationalism’s “potential hegemony and the 
exclusions that it engenders”, a position taken further by scholars, such as 
Chakrabarty, Guha, and Prakash, focusing on subaltern historiography.1096 
 
It is argued, however, that one should not be too quick to dismiss nationalism. Kim Il 
Sung’s ability to put forward a national narrative, one that resonated with a large 
plethora of the North Korean populace, played a key role in the aftermath of Japanese 
colonization. Of course this was, as noted, only one narrative – albeit a dominant one 
– and it certainly marginalized and, over time, silenced others. And such contestation 
should certainly be noted. However, as has been shown, one must not overlook the 
vital importance national narrative plays in the provision of individuals’ OS. This is 
especially true in the aftermath of colonization,1097 as individuals seek to construct a 
new narrative in which to become embedded. If these narratives, influenced by 
colonial experiences – what Volkan would term a chosen trauma – are focused on 
resistance, this could have profound influence on foreign policy. This might be 
especially true when the process of decolonization was less than positive.  
 
As Jeronimo and Pinto write, the “ends of empire were plural and complex, and the 
imperial endgame was not an inexorable and inevitable process.” They go on to 
comment on the “diverse appropriation of idioms and repertoires of protest and 
resistance, and self-determination.”1098 North Korea is representative of those colonies 
forced to undertake violent resistance or, as in the case of former Soviet states, those 
who gained independence following domestic uprisings in the wake of Gorbachev’s 
perestroika reforms. In these instances, the transition to independence was a less than 
positive experience (for example the British Empire is often viewed as undertaking a 
“serene transfer of power”1099), eliminating the potential for at least a minimal level of 
healing or reconciliation. What is important therefore, aligning with postcolonial 
studies, is “the relations of domination and resistance and the effect they have had on 
identity, in, through, and beyond the colonial encounter.”1100  
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In short, there is a need for IR to take seriously the impact of “colonial violence and 
dispossession”1101 on national narratives, which in turn have a profound relationship 
with foreign policy. Those states that, much like North Korea,1102 hold narratives 
emanating from a negative decolonization experience might in turn be expected to 
have similar behavioral expectations. 1103  This leads to a somewhat revised 
interpretation of resistance than is often found in postcolonial studies, which often 
entails crafting a counter-narrative via postcolonial works.1104 Here, the focus is 
instead on how colonial history impacted national identity and the influence this in 
turn has for contemporary foreign relations; in other words how those states continue 
to ‘resist’ perceived imperialist tendencies in foreign relations. States like North 
Korea, by purposefully resisting Great Power policies and remnants of/reminders of 
the past, are able to empower a distinct identity construct that emerged after 
liberation. It may be then that what we term as abnormal is merely a continuation of 
the “resistance and voices of rejection” of the “marginalized and dominated.” Indeed, 
flaunting international norms imposed by Great Powers may be a means of 
showcasing this resistance, especially given the difficulty faced by the “Third 
World…[in] implementing a new representational regime.”1105 This can also partially 
be seen in North Korea’s call to overcome “homogeneification” – globalization.  
 
3. There is, consequently, an important need for IR to no longer treat imperialism “as 
a “historical category” but to explore its “workings”, consequences, and mechanisms 
by which it declined.”1106 OS could in turn help to showcase the importance of these 
experiences by examining how they have been codified in national narratives and the 
impact this in turn has on state behavior. It also broadens the analytical scope, 
expanding the postcolonial focus on “modernity critically received…[with its] 
disabling effects [presented] as a rationale for Third World doctrines of 
resistance”;1107 it is not just North-South relations or modernity, but the importance of 
how historical events, such as colonization, are represented in national narrative and 
the impact this has on interests and perceptions.  
 
In line with this overview, and given the empirical analysis, a few cursory points can 
be drawn out in regards to literature on conflict resolution.  
 
3. Ontological Security & Conflict Resolution    
 
Theoretical approaches to conflict resolution originally surrounded a classical 
interpretation of conflict, optimized by Peter Wallensteen’s definition, as “a social 
situation, in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same 
moment in time an available set of scarce resources.”1108 Resource-based negotiations 
therefore focused on “maximizing predefined outcomes,” largely derived from realist 
thinking, and left little room for information processing and interactional learning. 
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While allowing for “short-term, material 'fixes [the] underlying conflict causes 
[remain] untouched,”1109 a problem Farneti shows also plagues works building from 
John Rawls focus on “a fair allocation of a limited set of available resources.”1110 
While the introduction of “Interest Based Bargaining” subsequently sought to move 
emphasis towards motivations, Rothman and Olson argue this maintained previously 
“uncritical attitude towards interests,” overlooking ideational variables.1111  
 
The empirical record substantiates critiques of these traditional approaches (Licklider, 
Rothman & Olson), with Herbet Kelman arguing the failure to address “identity 
issues has the effect of further polarizing the [involved] parties.”1112 Since the 1990s, 
Rumeleli notes how  “numerous scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution have 
underscored that identity-based and interest-based concerns are closely intertwined… 
and there is the need to also address the psycho-cultural dynamics of conflict.”1113 
The thesis’ OS framework can advance these works in a number of ways.  
 
For one, it allows for broader applicability than current works by eliminating self-
imposed restrictions to focus on intra-state conflicts given the belief that “identity 
issues [are] not central” to inter-state conflicts. 1114 As the thesis found, this has led to 
misdiagnosed analysis, with DPRK foreign policy best accounted for through the 
prism of national narrative. Secondly, Rumeleli notes that while “social psychological 
approaches to conflict resolution [have] stressed the necessity to reconstruct societal 
beliefs…insufficient attention has been paid to the processes whereby these 
alternative believes are formulated and become ingrained in self narratives and 
practice.”1115 Therefore, she forges a framework wherein OS can hinder conflict 
resolution as groups come to feel anxious about disruptions to established identities of 
Self and Other.  At the same time this can provide the necessitated room for a re-
articulation of Self and Other.  
 
Rumeleli’s framework is an important contribution and represents the first attempt to 
fuse OS and conflict resolution. However it largely builds from Mitzen’s application 
of Mercer and Social Identity Theory to argue states obtain OS through routinized 
relations, and in doing so can possibly become attached to conflict. Such a view was 
critiqued in Chapters 2 and 3; group identity is not founded upon relations with 
another group, but on a reflexively forged group narrative. While these narratives are 
largely the result of previous interactions, they still become the lens for interpreting 
interactions. Of course groups could maintain detrimental relationships if integral to 
self-narrative, in which case Rumelei’s framework would be applicable, as attempts to 
refashion the relationship would pose an ideational threat. This is not a foregone 
conclusion though, but is dependent on the narrative at hand. Consequently, there is a 
need to shift the OS perspective on conflict resolution away from inter-group relations 
and towards the sources of ideational threats the belligerents are responding to.   
 
One possibility comes from the work of Subotic who, as examined in Chapter 3, 
argues that while still coherent entities, narratives contain various layers and “inherent 
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contradictions”1116 that can be activated and deactivated while still maintaining the 
overarching structure. The central motifs of the metanarrative are ‘vague enough’ that 
they can allow for changes in more “specific, derivative narratives” (also Delehanty 
and Steele, Hopf1117), adjusting behavior to mitigate a threat while at the same time 
maintaining perceived continuity. For example, Subotic notes how Serbia, when 
forced to adopt to changing circumstances, finally coped with the unavoidable loss of 
Kosovo (an area central to narrative) by agreeing to terms but refusing to grant 
recognition, thereby preserving Serbia’s metanarrative. Relatedly, Chernobrov has 
noted how OS can also be maintained so long as “evaluative continuity in the 
relationship – a positive self – is preserved.” This helps demonstrate the potential 
space that exists from which to formulate settlements that, by being interpreted as 
supporting a positive conception of the Self (and/or a more acceptable conception of 
the Other1118), could allow for a cessation of hostilities while still upholding OS.1119 
 
When an inter-group relationship is fundamental to self-narrative, inducing an 
environment that the belligerents “intersubjectively interpret as necessitating 
change”1120 might therefore force them to adjust behavior in conjunction with the 
(de)/activation of derivative narratives. When the relationship is not vital to the 
narrative of the belligerents, the goal might then be to seek out a solution that 
resonates with specific derivative narratives, thereby allowing for a resolution that is 
ideationally acceptable.  Thus, when a state aggressively responds to ideational threats, 
it becomes important to formulate policies that allow for the “containment of anxiety 
without securitization”,1121 attempting to find resonance between what flexibility the 
pertinent narrative has (vis-à-vis its range of derivative narratives) and how these 
correlate with the array of possible resolutions at hand.  In both instances, the focus 
shifts towards addressing what prompted the ideational threat, and not on inter-group 
relationships in and of themselves.  
 
Within the context of North Korea, attempts to engage with Pyongyang that only 
focus on inducement/coercion through material incentives are missing a key part of 
the North’s strategic calculus. We must also begin to move away from the commonly 
held notion that “a knowingly false image—an incorrect description—would not hold 
and can be avoided.”1122 In other words, we must recognize that North Korea’s image 
of Others and representations of events, even if divorced from objective knowledge, 
still holds resonance with its population precisely because it conforms with its own 
national narrative. Instead, it is vital to take into account DPRK narrative and how 
this resonates with the proposals at hand.  As noted above, this is further complicated 
by the limited maneuverability the régime has given the extent to which its legitimacy 
is entwined with the existing narrative. Problems will thus arise when there is an 
impasse over ideationally acceptable policies. For example while policy X might be 
ideationally acceptable to Pyongyang, it might be ideationally unacceptable to others.  
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While only a cursory examination, it would appear as though OS could hold 
important insights into conflict resolution by helping policymakers and scholars better 
understand and account for the interests and perceptions of the belligerents. Only once 
such an understanding is attained will progress towards de-escalation be achieved.   
 
4. Final Remarks 
 
IR theory has been witnessing a bourgeoning new subfield of literature surrounding 
the concept of OS. These work have already achieved great strides in reconfiguring 
how scholars conceptualize and employ identity in the field of IR. The aim of this 
thesis was to further clarify how OS might be best applied to interstate relations, 
creating a new analytical framework that could account for gaps in security studies by 
reintegrating foreign policy analysis and unit level factors.  
 
To this end, the thesis examined the concept of OS, the security of being, and 
individuals’ desire for a (perceived) stable self-identity (self-narrative). It then sought 
to integrate complementary works on self-identity, nationalism, and evolutionary 
biology to further establish the historical relationship between individual self-identity 
and one’s community. Not only is self-narrative influenced by one’s community, 
individuals also seek to nest narratives, placing themselves within a larger, seemingly 
more stable, communal narrative. Consequently, individuals have an interest in 
maintaining their community as this provides OS. It was argued this has historically 
been the case for man, dating back to its earliest groups, and is a relationship that 
continues today under nations and nation states. The implications of these findings 
were then expanded on in regards to interstate relations, integrating elements of SRT 
and FPA to clearly establish how OS comes to impact state perceptions and interests.  
 
Because nations are “imagined” individuals have an interest in maintaining communal 
narrative. Policymakers, and thus states, will therefore come to interpret events in 
terms of what they mean for the narrative. An entity or event seen as threatening the 
narrative, generating a personal crisis, will be re-presented as negative, leading to 
corresponding foreign policy postures.  All of this helps to establish how OS can 
account for states perceptions and interests that would otherwise appear seemingly 
irrational to the outside observer/those employing a traditional security study lens. 
This was empirically verified by generating behavioral expectations derived from 
discourse analysis on the DPRK, and placing these expectations against DPRK 
foreign policy and archival records. These findings have raised numerous avenues for 
potentially fruitful investigation, in terms of North Korea empirically and 
theoretically in terms of work on OS, FPA, and conflict resolution.   
 
To conclude, OS is an important new field of study and has already generated 
important new insights for IR, and it is believed the framework provided in the thesis 
will allow scholars to further pursue OS in regards to a range of case studies, (Vichy 
France and government in exile; China’s potential challenge to the Western/U.S. 
global order;1123 Putin’s role in reformulating a post-Soviet identity for Russia), 
generating further breakthroughs in our understanding of interstate (and intrastate) 
relations.    
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